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VOL. IV.



MARQUESS WELLESLEY

from a picture by Sir Thomas Lawrence

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THE

HISTORY

OF

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HISTORY OF INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

Effects of the Treaty of Poonah—Preparation for a Pindarry War—Treachery of the Peishwah—Battle of Kirkee—The Peishwah abandons his Capital—Affairs of Nagpoor—Battle of Seetabuldee—Appa Sahib defeated—Opens a Negotiation—The Arabs resist—They retire into the Citadel, repel an Assault, and capitulate—Appa Sahib is admitted to terms.

One of the first consequences of the treaty of Poonah, as it bore upon the relative situation of the English and of the native powers, displayed itself in a fresh arrangement into which the Presidency of Bombay judged it expedient to enter with the Guickwar. The contingent heretofore furnished by that prince for the defence of Guzerat had proved to be in every respect inadequate. He was now required, in consideration of an exemption from foreign tribute, to increase his available force by a thousand infantry, and two regiments of cavalry. A thorough reform, moreover,

in the constitution of his military establishment, was insisted on, and a new and a better frontier-line, which should leave the respective possessions of the two powers distinct, was required and conceded. These arrangements, as well as the acquisition of all that influence which Bajee Row had hitherto exercised in Hindostan and Bundelcund, proved of essential service in facilitating the projected operations against the Pindarries; of the design of which, as well as of the plan drawn up for its accomplishment, it will be necessary to give a somewhat more detailed account.

It will be borne in mind that, during the autumn of 1816, there arrived from the India House a despatch, in which was conveyed a qualified sanction to Lord Hastings's plan for the eradication of the predatory system from Central India. The views of the court do not, indeed, seem to have extended further than to secure an exception on the part of their own subjects from the evils of that system; but their wishes were so expressed as to leave the Governor General in a great measure free to put upon them almost any construction which might to himself appear advisable. Perhaps no man was ever better qualified to act with decision in a case where much might happen to be left to his own discretion. Lord Hastings had long made up his mind that a Pindarry war must be a war of extermination; that not the English only, but the native powers ought to take part in it; and that the state which should

refuse to join in an undertaking, in the success of which all were equally interested, would deserve to be treated as a public enemy. He considered that the moment had at length arrived when an opportunity of carrying these designs into execution lay within his reach, and he was too prudent to permit it to pass unimproved.

The settlements of the Pindarries lay chiefly in Malwa, and in the valley of the Nerbudda; their points of muster were not unfrequently at the summits of the Ghauts which lead from Malwa into Bundelcund. Lord Hastings resolved to drive them in as it were upon their own centre, by operating against them simultaneously from the sides of Berar, Kandeish, Bundelcund, Allahabad, Agra, Rajpootana, and Guzerat. With this view he put in motion thirty-four thousand regular troops of the army of Bengal, of which five thousand were cavalry, and distributed them into four divisions, with two corps of observation. The first or centre division, commanded, under Lord Hastings in person, by Major-General Browne, was directed to concentrate between Kalpee and Etawa in Allahabad. The second, or right division, under Major-General R. Donkin, took post at Agra; the third, or left division, of which Major-General Marshall was at the head, occupied a position at Calingur, in Bundelcund; while the fourth, or reserve, placed itself, with General Ochterlony, at Rewarre in the province of Delhi. The two corps of observation again were commanded by Brigadiers Hardyman and

Toone; the former in the country south of Merzapoor and Benares, the latter in the remote extremity of Bahar. At the same time a force of not less than fifty-seven thousand men, including five thousand two hundred and fifty-five cavalry, was called into play, under Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, in the provinces south of the Nerbudda. It was distributed into six divisions, including a corps of reserve, and took up the circle at various points where the Bengal forces had permitted it to fail. The first division, for example, under Hislop in person, was directed to move towards Hoshingabad and Hurda on the Nerbudda. The second, under Colonel Doveton, was to manœuvre in Berar, so as to effect the double purpose of supporting the first, and covering the Nizam's territories. The fourth, of which Colonel Smith had charge, communicated in Kandeish, between Doveton on the right, and the Guzerat force on the left; while the third, under Colonel Sir John Malcolm, acted as a sort of advanced guard to General Hislop. The fifth again extended itself along the frontier on the right of the first, and had at its head Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Adams; while the reserve, first under Brigadier Pritzler, eventually led on by General Munro, watched the turn which events might take, from its position on the Toombuddra. It is only necessary to add, that the Guzerat division from Bombay, of which Major-General Sir W. Grant Keir was the commandant,

received orders directly from Sir Thomas Hislop; and that both to the army of the Deccan and to that of the Governor-General, bodies of irregulars were attached, which fell little short, in their aggregate amount, of twenty-four thousand men.

Orders to effect this disposition of the most formidable army that ever took the field in India were issued so early as the month of June, 1817. A variety of accidents combined to hinder the execution of the plan till the middle of November; for the rains were this year unusually protracted; Sir Thomas Hislop was seized with a dangerous distemper; and the movements of one corps depending on the pliability of another, all were kept stationary till they should be alike in a condition to move. Meanwhile a variety of important and deeply interesting political negotiations went forward, to which the representative of the Holkar family, Scindiah, Ameer Khan, the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Oudpoor, and other Rajpoot states, the Bundula chiefs, who were wont to pay tribute to the Peishwah, the young sovereign of Bhopal, and various other princes, were parties. These tended one and all to the same end, namely, to secure, if not the active assistance, at least the passive good will of the several potentates in the impending struggle, as well as to obtain pledges that no shelter would be afforded by them to such fugitive bands as might escape from Malwa into their respective dominions. Not from any quarter,

except one, did the agents of the British government receive any proof of a decided disinclination to accede to their propositions. Scindiah alone held aloof, nor was he forced into a concurrence with the general plan of operations, till after Lord Hastings and General Doveton had, from opposite sides, interposed themselves between him and the Pindarry horde, to which, as it afterwards appeared, he had promised assistance.

We are not going to overload this epitome by detailing at length either the process by which so many rival powers were induced to suspend their mutual hostility, or the difficulties with which the first attempts to accomplish that end were beset. Some, indeed, came in to the proposals of the Governor-General merely because they felt convinced of their inability to resist, while one at least, namely, the young sovereign of Bhopal, rejoiced in the opportunity which such proposals afforded of evincing the sincerity of his regard for the Company's friendship. The prevailing motive was, however, that which is wont to sway most states in their transactions with their neighbours—namely, a prospect, immediate or remote, of bettering their own condition. It proved a principle with Lord Hastings, for example, not to interfere in any respect with existing interests; that is to say, he would listen to no claims set up as of old standing, but avowed his intention of dealing with all his allies in the character which they might

happen to maintain at the moment. Hence to Ameer Khan, among others, was guaranteed the peaceable enjoyment of a sovereignty, to which his sole right was that of successful violence; an acknowledgment which he condescended to accept only after the total destruction of that of the Mahratta powers had left him without a chance of successful resistance. But we are anticipating.

We have said that Lord Hastings issued secret orders for the assembling of the armies of Hindostan and the Deccan, so early as the month of June, 1817. With the preparations thus made, the Pindarries appear to have become immediately acquainted, for they spent the rainy months in anxious efforts to arrange a plan by which the storm that threatened them might be met or averted. Their whole disposable force is said to have amounted at this time to something short of thirty-five thousand men; all of them mounted, some of them well mounted, and not a few respectably armed with spears or matchlocks. But there existed among their principal chiefs, Cheetoo, Kurum Khan, and Wasil Mohummed, a rivalry which even the sense of common danger failed to allay, and their deliberations led in consequence to no results in the slightest degree favourable to the nation. With a single exception, indeed—that of Sheik Dulloo, a brave but less influential leader, who avowed his intention of joining Trimbukjee—they all came to the determination of attempting nothing, under the

fond but somewhat groundless expectation that the Mahrattas would openly declare for them ere the season of active operations should arrive. Thus was Lord Hastings left at leisure to mature his devices in absolute freedom from insult, and the accidents to which we alluded a short time ago proved no otherwise hurtful than that they were vexatious.

The first of the divisions which found itself in a condition to act was that of General Marshall, which composed, as has been seen, the left of the army of Hindostan. Marshall reached his place of assembly so early as the 10th of October, and without waiting for the announcement of any simultaneous movement, began to push upon Sagur, by way of Punna and Hutta. He had reached the latter of these places, when intelligence came in that Wasil Mohummed had passed him to the westward, and was committing terrible depredations in Bundelcund. But this diversion, though well intended, impeded not the progress of the campaign, inasmuch as there remained force enough, with the divisions in the rear, to render every attempt of the kind innocuous. A brigade of cavalry under Major Cumming, detached from Lord Hastings's corps, soon cleared the country of the marauders, after which it took post at Kyta, whence it was enabled at the same time to guard against a repetition of the visit, and to keep open Marshall's communications with the rear.

On the 10th of November, Lord Hastings

joined his columns; and Hislop, now restored to perfect health, established his head-quarters at Hurda. Malcolm, too, was in the valley of the Nerbudda; and the Güzerat corps, made aware that active operations were at hand, closed up to Dohund, for the purpose of taking part in them, when information was received of the occurrence of events at Poonah which caused a temporary change in the dispositions of a portion of the army. Anticipations, which Mr. Elphinstone never ceased to entertain, were shown to have been from the first well grounded. The Peishwah had at length thrown aside the mask, and the war was seen to be, not with the free-booters alone, but with the acknowledged lord of the Mahratta confederacy. How this came about a few words will suffice to explain.

With the treaty of Poonah, forced upon him by an inevitable necessity, the Peishwah was, as might have been anticipated, exceedingly displeased. Not even when in the act of exchanging ratifications did he condescend to disguise the feeling; and his abrupt removal from Poonah immediately afterwards fully confirmed the suspicions which his previous deportment had excited. Under these circumstances, Mr. Elphinstone had ventured to suggest that a watchful eye should be kept upon his proceedings, and that there should be left in the vicinity of the capital a force capable of overawing any movement into which wounded pride or mistaken views of ambition might lead him.

It was proposed, indeed, that Smith's division should not march to the frontier; but Sir John Malcolm, having visited the Peishwah early in August, brought back a report so favourable, that Mr. Elphinstone either was, or seemed to be, shaken in his opinions. The consequence was, that every disposable man, including a large portion of the subsidiary force, was marched to the borders of Malwa, while the presidency was left to the protection of three battalions of sepoys, of a corps of irregulars under Major Ford, and of one wing of the Bombay European regiment, which did not reach Poonah till after hostilities began.

While the British government acted with so much either of rashness or inconsideration, the Peishwah was busily engaged in bringing to a point that confederacy which he had so long and so zealously laboured to effect. He availed himself likewise of certain engagements into which the English had entered, to demand from them at this particular juncture the employment in his service of a portion of the corps which had assembled under General Pritzler on the Toombuddra. There was a case of disputed succession in Soondoor, one of the principalities in the southern Mahratta country, which owed allegiance to the Peishwah; and the English having undertaken to settle it, he now called upon them to fulfil their pledge. They could not, with any show of justice, refuse to do so; and Colonel Munro was, in consequence,

directed to march against the fortress in which the claimant opposed to his highness's views held his court. But this, though it served partially to embarrass the general plan, by placing a weak corps in a situation altogether isolated, was not the only expedient which the Peishwah adopted with a view to harass his hated allies. He returned to the capital in the end of September, and began immediately to prepare for that blow which he had some weeks previously desired to strike, but from striking which his fears continued to restrain him.

We have said, that during an interview which he obtained with the Peishwah in the month of August, Sir John Malcolm received of his designs an impression so favourable, that Smith's division, which had hitherto lingered in the vicinity of Poonah, was immediately pushed to the front. Another, and, under existing circumstances, a not less unfavourable result attended this conference. The forts which he had given up to the English as a security for the performance of his engagements were restored to the Peishwah, and he received every encouragement to continue with assiduity the enlistment of soldiers for his army. Ample use was made of this display of confidence. His arsenals were everywhere replenished, recruits were gathered from all quarters, orders were issued to equip and prepare a fleet for sea, and the garrisons of all his castles, redoubts, and strongholds were rein-

forced. At the same time measures were adopted to conciliate the chiefs and jaghiredars whom recent events had tended somewhat to alienate; while his agents became every day more and more busy at Nagpoor, and in the camps of Scindiah, Holkar, and Ameer Khan. But that upon which he mainly relied, was the facility which he believed that he possessed of corrupting the troops composing the resident's escort. A considerable proportion of these were by lineage Mahrattas. Major Ford's battalions, indeed, consisted almost exclusively of natives of the Peishwah's provinces; and there were not wanting persons attached to the court whose craft or vanity induced them to assert that even the European officers themselves might be bought over. Thus, by a happy combination of treachery and violence, he hoped to accomplish the great end of his wishes—namely, the total emancipation of Poonah from a foreign yoke, and the re-establishment of a Mahratta empire in the heart of India.

There were two parties at this time in the Peishwah's durbar, of which the designs were as opposite as the temperaments of their leaders were distinct. Cassee Rao Gokla, a high-spirited and warlike Brahmin, who had served with distinction in the campaign of 1803, was at the head of one, which ceased not to advocate the possible restoration of the sovereignty to the splendour which it enjoyed in the days of Sivagee. Gokla and his friends were zealously opposed by Moroo Duckshut, likewise a Brah-

min, but a civil officer, who, well aware of the Peishwah's weakness, when contrasted with the overwhelming strength of the English, deprecated, above all things, a rupture with that power. It is extremely probable that the Peishwah, a weak and timid man, would have given his confidence to Duckshut in preference to Gokla, had there not existed between Duckshut and Trimbukjee an irreconcilable feud, of which the origin was to be found in the steady opposition offered by the Brahmin to the political elevation of the spy and parasite. That circumstance, however, weighed more with the infatuated prince than all the arguments of either party; and obeying an impulse rather of personal pique than of reason, he gave himself up without reserve into Gokla's hands. No time was lost by that active warrior in assembling a large army around Poonah. The neighbouring jaghiredars were invited to bring in their followers; the principal officers in Concan, and in the other districts ceded by the treaty of Poonah, were instructed to reoccupy their old positions; and finally, orders were issued to concentrate between the Toombuddra and the Kistna a corps of horse and foot for the invasion of the Company's provinces.

Of these startling movements Mr. Elphinstone was no unobservant spectator. He remonstrated against them; but his complaints were met by reiterated assurances that the sole motive which actuated the Peishwah in all his preparations was a desire to contribute, by

every means in his power, to the extirpation of the Pindarries, and the establishment of permanent peace in central India. Meanwhile, fresh bodies of troops arrived day after day, till, towards the end of October, the Poonah brigade found itself straitened in its lines. The Mahrattas closed in upon them without delicacy, and their horsemen rode through the camp, covering the sepoys with personal abuse, and otherwise giving proof of hostile intentions. It was impossible any longer to doubt that a rupture was at hand; and there remained to Mr. Elphinstone no other alternative than that of preparing to meet the storm under circumstances as little unfavourable as could be.

The city of Poonah is situated upon the right bank of the Moota-Moola river, which, running from east to west, takes its name from two streams which unite to the north-west of the town. At the point of confluence, and between these two streams, the British residency was built, being separated from the city by the Moota, while the Moola swept round it on the farther side from the north. Immediately opposite to the residency, the Moola was fordable. It was likewise crossed by a bridge about a mile farther up, beyond which, again, the river made a semicircular bend northward; and there stood at the western extremity of that bend a village called Kirkee, of which, in a military point of view, the position was highly important. A body of troops having their left in that village would be secured both on the

right and in the rear by the curvature of the Moola, while the extent of front exposed was not greater than might be effectually filled up by a brigade of three thousand infantry, with their guns. Now it so happened that up to the present moment the Poonah corps had never occupied this alignment. It lay, on the contrary, between the residency and the town, in a situation well adapted, no doubt, for the protection of the latter, but perfectly useless in the event of any hostile movements being made, as well from within as from without the city. Mr. Elphinstone, having consulted with Colonel Burr, the commandant, determined to withdraw the brigade to the position of Kirkee; and the evolution being performed without obstruction, the residency became a sort of outpost to what might be considered as an intrenched camp.

The retrogression of the brigade, and a simultaneous movement on the part of Major Ford's irregulars, brought matters to a crisis. Nothing was now talked of except war; indeed, Moroo Duckshut, who had contracted a sincere friendship for Ford, went so far as to warn him, that his people were universally bribed, and that it was high time to attend to his own safety. Not long afterwards a British officer, while journeying to Bombay, was attacked, wounded, and robbed, within two miles of the city; and the very sentinels at the gates of the residency became exposed to insult while standing with arms in their hands. Mr. Elphinstone, though he looked forward to but

one result, was extremely averse to make, even indirectly, the first hostile movement: he, therefore, contented himself with reinforcing his body-guard, and enjoining upon both officers and men increased vigilance. But that which he shunned to precipitate, events over which he had no control soon brought about. General Smith, having failed to receive daily advices from Poonah, came to the conclusion that all was not right, and directed a light battalion, with a thousand auxiliary horse, to hasten back from his camp, on the borders of Kandeish, in order to re-open the communications. It was now that Gokla, who, to do him justice, had from the first preferred open violence to treachery, urged upon his master the necessity of striking a blow; and the Mahratta army began to move, as if with the design of interposing themselves between the residency and the camp. With great judgment, Mr. Elphinstone and his family sprang into the saddle; they forded the river under cover of the escort, which sustained a trifling skirmish while passing, and reached Kirkee, not without having incurred considerable hazard from the fire of the Peishwah's troops who lined the opposite bank.

It was now the 5th of November, and the Madras European battalion, being warned in good time, had, by forced marches of great length, gained their position. The little army, though in point of numbers still very inconsiderable, was thus in its organization com-

plete; for there were present with the sepoys a sufficient number of Europeans to animate by their example and to create confidence. Mr. Elphinstone had early resolved to act, whenever the fitting moment should arrive, on the offensive; and he now, while attending to his own personal safety, sent forward to desire that Colonel Burr would advance in order of battle. In like manner, Major Ford, who, with his irregulars, had taken post to the westward, was commanded to close up; and both officers, after providing for the defence of their respective camps, made ready to obey their instructions. Nevertheless, the persons attached to the residency had, as yet, enjoyed no opportunity of ascertaining either the numbers or the consistency of the force by which they were threatened. There intervened between them and the plain a range of heights, which shut out all means of observing the enemy's movements, except so far as these might be calculated from the march of the detachment, which had endeavoured to gain the rear of the residency and the command of the ford. Now, however, while approaching the camp, it became necessary to ascend an eminence, where the eye was enabled to range over a wide extent of country. A more imposing spectacle has rarely burst upon the vision either of a soldier or a civilian. The whole of the level was covered by clouds of cavalry, to reinforce which endless streams of horsemen were pouring from the city, while the

high grounds beyond were occupied by dense masses of foot, with here and there a battery of heavy cannon. The following is Captain Grant Duff's spirited description of a scene, of which he was himself no indifferent spectator.

"Those only," says he, "who have witnessed 'the bore' in the Gulf of Cambay, and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at sight of the Peishwah's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day; there was a dead calm, and no sound was heard except the rushing, the trampling, and the neighing of the horses, and the rumbling of the gun-wheels. The effect was heightened by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes, startled from sleep, bounding off, and then turning for a moment to gaze on this tremendous inundation, which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn, and completely overwhelmed every ordinary barrier as it moved." This is a splendid description; but highly as the writer's feelings might have been excited, there was that in rapid progress which could not fail to give to them a graver tone. Already was the British brigade under arms, and advancing in a sort of echellon, so as to facilitate the junction of Ford's corps, while the light troops thrown out soon came into contact with the enemy, and a desultory fire of musketry began.

The forward movement of the British brigade excited great surprise among the Mahrattas, who, attributing to fear the recent occupation of Kirkee, had been led to anticipate an easy triumph. The Peishwah, in particular, irresolute at all times, became grievously alarmed, and despatched a messenger to Gokla with positive orders that he should not, under any circumstances, fire the first cannon. But Gokla, conscious that the moment for hesitation was past, took no further notice of the emissary than to desire a battery of nine guns to open ere he could deliver himself of his commission. This decisive step he followed up by detaching a body of camel-rockets to harass the English left, and by launching against both flanks a swarm of his best cavalry: in five minutes the brigade was enveloped on every side, and the battle raged from one extremity of the plain to the other.

Had the charge been delayed, so as to permit a simultaneous advance of the Mahratta infantry, the contest, though doubtless not less certain in its issue, must have proved much more trying than it did. As it was, the horse, being received with a close and destructive fire, drew off, and galloped wildly round the flanks, without attempting to break in upon a line where every man held his station with remarkable steadiness. In like manner, a bold attack from a single regular battalion, led on by a Portuguese, named Da Pinto, was met and repulsed by the seventh

regiment of native infantry; which, however, in its eagerness to follow up the blow, fell into confusion, and was instantly assailed by a fresh body of horse. But the sepoys, roused by the voice of their old leader, Colonel Burr, rallied at the edge of a deep slough, into which the enemy plunged with reckless haste, under a heavy fire of musketry. Man and horse came rolling to the ground, and Moroo Duckshut, himself slain by a grape-shot, gave proof that his opposition to the war had not originated in any undue regard to his own personal safety. Once more the Mahrattas recoiled, and the line continuing to push forward, while the guns kept up a well-directed fire, no further attempts were made to close in upon the standards. Gokla, on the contrary, drew off to his original position, and the field of battle was left in possession of the English.

There were engaged in this affair, on the side of the Peishwah, eighteen thousand horse, and eight thousand foot, supported by fourteen guns: the total number of British troops brought into action, including Major Ford's battalion, which came up soon after the cannonade began, did not exceed two thousand eight hundred men. The British loss amounted in all to eighty-six men killed and wounded, of whom fifty belonged to the seventh regiment on the left of the line. Of Mahrattas, about five hundred were slain, besides many wounded, of whom by far the greater proportion were in a condition to be removed to the

rear. It appeared too that in the expectations which he had been led to form, as to the willingness of the sepoys to desert, the Peishwah grossly deceived himself; inasmuch as, with the exception of a few of the Mahrattas belonging to Ford's battalion, and a portion of the auxiliary horse, which joined next day, not a man quitted his colours. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the deepest dejection immediately seized upon Bajee Rao, mixed up, indeed, as not unfrequently occurs, with deadly rancour; and hence that, in defiance of a firm impression that his cause was desperate, he began to act as if the hope even of forgiveness had departed from him. He caused the territory to be plundered and burned, and the grossest cruelties to be inflicted on the unfortunate stragglers, male and female, whom he found there. Equally vindictive were his proceedings towards certain British officers, who, in ignorance of an impending rupture, chanced to be employed in executing surveys, or in passing from point to point through his dominions. These were all seized, some of them hanged from the boughs of trees by the road-side, and others committed to close custody in one of the castles in the Concan. But such acts, however conclusive they might be of the hatred which he experienced towards the name of an Englishman, availed nothing to keep alive the courage of his followers, or to satisfy his own mind touching the final results of the contest. His

army had fallen back on the night of the 5th, beyond the Moota-Moola, with the intention of renewing the battle on the following day. But the reinforcement which General Smith had sent forward, arriving at Kirkee in the interval, even Gokla ceased to urge the measure, and all idea of it was abandoned.

From this date up to the 13th the two armies continued to face one another, the English being content to hold their ground till the supplies of which they were assured should arrive, while the Mahrattas desired, yet were afraid, to anticipate an event to which they could not look forward except with the deepest apprehension. At last General Smith, who had followed his detachment from Sooroor, reached Kirkee, and immediate preparations were made to assume the offensive. But the Peishwah, though strengthened by the junction of several of the southern jaghiredars, did not conceive that he was strong enough to abide the shock, and opposed the passage of the river, which a brigade under Colonel Milnes effected on the 16th, only by a distant and not very fatal cannonade. The consequence was that General Smith, when he advanced next day for the purpose of bringing on a battle, found that the camp, of which the tents were in part standing, was deserted; and that the Peishwah, after abandoning his capital and all his wounded to their fate, was in full retreat towards Satara. The city was occupied without delay, the communications with

Bombay were restored, and eighteen of the enemy's guns, with a considerable portion of his baggage, were overtaken and captured at Singhur; after which General Smith, who was joined on the 18th by a regiment of Madras cavalry, made arrangements to prosecute an active pursuit of the fugitive Peishwah.

Meanwhile the affairs of Nagpoor were conducted after a fashion which left little ground of doubt in the mind of the resident, that the devotion of Appa Sahib to the interests of his European patrons, was not more to be depended upon than that of Mahrattas in general. He had early listened with a ready ear to the suggestions of Bajee Rao, and but for the occurrence of the Poonah treaty, would have doubtless given in long ago a formal adhesion to the league. But though that event sufficed to induce caution in his proceedings, it had not the effect of withdrawing his attention from a subject which, from the hour that he became firmly seated on the musnud, seems to have occupied a large share of his thoughts. This was fully evinced by the avidity with which he welcomed back the Peishwah's agents, as soon as they began to renew their intrigues; while his prompt acceptance of a robe of honour, conveyed to him subsequently to the rupture at Poonah, constituted a feature in the case which was not to be misunderstood. Like his fellow functionary Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Jenkins was at this time very slenderly guarded; his whole

force consisting of two weak battalions of native infantry, three troops of cavalry and six guns. Nevertheless he determined to stand on the defensive; and having concentrated the brigade, took up a position beside the residency, where he prepared to meet the attack with which it was evident that he would shortly be threatened.

The Nagpoor residency lay to the west of the city, from which it was separated by a ridge of elevated ground, the extremities of which are terminated by two hills at the distance of about three hundred and thirty yards from one another. Of these, called the Seëta-buldee hills, that towards the north was the more lofty; that towards the south less elevated, but of a surface considerably more extended. They were both occupied in force, the former being held by three hundred infantry and a six-pounder, the latter by an entire battalion, a portion of another, and the remainder of the guns. Light troops in extended order kept open the communication between the extreme points; the cavalry drew up in the ground contiguous to the residency, and the women and baggage were placed for shelter under a slight escort in the mansion itself. Such was the order which, on the 25th of November, a display of growing hostility induced Mr. Jenkins to assume; and on the 26th the assembling of large bodies of horse in his front, the coming in of numerous cannon, and the

ostentatious parade of a powerful Arab infantry, gave proof that he had not begun too soon to provide against surprise.

Notwithstanding this display of evil intentions, the day passed over in quiet, and at sunset the piquets were as usual paraded for the purpose of relieving those on duty. A few hours earlier the Arabs had thrown themselves into a bazaar, which the native merchants had established along the base of the narrower hill. They now opened a fusillade upon the British guards; and their cannon, of which several pieces were mounted so as to command that angle of the position, began to fire also. Immediately the alarm was taken. The six-pounder, which stood ready loaded, was discharged; the troops formed along the ascent; and a smart firing was kept up till about two o'clock in the morning. It proved eminently disastrous to the English, who, besides that they suffered severely by an incessant tiraillade to which their exposed situation on the ascent of the hill laid them bare, were more than once assaulted with a hardihood and daring which they found it an exceedingly difficult matter to check.

As soon as the enemy had ceased to annoy them, the gallant defenders of the hill began, as well as their scanty means would allow, to fortify their position. They were sadly cramped in entrenching tools, and the soil was light and rocky; yet they contrived, by piling sacks of flour and wheat one above another, to surround the summit with an imperfect breast-

work. Behind this they awaited the renewed attack to which they were well aware that the dawn would expose them; and they prepared themselves to meet it, by devoting the intermediate space of time, not to repose, but to the fabrication of cartridges. They were nowise deceived in their anticipations. The return of light showed them the enemy's batteries increased by the addition of many heavy guns; and the opening of their fire served as a signal of attack to several dense masses, which rushed from behind the sutlers' booths. A fierce and obstinate struggle ensued, during which the assailants were more than once repulsed; till a screw becoming loose in the six-pounder, it ceased for a few moments to be serviceable, and the Arabs, despite of a murderous discharge of musketry, crowned the height.

Elated by this success, the Arabs not only turned the six-pounder upon the lower hill, but running up several of their own pieces, opened a fire which produced dreadful havoc in the ranks of the corps which sustained it. At the same time the ridge which connects the one height with the other was seized, and a heavy column advanced, as if for the purpose of carrying by assault the last defensible spot which remained to Mr. Jenkins and his followers: for of the out-houses attached to the residency, almost all were already occupied, and the shrieks of the women and camp-followers, distinctly heard over the tumult of the

battle, made the sepoys aware of the uses to which success was turned by their barbarous enemies. A feeling almost of despondency began, in consequence, to arise among them, when suddenly the three troops of cavalry, which had hitherto remained inactive within the enclosures, were seen to rush, sword in hand, upon a cloud of Nagpoor horse and disperse them. Not content with this, the gallant band rode fiercely toward a battery, cut down the artillery-men, made themselves masters of the guns, and then swept the plain far and near of the hosts which covered it. In a moment, the infantry, who beheld the exploit, recovered their confidence. The Arab column was shattered by a close and well-directed volley; the troops advanced upon them while wavering, charged and drove them back to the upper hill, the explosion of a tumbril on the brow of which presented an opportunity of attack which was not permitted to pass unimproved. With fixed bayonets and loud shouts the sepoys rushed up the slope, and in ten minutes were again masters of the whole position, as well as of two of the enemy's pieces and their own abandoned six-pounder.

Brilliant as these successes were, they would have been productive of no decisive results, had the officers in command contented themselves with merely retaining what they had so bravely won. The Arabs, though repulsed, were not yet defeated; indeed they retired no farther than the bazaar, within the streets and

lanes of which they began again to rally as if for the purpose of renewing the contest. But before they could mature their dispositions, the cavalry broke in, cut down multitudes, and secured a couple of guns, while the infantry, pouring from their vantage ground, drove them from hamlet to hamlet, and completed the route which their mounted comrades had begun. All order and confidence were now lost. The enemy fled in confusion, leaving the ground covered with dead and dying, and by far the greater proportion of his park in the hands of the victors.

Thus ended, after a contest of eighteen hours' duration, the battle of Seetabuldee, than which there will not be found in the annals of British India an action more obstinate or more glorious in its issue. On the side of the English there were engaged about fifteen hundred men, including European officers, artillery-men, and troopers: of the enemy ten thousand horse, with an equal number of foot, among whom were included between three and four thousand disciplined Arabs. The loss of the assailants has never been accurately stated, but it is represented by those who beheld the fields covered with their slain to have been enormous; that of the defenders amounted to a full fifth of their whole numbers, and comprised, among others, four European officers killed, and seven severely wounded. But deeply as these casualties might be deplored, the victory of which they were the price was, when its consequences,

both immediate and remote, are considered, very cheaply purchased. Had the British brigade been destroyed, a flame would have been kindled throughout India which it might have cost oceans of blood to extinguish; whereas the rout of the Bhoonslah's best army, by an inconsiderable detachment of sepoys, convinced both him and his correspondents, that their strength, when opposed to the discipline and valour of the Company's troops, was absolute weakness. Appa Sahib began immediately to repent of the step which he had taken, and hoping, in some degree, to atone for it by a prompt submission, sent in, on the 27th, to implore the resident's clemency. But Mr. Jenkins refused to treat further than by granting to him an armistice of two days' duration; ere the close of which he knew that strong reinforcements would reach his camp, and that he would be in a condition to dictate whatever terms might to himself appear desirable.

In the expectations which he had formed of receiving immediate support, Mr. Jenkins was not disappointed. Both the Governor-General and Sir Thomas Hislop, having been warned of the Rajah's hostile intentions, had instructed the corps nearest at hand to hold themselves in readiness for a march upon Nagpoor; and of these one, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, came in, so early as the 29th, from the valley of the Nerbudda. It comprised two battalions of infantry, three troops of cavalry, and a couple of

galloper guns, and served effectually to remove whatever of alarm might yet prevail within the lines of the gallant brigade which had already sustained so unequal a combat. The 5th and 12th of December likewise brought in supplies, as well as Brigadier-General Doveton, to assume the command of what was now a formidable army; while Brigadier-General Hardyman led in all haste his corps of observation towards the point of danger. Mr. Jenkins now felt that he was in a condition to dictate his own terms, and in the event of their rejection to push the war to extremity. He, therefore, voluntarily reopened with Appa Sahib a negociation, into which, under different circumstances, he had appeared shy of entering.

The terms proposed to the Rajah were such as the relative situations of the contracting parties may be supposed to have dictated. He was required to surrender all his artillery, to dismiss his Arabs and other mercenary troops, and to acknowledge his absolute dependence for whatever might be granted to him on the bounty of the English; and, above all, he was told that, unless he gave himself up as a hostage for the faithful execution of the treaty before four o'clock on the morning of the 16th, hostilities would immediately recommence. Appa Sahib accepted the hard conditions, but hesitated, after he had done so, in fulfilling them. His hour of surrender was postponed to seven, and then to nine; but nine o'clock expired, and he came not, neither was his arrival anti-

cipated. General Doveton, indeed, was informed that the commanders of the Arab battalions refused to sanction the measure, and that the Rajah was entirely in their hands; upon which he caused his line to get under arms, and advanced upon Nagpoor. Now then, at last, a sense of personal danger overcame Appa Sahib, who escaped from his chiefs, and rode at full speed to the residency; but his presence there, however satisfactory it might be to Mr. Jenkins, retarded not the progress of the troops for a moment. They pushed on, took possession of the arsenal with all its stores, and advanced in order of battle against the Arabs, who stood ready to meet them. A sharp, but not very protracted affair ensued, which ended in the total defeat of the enemy, with the loss of seventy-five pieces of cannon, forty elephants, and the whole of their camp-equipage and baggage.

Though driven from the field, the Arabs were so far from being subdued, that both they and the leaders seemed to gather courage from despair; they retreated into the citadel, and rejected every offer which was made with the view of inducing them to evacuate the place. It was immediately invested and battered; but the artillery fire producing little effect, an attempt was made to carry one of the gates by assault. The Arabs repulsed the attack, killing and wounding about two hundred and fifty of the storming party, and General Doveton was reluctantly compelled to con-

vert the siege into a blockade, till a battering train, for which he sent, should arrive, and enable him to carry on his approaches with more of science as well as of vigour. The Arabs, however, feeling that they had done enough for their own honour, proposed to capitulate. They were at once admitted to terms; and with their families, arms, baggage, and a high renown, were escorted beyond the frontiers of Nagpoor.

The fall of the citadel and the departure of the Rajah's best troops appearing to lay the strength of the principality entirely at his feet, Mr. Jenkins proceeded to negotiate with Appa Sahib the conditions on which he should be again admitted to the benefit of an English alliance. Unaware that Lord Hastings had determined on an absolute change of dynasty, the resident directed his attention to the adjustment of such a treaty as should reduce the head of the Bhoonslah's state to the rank of a mere pageant, by giving to the British government a complete control over every branch, both of internal and external administration. With this view he required that all the forts in Nagpoor should be garrisoned, at the option of the Governor-General, by British troops; and that a new fortress should be erected in the Seetabuldee hills for the purpose of overawing the capital. The cession of several important districts north of the Nerbudda was likewise demanded; and it was explicitly stipulated that no individual should be admitted into the

Rajah's councils, unless first of all approved by the representative of the British government.

Degrading as these terms were, Appah Saheb at once accepted them, and the arrangements were, to a certain degree, complete, when Lord Hastings's final instructions arrived. But to these it was now too late to pay obedience. Mr. Jenkins stated his case fairly, which obtained additional consideration in consequence of the helpless condition of the youth whom it had been proposed to set up as Rajah; and Lord Hastings, convinced that he had acted with sound judgment throughout, gave his sanction to the arrangements by ratifying the treaty when submitted to him for approval.

CHAPTER II.

Operations against the Pindarries—Scindiah overawed—The Cholera—Affairs of Holkar—He espouses the cause of the Peishwah—Battle of Mohudpoor—Holkar's submission—Operations against the Peishwah—His rapid movements—Gallant action at Koreigaum—The Peishwah marches south—General Munro's successes—General Pritzler—Satara taken—Peishwah doubles back—Reorganization of the pursuing Forces—Affair of Cavalry, and Death of Gokla—The Chiefs submit—Desperate state of the Peishwah's affairs.

All this while the divisions to which the extirpation of the Pindarries had been immediately committed were prosecuting their toilsome, though not very hazardous campaign, with great vigour. The well-concerted movements of Generals Malcolm, Adams, and Marshall had the effect, towards the close of November, of expelling the freebooters from Malwa, and reducing their leaders to the necessity of seeking elsewhere that shelter which their own settlements could no longer afford. Two of these, by name Kureen Khan and Wasil Mohammed, retreated northward by Nya-Seraee towards Gwalior, while a third, Cheetoo, moved off in a westerly direction, partly with the hope of finding support among Holkar's troublesome

soldiery, partly for the purpose of seeking out Rao Bao, one of Scindiah's commanders, who stood pledged to afford protection to himself, and a place of permanent shelter to his family.

For some time previous to these occurrences, indeed ever since the Peishwah began to exhibit symptoms of disaffection, the bearing of Holkar's troops had been the reverse of friendly; and the route now taken by two out of the three Pindarrie leaders seemed to imply that those of Scindiah were not more to be depended upon. To Ameer Khan likewise it was impossible to look except with suspicion, while the rumoured assembling of an army of Goorkas, and their frequent and confidential correspondence with the natives of Hindostan, told a tale of fresh difficulties, if not of impending war. It is true that the victory of Nagpoor put an immediate end to the misgivings of Ameer Khan; and that he accepted with thankfulness the independence which was offered to him, even though purchased at the price of an English alliance: but in other quarters clouds continued to collect, which no man could behold with indifference, and which, with the timid or the wavering, might have led to a total change of system. Not for one moment, however, was Lord Hastings diverted from the execution of a plan, which he had formed, after the most mature consideration both of its hazards and its advantages. Having taken into account almost all the contingencies to which a general com-

bination among the native powers could give rise, he pursued his own course steadily and without faltering, even when, in the judgment of others, his doing so was pregnant with peril, if not to the permanent security, at all events to the temporary interests of the British provinces.

Allusion was made some time ago to the promptitude and address with which, at the opening of the Pindarrie campaign, the hostile designs of Scindiah were ascertained and prevented. How this was effected, Lord Hastings has himself informed us in a dispatch, from which the following is an extract:—"About twenty miles south of Gwalior, a ridge of very abrupt hills, covered with the tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the little Scind to the Chumbul, which rivers form the flank boundaries of the Gwalior district and its dependencies. There are but two routes by which carriages, perhaps cavalry, can pass that chain, one along the little Scind, and another not far from the Chumbul. By my seizing, with the centre, a position which would bar any movements along the little Scind, and placing Major General Donkin's division at the back of the other pass, Scindiah was reduced to the dilemma of subscribing the treaty which I offered him, or of crossing the hills through bye-paths, attended by a few followers who might be able to accompany him, sacrificing his splendid train of artillery (above one hundred guns) with all its appendages, and abandoning at once to us

his most valuable possessions."—Such was the position of affairs in the month of November, at which period it will be borne in mind that Scindiah, though with undisguised reluctance, seceded from the Mahratta cause, and subscribed the treaty proposed. But the fortune of war soon drew off General Donkin to other points in the arena, while events, much more afflicting, led immediately afterwards to a change of position on the part of Lord Hastings's division.—That terrible disease the cholera, of which the origin and cause are alike unknown, suddenly broke out in the camp, and both soldiers and settlers died by hundreds daily. Appearing first in the Delta of the Ganges, about the commencement of the rainy season in 1817, it had spread up the courses of the rivers, and now fell with indescribable fury upon that portion of the grand army which lay along the banks of the Scind. It was but natural that the medical men, to whom the symptoms of the malady were new, should attribute its great virulence to the moisture of the atmosphere; and Lord Hastings, convinced by their reasoning, fell back to Erich, where, without doubt, casualties occurred much less frequently. But a measure, which a regard to the health of his own troops had dictated, offered facilities to Scindiah, which he knew not how to reject. A correspondence was re-opened with the Pindarries, and the two Durahs, or bands, of which Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahommed were at the head, began, in consequence, that

march upon Gwalior to which we have just alluded.

The sick were still very numerous, and the panic far from subdued in the camp, when information of the Pindarrie movement reached Lord Hastings. He lost no time in directing certain detachments, which kept open the communications between his own division and that of General Marshall at Serouj, to close round the enemy, while he himself moved again to the Scind, so as to threaten Gwalior. He caused General Marshall to push for Nya Seraee, and Colonel Adams upon Googal Chupore on the Perbuttee. Scindiah became alarmed, and the Pindarries, alike unable to proceed and to retire, halted irresolute among the jungles of Shahabad. By-and-by the corps of Donkin and Ochterlony advanced along the fords of the Chumbul and the valleys of Jypore, while Lahore Sing, rajah of Kota, placing a detachment at the head of the Lodwana Ghaut, blocked up the last avenue through which it appeared practicable for the freebooters to escape. Now then at last their destruction seemed inevitable, for the country into which they were driven was barren, and the means of egress wanting, nor did the result greatly disappoint those by whom this expectation was formed.

After suffering a surprise, in which his wife fell into the hands of the English, and the tents and baggage of his followers were plundered or burnt, Kureem Khan formed a junction with

Wasil Mahommed, when it was determined to dismiss all their adherents except four thousand choice horsemen, and with them to make a dash at the Lodwana Ghaut. The attack succeeded chiefly through the misconduct of Zalim Sing's troops; and the freebooters being again in a condition to shape their course whithersoever they chose, marched with all haste into Mewar. Harassed by a close and steady pursuit, they sustained repeated disasters, for they would not venture to face a detachment of troops, however numerically feeble; and the very villagers among whom they passed fell upon the stragglers and put them to death without mercy. With respect, again, to those whom the chiefs had cast, as it were, from them, they perished to a man; and a power, which a few months previously would have excited dismay throughout central India, was now dwindled down to a mere handful of fugitives.

Meanwhile the march of Chetoo, of which the design was not long kept secret, led to operations still more decisive and far more brilliant.

We have said that for some time previously the bearing of Holkar's troops was not such as to impress the mind of Lord Hastings with any confidence in their friendly disposition. By the former regency, indeed, (Toolsee Baee was guardian to the young Mulhar Rao,) his Lordship's propositions were received with every mark of respect; she not only professed her willingness to enter into engagements similar to those which had been contracted with Scindiah, but to place herself and the infant Raja

under the protection of the British government. It would appear, too, that of the sincerity of these offers no doubt was entertained, inasmuch as, without some such support, it was very evident that she must continue to be, what she had long been, a mere puppet in the hands of Ameer Khan, and of the sirdars, or military commanders. But before any advantage could be taken of the proposal, the rupture with the Peishwah occurred; and it became apparent that all power was vested, not in her hands, but in theirs. A cry was raised that it behoved the several branches of the Mahratta nation to support their acknowledged head; and the army, carrying the young prince and his guardian along with them, began their march towards Poonah. They had proceeded as far as Mehudpoor, with the intention of crossing the Nerbudda by the ford of Choorie Muheshwur, when Chetoo, the third of the Pindarrie leaders, met them. His reception was of the most flattering nature. His followers were permitted to encamp close to Holkar's lines, he was himself admitted to the honour of an audience, and ample assurances of support were given him. In a word, the expectations which he had been led to form were more than realized.

Things were in this state when Sir John Malcolm, who had directed his attention throughout to the movements of Chetoo's band, arrived, after a pursuit of eight days' continuance, at Agur. As he brought with him only a single regiment of horse, a couple of light battalions, and as many galloper-guns, however

adequate he might be to deal with Pindarries alone, he was in no condition to risk a battle with Holkar's disciplined army. He, therefore, halted within a few hours' march of the encampment, and hoping to gain by address what he was in no condition to effect by violence, immediately opened a negociation with the Regent and the principal sirdars. But the temper of the Patan leaders was altogether averse to any such arrangement as General Malcolm would offer. Both they and their followers had been promised the payment of all arrears as soon as they should reach Indore, besides a still larger donation from the coffers of Bajee Rao, whenever the Nerbudda should be crossed; and the prospect of immediate remuneration possessed many more attractions in their eyes than a vague assurance of kind treatment by the English. Sir John, therefore, became convinced that nothing was to be gained by diplomacy, and fell back, with great judgment, as far as Ougein, where, in the month of December, he formed a junction with the first division under the immediate command of Sir Thomas Hislop.

A variety of circumstances, very little approved at the moment, had combined to bring at this juncture the Commander-in-chief of the Deccan army to a point, where, of all others, his presence was the most needed. Alarmed by the repeated defection of the Peishwah, he ventured, on his own responsibility, to abandon the line of operations marked out for him at the opening of the campaign; and leaving the

Pindarries to the management of his subordinates, he marched back at the head of his own division towards Poonah. He was on his return northward, having been hastily recalled by the Governor-General, when Sir John Malcolm, with his light brigade, met him. Arrangements were promptly made for an advance to Mehudpoor, and a speedy adjustment of the points at issue between Holkar and the British government,—by treaty, provided a sense of impending danger should have induced the Sirdars to lower their tone,—by arbitration of a battle, in the event of other arguments failing.

On the 16th, the two armies occupied encampments within fourteen miles of one another, and a constant interchange of couriers and agents left room to hope that the quarrel might even yet be amicably adjusted. But, on the 18th, it was ascertained that the war-faction had prevailed, and that both the Regent and his minister had been barbarously murdered on the preceding evening. This was followed by frequent attacks of horse on such foraging and watering parties as ventured to any distance from the British lines; and the necessity of bringing on an action, with as little delay as possible, became apparent.

By dawn, on the 21st, the British army was again in order of march, its patrols and baggage being continually harassed by clouds of irregular cavalry. It had proceeded a distance of nearly eight miles, when a messenger from Holkar came in with one of those equivocal

communications which native princes are apt to make, when their fears and their ambition stand opposed to one another. No check was, however, permitted, inasmuch as Sir John Malcolm, well acquainted with the tortuosities of Indian diplomacy, had prepared, the night previous, a sufficient answer,—and the messenger returned to report to those from whom he came that a crisis was at hand. Nor, in making this report, did he in any degree over-estimate either the courage or the activity of the assailants. At nine o'clock the advanced guard reached a rising ground, whence the enemy's dispositions could be examined; and the line closing rapidly up, a halt was ordered, for the purpose of affording time to the General to accomplish such arrangements as the peculiarity of his situation seemed to require.

The position of Holkar's army was in rear of the Soopra, having its left covered by a bend in the stream, and protected on the right by a deep ravine, which terminated in the bed of the river. His first line, which consisted entirely of infantry with fifty pieces of cannon, occupied the crest of a natural glacis, which was distant about eight hundred yards from the margin of the river; his second, composed of cavalry in heavy masses, supported it closely in the rear. There were, besides these, various swarms of horse scattered here and there in his front, of which several had skirmished with the English during the whole of the march; and now, trusting to their knowledge of the fords, continued for a

while to hold the right of the Soopra, after the several columns destined for the attack had begun to form. But the advance of a strong reconnoissance, of which Sir John Malcolm took the lead, soon compelled them to withdraw, and afforded to Colonel Blacker, the head of the Quarter-Master-General's department, an opportunity of completing his survey; the result of which was a determination, on Sir Thomas Hislop's part, to give the assault, rather than waste time in any endeavours to turn the position by either flank.

It had been ascertained in the course of the evening that there were two fords on the Soopra, one directly in the face of the enemy's line; the other at a considerable distance to the right, not far from the village of Mehudpoor. The latter was represented as difficult of passage, and lay so completely out of the British line of march, that an entire day must have been expended in any effort to take advantage of it. This consideration, aided by the belief that more is to be done, especially in Indian warfare, by hardihood and dash, than by manœuvre, induced the General to confine his attention entirely to the former.

Towards it, therefore, a light brigade was immediately pushed, under cover of a battery which opened from the nearer bank, and the riflemen having passed, the cavalry and horse-artillery moved to support them in high spirits. Everything was done with admirable precision, every evolution performed with the ut-

most steadiness and alacrity. Harassed by a fire, upon which their light pieces could make no impression, the cavalry traversed a ravine to the left, and drew up under cover of a little broken ground, whence they were enabled effectually to secure the approaches to the ford. In like manner the light infantry seized the gorges of one or two gullies, by which the steep bank of the river was penetrated, and quietly lay down till the columns destined to support them had made good their passage. That done, there remained but one step to be taken, a step which in our Indian warfare has never yet failed of producing the best results. The troops rushed forward to the charge, and in less than half an hour the enemy's cavalry and infantry were in full flight, and their guns in possession of the victors. A faint attempt was indeed made to rally at a second position, which had been marked out, rather, as it proved, with a view to facilitate the escape of the fugitives, than to recover the day which was lost. But the approach of the light brigade soon drove the artillerymen from their guns, which, like those captured on the first field of battle, became the prey of the conquerors.

The casualties in the British line amounted, on this occasion, to one hundred and sixty-four killed, and six hundred and four wounded; including three European officers in the former list, and not less than thirty-five in the latter. The enemy's loss was computed at three thousand men; besides sixty-three pieces of

cannon, eight elephants, some hundreds of camels, all their tents, and an immense quantity of baggage. Their *morale*, moreover, was completely destroyed,—a calamity far more serious in its nature than any that it is in the power of fire or steel to inflict,—indeed, they became, in a military point of view, to the full as innocuous as the wandering Pindarries whose cause they had so rashly espoused. Sir Thomas Hislop did not consider it necessary to follow them with his whole strength, but committing the pursuit to Sir John Malcolm and the light troops, retained his station at Mehudpoor, where he was afterwards joined by the Guzerat division under General Keir.

We should grievously try the reader's patience, without communicating to him any useful information, were we to describe at length the events which followed out of this signal and important victory. Let it suffice to state, that Holkar (a name, like that of Pharaoh among the Egyptians, adopted by each Maha Rajah as he succeeded to the throne) received from it a perfect impression of his own helplessness, and gladly purchased peace by ceding to the English and their dependents some of his most important provinces. He accepted, moreover, a subsidiary alliance, similar in almost all respects to that which was imposed upon the most dependent of the native princes, and consented to nominate to office such individuals as possessed, or appeared to possess, the confidence of his conquerors. It

happened, indeed, as was invariably the case on the first conclusion of similar treaties, that here and there a spirited Killedar refused, for a time, to surrender his fortress. But the overwhelming force which the English General was enabled to bring against them reduced all, one after another, to obedience; so that by the end of January, a second member of that league which the Peishwah had so adroitly laboured to consolidate was severed from the trunk.

The effect upon Scindia and his turbulent chieftains of this utter prostration of Holkar's strength was very satisfactory. The former acquiesced without a murmur in every arrangement which the Resident led him to believe would be agreeable to the Governor-General,—while the latter broke off, at least ostensibly, all connexion with the Pindarries, and expelled them from their camps. This was particularly the case with Jeswunt Rao, to whom, on the approach of the English army to Mehudpoor, Chetoo had fled for shelter. He dismissed the freebooter unasked, or if he did retain secretly in his pay a portion of that freebooter's band, he, at the same time, received with apparent cordiality the officer whom Lord Hastings had appointed to act with his troops, under the stipulations of the treaty of Gwalior. The consequence was, that the Pindarries, deprived of all support among the native powers, were pursued from point to point by English detachments; and losing all courage,—a quality with which they seem never to have

been overcharged,—were cut to pieces in detail wherever overtaken. The results may be stated in few words. After leading the chase from Malwa into Mewar, and from Mewar back again into Malwa, Chetoo, whose proud spirit could not brook submission, found himself deserted by all except about two hundred horsemen, with whom he threaded his way through the toils, and finally joined Appah Saheb, in the rainy season of 1818. He followed that chief through the mountains and jungles of Mohadeo, and would have thrown himself, after their expulsion thence, into Asseergurh, had not the commandant, swayed by motives of selfish policy, closed the gates upon him after his troop had been admitted. Chetoo made back into the jungle in order to conceal himself. Some days elapsed, during which no tidings were obtained of him, and it was imagined that he had fled to a much more remote part of the continent, when, one morning, his horse, saddled, and otherwise caparisoned as it had been when its rider first disappeared, was seen quietly grazing along the edge of the forest. A search was immediately instituted, and in the saddle were found several valuable rings, besides two hundred and fifty rupees in coined money, a sufficient proof that whatever his fate might have been, he had, at least, not fallen among thieves. Armed parties now penetrated the jungle, one of the favourite haunts of the tiger in that part of India, and all that remained of the leader of twenty thou-

sand men was found to be a mangled head, some fragments of bones, and his outer robe saturated with blood.

It may not be amiss if we state here the fate which overtook Chetoo's rivals and fellow-leaders, Wasil Mohammed and Kureem Khan. They never recovered the blow which had been inflicted upon them in Malwa, and were, at last, after undergoing innumerable hardships, and traversing the entire breadth of the Deccan, compelled to dismiss the few followers that still adhered to their fortunes, and surrender at discretion. They were immediately transferred to places of safe keeping, and their lands and castles, like those of Chetoo, made over to more deserving occupants.

We return now to the war with the Peishwah, which was conducted all this while both at Poonah and the Kistna, with extraordinary vigour and success. From the former point, Brigadier-General Smith, on the 22d of November, commenced a rapid march to the northward, in the hope of overtaking the enemy, who were reported to have pitched their tents at Mahaollee, near Satara. On the 24th he was at Rajworrah, where he halted to refresh his troops, worn down by the exertions of the previous day, during which they had, by sheer strength of arm, dragged a heavy battering train up the steep face of the little Boor Ghaut. On the 25th, the division accomplished not less than twenty-four miles, threatened at every step by swarms of irregulars; and

forcing the Salpee Ghaut on the 28th, caused the Peishwah to break up with precipitation, and flee to Possesolee. Here, however, he made no permanent stay. Having secured the family of the Rajah of Satara, the single object which he sought to attain by his movement to the south, he doubled back upon Punderpoor; where, giving the slip to General Smith, and passing midway between Poonah and Seroor, he advanced northward, on the road to Nassek, till he reached Wuttoor. Here Trimbukjee Dainglia joined him with a considerable reinforcement both of horse and foot; and the position being a strong one, he consented, under an impression that he was safe, to give to his jaded followers some days of repose.

In the meanwhile, General Smith, who reached Punderpoor two days after the Peishwah quitted it, had drawn off towards Seroor, where he recruited his horses and cattle, deposited his battering train, and otherwise made ready to act with increased effect. He adopted this course because he was fully aware as soon as the enemy got so far the start of him, that address as well as celerity of movement would be required, and that, instead of pressing upon the rear of the Peishwah, it would be wise to give prevalence to the notion that for the present, at least, pursuit would be intermitted. This was very easily effected; after which he marched with a light corps in an easterly direction, entered the valley of the Godavery by the Nimba

Deira Ghaut, and gained, almost unnoticed, the village of Hunnemuntgaum. He was then considerably to the northward of the position which the Peishwah had taken up, and capable, by a single march, of interposing between him and Nassic. Now then the enemy became seriously alarmed, but it was too late. He descended into the valley of the Paree in sufficient time to learn that the English had passed Sungumner. He took a westerly course in the direction of Kootool, and became intangled with his numerous cavalry in a close and difficult country, and he re-ascended to Wuttoor, still uncertain how to act or whither to betake himself. But the English were by this time advancing rapidly by Rejapoor, Tugum, and Singadeo. There was no longer time to deliberate; so he struck his tents, led his force towards the south, and pushed by forced marches along the road to Poonah.

The duty of covering Poonah was, at this time, entrusted to Colonel Burr, whose force consisted of three battalions of native infantry, a body of seventeen hundred irregular cavalry, and a few pieces of light artillery. He was soon informed of the Peishwah's approach; and being in ignorance both as to the position and the plans of General Smith, he naturally anticipated an immediate attack. Under such circumstances, he considered it expedient to solicit from the nearest British station a reinforcement of, at least, one battalion. The request was promptly complied with; and at

eight P. M. on the 31st of December, the 2d battalion Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred auxiliary horse, and a detachment of artillery with two six-pounders, marched, under the orders of Captain Staunton, for Seroor. They met with no obstruction by the way, nor did any flying rumours reach them, till one o'clock next morning, when, on gaining the heights above Koreigaum, an appalling spectacle suddenly presented itself to the eyes of the officer in command. The whole of the plain beneath was covered with the Peishwah's army: twenty thousand horse, with eight thousand infantry, of whom no inconsiderable portion were Arabs, rendered the chances of retreat not less desperate than those of an advance; while the probabilities of successful resistance in a country destitute of all cover, and open on every side to the action of cavalry, were, to say the least, extremely slender. Captain Staunton, though startled, lost not his presence of mind for a moment. He saw that the road to the village was yet open; and well aware that his last hope of salvation lay in securing whatever shelter its walls and houses might supply, he pushed for it at double-quick time. But he moved not alone. The enemy, as if anticipating the manœuvre, advanced a strong corps simultaneously with his own, and both parties reached their ground so completely together, that the village became, as it were, partitioned out between the hostile armies.

It was well for Captain Staunton and his

handful of heroes, that the Mahrattas were not, on this occasion, supported by a superior artillery. Their parc, like his own, consisted of two guns only, which by some strange oversight, or, perhaps, by reason of their imperfect pliability, were never brought, to any useful purpose, into play. The six-pounders, on the contrary, which accompanied the detachment were soon in an admirable position, whence they commanded two of the principal avenues by which the enemy could advance in force; and though themselves open to a sweeping musketry fire from certain walls and houses near, they did good service during the continuance of an action almost without parallel in point of severity. But the contest was, after all, rather that of man to man, than any trial of skill either in manœuvring or gunnery. From ten o'clock in the morning till sun-set charges were continually made, which, though bravely conducted on each occasion by fresh troops, were at least as bravely sustained and invariably repulsed.

We will not attempt to give any minute description of a battle, which resembled in all its features rather the mêlée of a tournament than a struggle between two bodies of disciplined troops. When we state, indeed, that the Sepoys fought under every disadvantage of straitened room, and the total absence of hope, that they tasted nothing all day, not even water,—that their communication with the river was entirely cut off—that their handful of

horse, unable to show themselves on the plain, became rather an incumbrance than an aid,—and that there were present with them only eight European officers, including two assistant surgeons, we shall, it is presumed, have said enough to entitle them to take rank among the bravest and most enduring troops that ever served under the standard of England. But to enter into a minute detail of each assault as it was given and met would serve no purpose which is not much more effectually attained in the following spirited extract from Captain Duff's History of the Mahrattas. "Every foot of ground," says he, "was disputed; several streets were taken and retaken, till more than half the European officers being wounded, the Arabs made themselves masters of a small temple towards the east side of the village, generally used as a choultry, where three of the officers were lying wounded. Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, one of their number, got up and went out, but was immediately stabbed by the Arabs, and his body cruelly mangled. Lieutenant Swanston, who had two severe wounds, had the presence of mind to advise his remaining companions to suffer the Arabs to rifle them unresistingly; which they did, but committed no further violence; and in the mean time a party of the battalion under Lieut. Jones and Assistant Surgeon Wyllie arrived to their rescue, retook the choultry, avenged the death of Mr. Wingate, and carried their companions to a place of greater safety.

The sufferings of the wounded became extreme, from thirst; and the men who continued the conflict were fainting or nearly frantic, from the dreadful privation of water. Some of the artillerymen, all of whom bore a very conspicuous part in this glorious defence, proposed to Captain Staunton that they should surrender, if terms could be obtained. His determined refusal did not satisfy them; but Lieut. Chisholm, their officer, being killed, the enemy, encouraged by this circumstance, rushed upon one of the guns and took it. Lieut. Thomas Pattinson, Adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was taken, than getting up, he called to the grenadiers once more to follow him; and seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking them down right and left, until a second ball through his body completely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the Sepoys, thus led, were irresistible, the gun was retaken, and the dead Arabs, literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended. The body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found by his gun with the head cut off. Captain Staunton judiciously took advantage of the circumstance, by pointing it out to the men, and telling them such was the way all would be served who fell, dead or alive, into the hands of the Mahrattas; on which they declared they would die to a man; and

the conflict was resumed by all with the most determined valour. Captain Staunton, Lieut. Jones, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie were the only officers who remained fit for duty, and manfully persevered in continuing the defence. Their situation towards evening was very hopeless; Captain Staunton had apprized Colonel Burr of the difficulties he laboured under, and an unavailing attempt from Poonah had been made for his relief. As the night fell, however, the vigour of the attack relaxed, and the men were able to procure a supply of water. By nine o'clock at night the firing ceased, and the village was evacuated by the Peishwah's troops."

The loss of the British in this desperate affair was great; of the battalion, there fell one hundred and seventy-five rank and file; of the auxiliary horse, nearly one-half were placed *hors de combat;* and of the European officers, two were killed on the spot, one died next day, and two were wounded. On the side of the Mahrattas, between five and six hundred men were slain; a heavy list of casualties, without doubt, but in its moral effect very little to be accounted of, when compared with the impression produced upon all minds by the indomitable courage of a handful of warriors who appeared to set the odds both of numbers and position at defiance. It is said that the Peishwah, in particular, was overwhelmed with the conviction that he had, indeed, adventured upon an enterprise to which

his resources were wholly inadequate. He sat, during the action, on a rising ground, about two miles distant from the village, while Gokla, Appa Dessaye, and Trimbukjee Dainglia directed the attack in succession, and repeatedly expressed his impatience by demanding of his officers where were now their boasts of defeating the English, seeing that, with all their strength, they could not overwhelm a single battalion. But his impatience and chagrin were alike unavailing. Sunset found his Arabs as far as ever from the conquest of Koreigaum, and the dawn brought intelligence which put an immediate stop to further hostile proceedings. General Smith was at hand; and hence, after a vain attempt, by means of spies, to draw Captain Staunton from the village, the Mahrattas broke up, leaving their wearied, but still determined opponents to accomplish, with all their wounded and baggage, a secure and honourable retreat to the point whence they set out. Smarting under the sense of utter degradation, and eager to escape the dangers that threatened him from behind, the Peishwah, being indifferent to the fate of his capital, again took the road to the south. He passed rapidly through Possesolee and Merich to Gokah on the Gutpurba, giving out that he was about first to re-occupy the provinces ceded at the treaty of Poonah, and then to enter, by invitation, the territory of the Rajah of Mysore.

But the rumour, if set on foot for the pur-

pose of trying the temper of the people beyond the Gutpurba, did not justify the expectations of its author. Brigadier-General Munro, a man of rare ability both as a statesman and a soldier, had already been there, and had achieved, with a force altogether insignificant, a series of brilliant successes, which broke the influence of the Peishwah, between the Malpurba and the Gutpurba, and cut off all hope for his adherents. The Peishwah, therefore, finding that there was an impediment in his path, and that not only General Smith, but General Pritzler was closing upon him, suddenly re-crossed the Kistna at Gulgata, and passing to the westward, made a detour so as to throw out his pursuers, and reached Merich by way of Hutanee. He sustained, it is true, while executing this excentric movement, some loss from General Pritzler's cavalry, but the movement itself was so masterly, that it occasioned a totally novel arrangement in the future conduct of the pursuit.

Unable to overtake an army which, being composed chiefly of horse, and very little encumbered with guns or baggage, threaded defiles and traversed jungles quite impervious to regular troops, General Smith sat down before Satara, which surrendered as soon as the mortars were in battery, and before a shot had been fired. The possession of this place, and the turn which affairs had manifestly taken, induced Mr. Elphinstone to execute at once a scheme which, under the sanction of the Go-

vernor-General, he had for some time meditated. Bold steps were taken to prepare the minds of the people for the degradation of the Peishwah and his family, and a readjustment of the Mahratta empire. A sort of manifesto was put forth, in which the crimes, both political and personal, of the delinquent were stated, he himself pronounced unfit to exercise any longer the functions of royalty; his family outlawed; his adherents invited to desert him, on penalty of condign punishment; and assurances of protection given to all such as should, within a limited time, submit themselves. This done, the attention of the heads of departments was turned to a fresh distribution of the force employed in the field, of which late events had shown that, however superior it might be to that of the enemy, the organization was not such as to ensure a speedy termination of the war.

Up to the present moment the pursuit of the Peishwah, like a boar-hunt in the forest of the Cevennes, had carried those engaged over a prodigious extent of country, without appearing to present any probable term to their labours. This was owing not more to the unwieldy nature of the pursuing force, which, uncertain how it might be opposed, marched with heavy guns, and carried convoy in its train, than to the inadvertency which occasioned a neglect of the fortified places, and, as a necessary consequence, left open constant points of retreat to the enemy. To Brigadier-General

Munro belongs the merit of having suggested a plan, of which the excellence was immediately acknowledged by Mr. Elphinstone, and which appears to us so obviously corresponding with common sense, that the only matter of surprise is how it came to be adopted so tardily. Generals Smith and Pritzler received orders to amalgamate their divisions. Out of the mass were formed two new corps, the one light, the other heavy; of which the former consisted entirely of horse, light infantry, galloper and other portable guns—the latter, of regiments of the line, a battering train, and the larger and more unwieldy of the field-pieces. At the head of the first General Smith renewed the chase, being then in a condition to follow whithersoever the enemy might lead; while General Pritzler, with the last, commenced a series of sieges, which promised gradually but surely to bring the whole of the Peishwah's territories into subjection.

The great and immediate benefits which followed the execution of this plan furnish the best evidence of its wisdom. It more than answered the expectations of its authors; for as the fall of one stronghold invariably struck terror into the garrison of another, each, as it came late upon the roll of sieges, offered less resistance than that which preceded. Nor was the success of General Smith in his more dashing operations in the open field either less brilliant or less effectual. Having cautiously followed the Peishwah into the country

about Pundapoor and Sholapoor, he turned suddenly in quest of him in the direction of Ashtee, at which place the spies reported that he had passed the night of the 19th of February. "The march," we use the language of Colonel Blacker, "was continued without intermission by Mundapoor; and at eight o'clock in the forenoon of the 20th, the Brigadier-General had the satisfaction of hearing the enemy's *nagarras* beating below a hill which covered him from their view. They were not, however, entirely unapprized of his approach; and though unable altogether to avoid a conflict, they were not without time to make some preparation for it. They had prepared to march that morning, and had accordingly struck their tents and laden their baggage. The Peishwah, however, did not consider himself safe in a palankeen. He therefore mounted a horse, and fled precipitately, with a sufficient guard, leaving Gokla, with from eight to ten thousand horse, to cover his retreat, and, if possible, that of the baggage. When this measure was recommended to Bajee Rao, Gokla, thinking probably the entire fourth division, with its baggage, was advancing, assured him he would amuse the Brigadier-General, who would, as usual, open his guns; but when the British cavalry alone were discovered moving over the hill, he found that other dispositions must be adopted. His force was divided into several bodies, which made a demonstration of mutually supporting each other; and between them

and the British cavalry was a *nullah* of difficult passage, which it was necessary for the attacking body to cross."

While this was going on, the British cavalry continued to advance in regimental columns of threes, at forming distance, the two squadrons of his Majesty's 22nd dragoons being in the centre, the 7th Madras native cavalry on the right, the 2nd on the left. Each flank was supported by some pieces of horse-artillery, retired a little from the parallel; and the whole were in the act of deploying, when Gokla, at the head of about two thousand horse, suddenly cleared the nullah, and passing obliquely from the left to the right, poured a volley of matchlocks on the 2nd cavalry and dragoons, and fell in with spears at rest upon the 7th. As yet only three troops were formed, and these very imperfectly. They could not withstand the fury of the attack, and became huddled together, till a troop of the 22nd, charging by the rear, broke in upon the enemy, and opened out a space for them on which to act. A fierce encounter followed, in which Gokla bore himself nobly, giving and receiving more than one sabre wound, till he was at last cut down, defending himself to the last, and dying, as he had sworn to do, sword in hand. The fall of their leader served as a signal to the Mahrattas to abandon a contest which they had hitherto maintained with spirit. They broke and fled in all directions, and were pursued for about five miles with considerable effect; upwards of

two hundred dying by the sword, and thrice that number quitting their standards, to which they never returned.

This little affair, however unfortunately begun, in which the loss of the English consisted of no more than twenty persons wounded, including the general, brought with it results to the full as important as might have been expected to flow out of a general action. In the first place, with Gokla—emphatically termed the sword of the empire—expired the last hope of the war-party, inasmuch as the whole army contained not another man in whom both the Peishwah and the soldiers were willing to repose implicit confidence. In the next place, the cavalry, while pressing the chase, found themselves unexpectedly joined by a group of persons, among whom were the Rajah of Satara, his mother, two brothers, and their attendants, whom the hurry of the flight had separated from their guards, and who now gladly placed themselves under the protection of the English. These events, following fast upon the surrender of Satara, and the submission of other fortified places, caused a feeling of despondency to spread through all the leading men in the country, who began one by one to withdraw from the falling fortunes of the Peishwah, and to give in their adhesion to the new order of things. And high time it was that such as looked only to their own benefit should abandon a cause which appeared doomed to utter destruction. On all sides the

tide of invasion flowed strongly and overpoweringly. General Munro, in the north, after reducing upwards of twenty forts, was joined by General Webster, fresh from almost as many conquests on the Gutpurba, and advancing to Shalapoor, gave there the last blow to the Peishwah's power, by destroying his infantry corps in a sharp action. In the west, the army of Bombay had overrun the Concan; the north was utterly helpless; and in the east, whither the Peishwah was represented to have retired, there existed no rallying point for such as might desire to aid him. In a word, the die which he had thrown with a rash and precipitate hand, had turned up, on all occasions, against him; and the crisis which should determine his fate as the head of the Mahratta empire was at hand.

CHAPTER VII.

Affairs of Hindostan—Settlements with Scindiah, Ameer Khan, and the Rajpoot princes—Breaking up of the Grand Army—Return of Sir Thomas Hislop to the South—Continued operations against the Peishwah—Appah Saheb—His treachery and flight—The Peishwah endeavours to join him—Surrounded at Asseergurh and surrenders—Appah Saheb's operations—Capture of Asseergurh—Escape of Appah Saheb—British Supremacy proclaimed—Settlement of the Country—Lord Hastings returns to Europe.

It is necessary to advert, for a brief space, to the affairs of Hindostan, which were assuming all this while, from day to day, a more settled, as well as a much more satisfactory aspect. Overawed by the demonstrations of the Governor-General, Scindiah presumed not to violate, even in the most minute particular, the spirit of the treaty of Gwalior, while he readily assented to more than one innovation of which it was the tendency to promote the interests of the English at least as much as his own. In like manner, Ameer Khan, blending the chicanery of the outlaw with the prudence of a quiet citizen, steadily adhered to the engagements into which he had entered at the opening of the campaign. It was to no

purpose that his turbulent chieftains—for the most part, rather the masters, than the servants of those under whose banners they marched—expressed their abhorrence of a connexion which, while it lessened their immediate influence, bade fair to cut off, in due time, all those sources of emolument to which they had been accustomed to look. Ameer, after deceiving them for as long a period as his own convenience seemed to require, suddenly withdrew from the camp, and taking refuge in a fortified town, left them to be dealt with as might appear most agreeable to the wishes of Lord Hastings. Nor were his Lordship's wishes by this time a secret. He had early required that the artillery should be delivered up—the battalions and regiments of horse and foot disbanded; and Sir David Ochterlony, to whom the care of enforcing that requisition was intrusted, had moved to a convenient position for the purpose of discharging his trust. It is not necessary to describe at length the process by which so desirable an end was attained. Our purpose is sufficiently attained when we state, that partly by a display of force such as the Patans knew not how to oppose, and partly by the judicious promulgation of an order which offered service under the British flag to eight thousand men, the spirit of faction was broken; and the artillery having surrendered, such of the infantry and cavalry as found themselves shut out from the British ranks, lost all confidence, and dispersed. Ameer

Khan became, from that hour, confirmed in his new sovereignty, and continued ever after faithful to his engagements, as the friend and ally of the Company.

We stated some time ago, that the immediate effect of the battle of Mehudpoor was to emancipate Holkar from the thraldom of his sirdars; and to bring him more than ever into a state of dependence on the English government. Of his chiefs, on the other hand, one or two, including Jeswunt Rao, the friend and protector of the Pindarrie Chetoo, endeavoured for a while to maintain a rude independence; but the reduction of a stronghold here and there, and the surprise and defeat of Jeswunt's party at Jawud, soon put a stop to all further difficulties in that quarter. Before the middle of February, therefore, the dominions of Holkar were to the full as quiet as those of Scindiah or Ameer Khan. Nor was the case different in Ajmeer, Malwa, Mewar, or any other of the tracts of country over which the tide of war had recently swept. All of these, no matter how subdivided, or by what princes immediately governed, regarded themselves as alike dependent on the forbearance of the English; and as a necessary consequence, were alike willing to receive the law from a power which had now fairly assumed towards them, and towards India at large, an attitude of open superiority.

Affairs being brought to this point, and the elements of future conspiracies in a great measure destroyed, Lord Hastings determined to

relax a little from the military attitude which he had assumed on the side of Hindostan. On the 1st of February, the British force actually in the field to the north of the Nerbudda was thus disposed. The reserve division, under Sir David Ochterlony, occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Jypoor; the centre division, under the personal command of the Governor-General, lay along the banks of the Sindh; the right division, with Major-General Donkin, was on its march to occupy Kumulner, and the usurpations of Jeswunt Rao in Mewar, while the left was distributed into three corps, of which one was with General Marshall, about Sewuj and Beircha; another with General Browne, in the vicinity of Jawud; and a third, consisting of two battalions of infantry, in communication with his Lordship's head-quarters, under Brigadier-General Watson. Of the army of the Deccan again, the divisions of Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir John Malcolm continued still in the country round Mundesore. Lieut.-Colonel Adams was in Bhopal, where he found employment in receiving the submission of the Pindarrie chiefs. The Guzerat division, after a close pursuit of Chetoo, had halted in the vicinity of Indore; while two corps of observation, under Brigadiers Toone and Hardyman, were posted—the former on the southern frontier of Bahar,—the latter in Jubulpoor.

The maintenance in the field of such an army, with its train of followers, bullocks, horses, and other beasts of burthen, could not

but entail a heavy expense upon the Company's treasury, which was to be justified only by the urgency of the case as it had originally presented itself to the notice of the local authorities. Aware that one gigantic effort will generally accomplish what a thousand lesser throes might fail to bring about, Lord Hastings did not scruple to put forth the whole strength of the empire; and the results, in spite of more than one unforeseen difficulty, had fully justified his expectations. Now, however, that the necessity for exertion had ceased, it became his first duty to relieve the government from the pressure of offensive war; and hence, as soon as he saw matters in a satisfactory train of adjustment, he made preparations to return within his own frontier.

Having entered with Scindiah into certain territorial arrangements, by one of which the rights formerly exercised by the Peshwah north of the Nerbudda were exchanged for Ajmeer, Solamungur, and certain claims which he had been accustomed to advance on the Bhoondee principality, Lord Hastings quitted his camp; and marching slowly along the river from Sonaree and Ochar, down to Beircha, arrived, towards the end of February, at the point on which, in the previous November, he had first moved for the purpose of enforcing the treaty of Gwalior. Here the centre, or head-quarter division of the army of Hindostan was broken up; and three battalions, with the battering guns, being handed over to General Marshall,

that they might assist in the reduction of the principality of Sagur, the remainder were dispersed, the Europeans to Cawnpore, and the sepoys along the frontier line of Bundelkund and Etawa.

While these things were in progress, and General Marshall pushed his conquests with equal vigour and success, the right division, of which Major-General Donkin was at the head, received orders, so soon as Jeswunt Rao's possessions in Mewar should have been fully overawed, to detach to the support of Sir David Ochterlony, in Rajpootana, and to dissolve itself. This was effected by the return of the European portion of the corps to the standing cantonments at Meeruth; and the march of a brigade of native infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a proportionate detachment of artillery, to Holkar's capital, where, under Lieut.-Colonel Ludlow, it took post. Meantime, Jubulpoor was occupied by a portion of Brigadier-General Hardyman's corps, under the command of Major O'Brien, as well as Sergooja, Jaulpoor, Sohajpoor, and Sumbhupoor, by a detachment from General Toone's division, under Major Roughsedge. These were wild jungle districts, inhabited by the remains of those barbarous tribes, of whom we took occasion to speak, in an early portion of this history, as having been driven from the open country during the early irruptions of the Hindoos, and whose predatory habits rendered the annexation of their haunts to the British empire valuable

only so far as it tended to render the frontier line more connected, and, as a necessary consequence, more defensible.

Having thus disposed of the grand army, Lord Hastings turned his attention to that of the Deccan, which, as well as the Bombay division, he directed to complete its tour of service, and to disperse with as little delay as possible, by brigades, into cantonments. In obedience to these orders, the several subsidiary corps, namely, those of Poonah, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor, returned to their original condition of dependence on the will of the residents at each capital. Colonel Adams, at the same time, with the division of which he was at the head, marched upon Chouragurh, a refractory fortress in the northern extremity of the Mohadeo hills, while Sir Thomas Hislop himself took the road by Judoor and Muheshwur, into Candeish, where, after reinforcing General Doveton, he was directed formally to give up the command. In the meanwhile, Sir John Malcolm, to whom a portion of General Hislop's force had been transferred, continued to cover such portions of Holkar's ceded dominions as were not yet fully organized,—and executed a successful expedition into Soandwara,—a province on the west of Malwa, which had long been the favourite haunt of an organized band of freebooters. These he effectually extirpated; after which, he turned his undivided attention to the settlement of the provinces over which, by virtue of his ap-

pointment as civil commissioner, his authority extended.

All this was satisfactory enough, and the prospect of returning every where to a peace establishment appeared bright, when events befel which gave, for a time, a new direction to the current of public affairs. We have said that Sir Thomas Hislop, after strengthening General Doveton's corps in Candeish, had been instructed to break up his division, and to repair with the head-quarters of the army of the Deccan to Madras. On the 21st of February he passed the Nerbudda, not far from Muheshwur, and arriving on the 22d at the fort of Surdwar, summoned it to surrender. No resistance was offered, and the garrison being replaced by a battalion of sepoys, with a view of overawing the country between the Satpoora range and the Nerbudda, Sir Thomas resumed his march. He arrived on the 27th in the vicinity of Talner, one of those fortified rocks with which the Deccan is studded, and which, as it commanded the ford over the Taptee, had been claimed by the English, and ceded by Holkar at the peace of Mundesore. Not anticipating any opposition here, the march was conducted without much regard to order, that is to say, the baggage, which usually proceeds either in the rear or centre of the column, was pushed forward without any escort to protect it. Scarcely had the animals come within range of the fort, when several guns opened upon them, and the bat-men, taking fright, fell

back with precipitation and in extreme disorder upon the columns. A parley followed, which led to no satisfactory explanation, and General Hislop was in consequence compelled to suspend his further progress, that he might invest the place.

The ghurrie, or stronghold, of Talner consisted of a round hill, which rose from the edge of the Taptee to a height of about sixty or seventy feet, and was begirt by several circles of stout masonry, the interior invariably overlooking that which was without, and the whole connected by gates and winding barbicans. Against heavy artillery it could offer no resistance; but of heavy artillery Sir Thomas Hislop was destitute, and his six-pounders, though they sufficed to drive the Arab gunners from their posts, made little or no impression upon the walls themselves. In these circumstances it was determined to blow open the gate, and to force at the point of the bayonet an entrance, should the killedar continue his resistance. But before a shot was fired, the storming party, which had advanced close to the defences, ascertained that a portion of the wall had fallen in, and that there was an aperture between the gate-frame and what had once been the lintel, sufficiently capacious to admit them in single file. In a moment the men sprang across, and found the second gate unbarred; they passed that also, and pushed, with hasty steps, across the area. Now, then, at last, the killedar became seriously alarmed; and a wicket being

opened, he presented himself before them, for the purpose of negotiating the terms of a surrender.

The storming party was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Conway, Lieutenant-Colonel Macgregor Murray, and several other officers attached to the staff. While some of these held a rapid conversation with the killedar, which in the bustle and noise that surrounded them was probably very little understood, Colonel Murray, conceiving that the opportunity ought not to be lost of establishing a hold upon the place, quietly passed the wicket, and was followed by Major Gordon and three grenadiers. The remainder of the tale we give in the words of Colonel Blacker. Colonel Murray, though he placed himself within the line of the enemy's works, "refrained from drawing his sword, to show that he had no intention of breaking off the parley. He expected to be followed by as many men as should be able to maintain themselves in a confined situation; but four or five persons only had got in, when the enemy, apprehending the consequences, attacked most furiously, and laid them all dead except Colonel Murray, who fell towards the wicket covered with wounds. They attempted then to close the wicket, but their efforts were rendered ineffectual by a grenadier, who thrust his musket, with a happy presence of mind, into the aperture, and secured that entrance until Lieutenant-Colonel Mackintosh and Captain Macraith forced it open. It was held in this state during

the time that the Captain was, with one hand, dragging Colonel Murray through it, and warding off blows with his sword in the other. A fire was now poured in through the wicket, which cleared the gate-way sufficiently for the head of the storming party, under Captain Macgregor of the Royals, to enter; and the place was carried without further difficulty, but at the expense of that officer's life. As soon as the supporting detachment could open the gate, many troops poured in, the garrison were shortly put to the sword, and the killedar was hanged the same evening to a tree on the flag-staff tower."

Sir Thomas Hislop left a garrison in Talner, and passing the Taptee, marched by Umulner to Pahrola, where he came into communication with General Doveton's corps, of which the head-quarters were then at Outran. The latter, after settling the affairs of Nagpoor, had returned, early in January, to the west, and being thwarted in his design of laying siege to Asseerghur, was employed in receiving the submission of various forts and castles, which had been ceded to the English by Holkar. But from this both he and Sir Thomas Hislop were soon called away by the arrival of a new actor on the stage,—for the Peishwah, of whom little had recently been heard, suddenly appeared among the Ghauts, which interpose between Candeish and the vale of the Godavery. Of the circumstances which drew him thither it will be necessary to give some account.

We left Appah Saheb, the Rajah of Nagpoor, awakened as it were from his dream of ambition, and readmitted, by the kindness of Mr. Jenkins and the generosity of the Governor-General, to the benefits of a British alliance. Strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless perfectly true, that a sense of personal danger no sooner ceased to operate than he began to repent of his hasty submission, and to devise new schemes of revolt. The treaty of reconciliation was, indeed, as yet incomplete, when he issued secret orders to the governors of his fortified places, that they should hold out against the English wherever there appeared to be the slightest chance of gaining by resistance even the advantage of a little time. In like manner he directed the Goands and other savage tribes which acknowledged his sovereignty, to act upon the convoys and detachments of the British army; and by both parties were his instructions so faithfully obeyed, that on more than one occasion the progress of settling the country was seriously impeded. Chouragurh, Mundela, Dhamonee, and other forts, were not reduced till they had respectively withstood a siege, while the process of recruiting went on, more especially among the Arabs, with a degree of spirit which augured no long duration of the peace. Mr. Jenkins no sooner became aware of these things than his suspicions were roused; and he began immediately to take such steps as the emergency seemed to require; communicating

from time to time to the Governor-General such information as he chanced to receive.

Nothing tended more to sharpen the suspicions of Mr. Jenkins than the frequent interchange of couriers which began to take place between the Rajah and Gumput Rao, a turbulent chief, who had escaped with the remains of the Nagpoor army, after its defeat by General Doveton. Mr. Jenkins caused some of these to be arrested, and found ample proof that arrangements were already completed for the advance of the Peishwah into Nagpoor, and the junction of his forces to those of Appah Saheb. There was no longer room for doubt as to the course which it behoved him to follow. He caused the Rajah to be seized in his own palace; brought him in as a sort of state-prisoner to the residency; and having drawn up an ample statement of events as they had befallen, sent it, with a request for further instructions, to Lord Hastings. But that against which he hoped to provide was already in progress. Gumput Rao joined the Peishwah, was present with his horse at the battle of Astree, and continued to share his fortunes till their united army reached Puvinda, where two confidential agents met them, with a statement of Appah Saheb's captivity, and an urgent entreaty that they would march without delay to his release. The Peishwah, however, was not yet sufficiently master of himself to attend to the requisitions of an ally, however pressing. He continued his flight northward, carrying the

vakeels along with him, and, after a vain attempt to surprise Newusa, crossed the Godavery at Phooltamba, and marched upon Kopergaon. It is not worth while to follow him from stage to stage in the eccentric movements which he found it necessary to execute. Enough is done when we state, that early in March he skirted into Candeish, whence he fled with the utmost precipitation as soon as he had ascertained that Sir Thomas Hislop was between him and Burhampoor; and that from Assee, on the Peeree, the most southerly point to which he judged it prudent to retreat, he turned abruptly to the eastward, and made for Nagpoor. But it was now too late to retrieve a game which had from the first gone entirely against him. His enemies closed round him on every side, and being driven across the Wurda, he was reduced to the necessity of shifting from point to point, without any other view than that of escaping one or other of the columns which from all quarters pressed upon his line of march.

As soon as the real condition of the Peishwah's force had been ascertained, Sir Thomas Hislop considered it unnecessary to continue the pursuit; and taking with him such troops as could be most conveniently spared, returned to Madras. Meanwhile, the officers in command of brigades and divisions vied with one another in their efforts to bring the fugitive prince to battle. It fell to the lot of Colonel Adam to accomplish that object. The Peishwah, alarmed

by the approach of General Doveton to Pundur-Koura, was in full retreat towards the north, when Colonel Adam fell in with him about five miles from Soonee, and immediately attacked. It was a rout, rather than a battle. One regiment of cavalry, the 5th; of Bengal, with a brigade of horse-artillery, put the whole of Bajee Rao's army to flight, and pursued it many miles with unsparing vigour, so as to cut down not less than one thousand men, and to capture five elephants with all the baggage. The Peishwah never recovered that blow. His adherents fell off from him day by day, till he was left, ere long, with about eight thousand followers; among whom, the only sirdars that continued faithful to his broken fortunes, were Trimbukjee, and two others, with the widow of the gallant Goklah. At the same time, his principal fortresses, both in the south and west, fell one by one into the hands of the English. Of General Munro's successes we have already spoken; those of General Pritzler and Colonel Adam were not less marked—for the former reduced Wusota, after a few days' bombardment; and the latter, in a space of time scarcely more protracted, made himself master of the important castle of Chanda. In the former of these places were found two English officers, whom, at the opening of the campaign, the Peishwah had imprisoned, and who had been kept ever since in ignorance of the movements of their countrymen, even when they had begun to open their fire upon their

place of confinement. Nor was this all. Several members of the Rajah of Satara's family were relieved at the same time from a captivity which Bajee Rao designed to end only with their lives; and one more ground of accusation, in addition to the many already employed, was immediately, and by a very intelligible process, made out against the Peishwah.

In the mean while, Appah Saheb was kept a close prisoner within the residency at Nagpoor, where Mr. Jenkins, alarmed by the rumoured advance of Bajee Rao, had made ample preparations to sustain a siege. As soon, however, as the affair of Soonee became known, arrangements were made to transfer him to a place of greater security; and he was in due time marched, under an escort of the 22nd Bengal Native Infantry, towards the British territories. The particular agency through which he contrived to work upon the feelings of the sepoys has never been ascertained,—further than that suspicion rests strongly upon a Brahmin who accompanied the party from the capital;-but the escort had not proceeded beyond the frontier of Nagpoor, when it was ascertained that Bajee Rao had escaped in the disguise of a private soldier. Every exertion was made to trace his flight, but in vain. He was heard of at different places, but nowhere overtaken, till he found both shelter and a band of devoted followers among the Goands. It was to no purpose that large rewards were offered to such as should

deliver him up, dead or alive. No one betrayed him; and the wreck of the Pindarries, including Chetoo and his Dursha, as well as numerous stragglers from the Peishwah's army, rendered him, ere long, the head of a very formidable band of freebooters.

We return to the Peishwah, whose affairs, after the defeat at Soonee, became, even in his own eyes, completely desperate. There was indeed but one hope left,—namely, that Scindiah, in the event of his reaching his dominions with the semblance of an army, might yet join him; and to the realisation of this last vision of an active imagination all efforts were forthwith directed. Not that he calculated on a prolongation of the war, to which he was now convinced that his strength had never been adequate; but he hoped to find in the Maha Rajah an influential mediator, in other words, to obtain through his intervention at least favourable terms of submission. While, therefore, he sent off proposals both to Mr. Elphinstone and Mr. Jenkins, he crossed the Taptee near its confluence with the Poorna, and proceeded down the valley as far as Chupara, with the design of penetrating into Hindostan by the Surdwa Ghaut and Indore. But he discovered at Chupara, that the way was barred against him, and that Sir John Malcolm occupied the line of the Nerbudda from Hindia to Muheshwur. He therefore retreated to the vicinity of Asseergurh, where, after dispatching a confidential agent to Sir John, with

proposals of surrender, he avowed his intention, in case these proposals should be rejected, of sustaining a siege, and perishing among the ruins of the citadel.

The extraordinary readiness with which the governor of Asseergurh—a fortress belonging to Scindiah, and therefore in alliance with the English—held out to the fugitive Peishwah the right hand of fellowship, left no doubt touching the dispositions of Scindiah himself, however much a regard to the relative situations of the contending parties might induce him to disguise it. It was clear, indeed, that should Bajee Rao succeed in reaching Gwalior, the war would be as far as ever from its conclusion; and hence it became a point of the greatest importance to hinder, at almost any cost, the occurrence of so great a calamity. This consideration, as well as an earnest desire to put a speedy period to the harassing and unsatisfactory service on which his troops had been so long employed, induced Sir John Malcolm to accede to the Peishwah's desire, by opening with him a negotiation, which was conducted for a while, on both sides, through trustworthy agents, and led at last to a personal interview. Many demands were made by the Peishwah which the opposite party refused to grant; and various and important were the modifications introduced at almost every stage in the transactions. But in the end it was arranged that the Peishwah should renounce, both for himself and his family for ever, all authority over

the Mahratta nation; that he should become a sort of state-prisoner in the hands of the English, with an annual pension of eight lacs of rupees, or 100,000*l.* sterling; and that the chiefs who had adhered to him should be secured, not in their military jaghires, but in the possession of such property as might have been handed down to them by their ancestors. It is worthy of remark that in this treaty of submission all mention of Trimbukjee was omitted, the Peishwah having peremptorily declined to be a party, either directly or indirectly, to his seizure.

On the 3rd of June, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Bajee Rao passed into the English camp, whither he was followed by a body of five thousand horse, and three thousand infantry. Of the latter, twelve hundred were Arabs; and there came in not long afterwards several parties from the hills, which swelled the total amount to twelve thousand. This it must be confessed was a formidable army, the annihilation or dispersion of which could be accomplished only by the sacrifice of some lives, and the endurance of much additional fatigue by the survivors. Yet it may admit of a question whether the price at which submission was purchased did not considerably surpass in value the benefit secured. No doubt the Peishwah might have survived another defeat, which, situated as he was, would have as surely overtaken him as it did at Soonee;—in which case a junction with Appah Saheb lay not beyond

his reach. But even in this case it could hardly be said that his position would be improved, or his means of continued resistance at all increased. "They could never," says a competent authority, speaking of the supposed junction, "with all their means, have made head against a British force of the strength of a battalion of infantry, or a regiment of cavalry; nor could the country in which they must have taken refuge afford subsistence for greater numbers than were actually cooped up in it with Appah Saheb; so that famine, a principal instrument as it was in the subsequent operations, would have proved a yet more powerful agent for us, had Bajee Rao likewise sought refuge in the same wilds."

Whatever truth there may be in this reasoning, it is certain that the terms granted to the Peishwah were a great deal more liberal than it had entered into the contemplation of the Governor-General to afford. Sound policy, however, and a sense of what was due to the character of a trusted and an able agent, induced his Lordship to ratify the treaty as soon as it was presented to him, and the Peishwah was in consequence conducted to Bithoor, a place of Hindoo pilgrimage in the vicinity of Cawnpoor, which he had selected as his future residence. It was curious to observe the effect produced among his late adherents by the humiliation of their chief. They fell off from him by whole sections; some clamouring for

arrears of pay, others accusing him of having brought them and their families to ruin by his folly, till in the end his escort was reduced from eight thousand, to something less than eight hundred men. The natives of India, it appears, exhibit in cases of reverse of fortune the same grand features of moral character with the more polished inhabitants of France and of England.

The fall of the Peishwah had the effect, as it was natural that it should, of paralysing the exertions of the lesser chiefs in all parts of the country. Even Trimbukjee made a tender of submission, which was rejected. He then fled, under cover of the guns of Asseergurh, to seek a precarious subsistence as the leader of a band of robbers, who very soon deserted him. Not one, however, of Bajee Rao's sirdars ever attempted to rally the dispersed forces of their master, or to keep the field; and of the Arab mercenaries only a portion made their way across the hills in search of Appah Saheb, under whose banner they took service. It was an easy matter to reduce to submission a principality where the spirit of the leading men was every where so thoroughly broken. Every fortified place opened its gates; and before the end of the season, Mr. Elphinstone, to whom the care of settling the country was intrusted, had made great and satisfactory progress in the accomplishment of his task.

All this while Appah Saheb was passing from point to point among the hills, and gathering round him, from the wreck of other armies, a

host of desperate men, with whom he waged a desultory and annoying war upon the posts and convoys of the English. A body of one hundred sepoys, under Captain Sparkes, was attacked on its way to Bytool, and destroyed, after a desperate resistance. The valley of Bytool was immediately entered and plundered; while at Shalpoor, a party of eighteen men was surprised and cut to pieces, the village being afterwards committed to the flames. In like manner the Goands every where flew to arms; and though defeated as often as found, they nevertheless spread over more than one fertile region the horrors of barbarous war. Troops were forthwith marched into Gondwana from all quarters. Fort after fort was taken; and the enemy, being driven into the closest jungles, perished for lack of food; till towards the end of October, Appah Saheb, reduced to the greatest distress, was glad to seek shelter with a few followers among the most inaccessible points of the Mohadeo mountains. Round these, chains of posts were immediately drawn, while preparations were made to penetrate, with light columns, into the heart of the deepest valleys, where it was imagined that the fugitive might endeavour to conceal himself.

We stated some time ago that Chetoo, the Pindarrie leader, after escaping from Sir John Malcolm at the Chumbul, took service with Appah Saheb, and perished miserably. He was at this time a partner of Appah's desperate fortunes, and proved, by his habits of vigilance and activity, a singularly valuable ally. Under

his guidance, the Rajah shifted his lair, from day to day, and at last, taking advantage of a single false movement in the column which pressed him, effected his escape. Five hundred Arabs, who attempted to follow, were indeed cut to pieces, but Appah, Chetoo, and a band of chosen horsemen, burst into the plain, and pushed with equal rapidity and caution for Asseergurh. In a moment the alarm spread, and every disposable man and horse were put in requisition for the purpose of intercepting the freebooters in their route. Brigadier-General Doveton took the field with the Nizam's subsidiary force, and advancing from Ellichpoor to Warkera detached thence Colonel Pollock into the valley of the Taptee, with orders to reduce Jelpee Ameer, into which some of Appah's followers had thrown themselves, and to cut off all communication between Asseergurh and the Mahadeo hills, by a well-connected line of piquets. The Colonel appeared before the place on the 6th of January, 1819, and opened a battery of six-pounders on the 8th;—the fire of which, though little destructive to the walls, induced the garrison to propose a capitulation. To this, however, Colonel Pollock, who was aware of the advance of a heavy train, refused to listen, and the siege was continued with unabated fury. But Colonel Pollock did not know the habits of the men with whom he had to deal. That very night the garrison stole from their sally-ports, crept on their hands and knees along the deep bed of the

river, and, eluding the notice both of out-posts and sentinels, got clear off.

Being thus put in possession of Jelpee Ameer, Colonel Pollock established there his head-quarters, and remained on the alert till further orders should reach him. On the 3rd of February an express came in, which induced him to advance as far as Puploud, and to cover every road which led to Asseer with piquets of cavalry. These arrangements were completed on the morning of the 4th, and the troops, warned of the necessity for vigilance, did their duty as became them,—patrolling frequently both to the front and on the flanks, and permitting no human being to pass unexamined. Thus it was till the evening, when a small party of mounted men approached a post which had been established in the village of Yoora or Ioora. The troopers instantly turned out,—upon which the horsemen, dispersing into groups each consisting of five or six persons, dashed forward, some in one direction, some in another. One knot alone seemed to waver; but when the cavalry made a movement as if to seize them, they suddenly drove their horses into a ravine, and disappeared among the underwood. Both Appah and Chetoo, the Pindarree, were of that party; and they reached Asseergurh the following morning without any accident.

Of the fate which overtook Chetoo among the jungles that surround Asseergurh, we took occasion to speak in a previous chapter. That of Appah, though less tragical, was scarcely less

striking. The governor of Asseergurh refusing to deliver him up, and persisting in such refusal in spite of a peremptory command from Scindiah, the divisions of General Doveton and Sir John Malcolm proceeded to invest the place; and there opened upon its defences, in due time, one of the most formidable trains of battering cannon which has ever been brought to bear by a British army in India. On the 17th of March the labours of the siege began; and they were prosecuted with unabating vigour up to the 8th of April. The garrison made, during this interval, repeated sorties, and altogether conducted the defence with praiseworthy courage; but the superior skill of the assailants rendered their courage unavailing, even though assisted by works of no common strength. On the 9th of April Asseergurh surrendered, and twelve hundred Arabs, Sindees, and Mukranees laid down their arms in the ditch.

Two discoveries were effected upon the submission of this place, both of them altogether unexpected, and, though after a different fashion, both highly interesting. In the first place, it was ascertained that Appah Saheb was not within the fortress, and that, if any credit could be given to the asseverations of the governor, he had never been there. He fled, it was asserted, on the first approach of the English, and left no trace behind of the route which he had taken. In the next place, a letter from Scindiah was found, which contained orders to the killedar, that he should afford to Bajee Rao every

assistance in his power, "because," continued the document, "should you not do so, I shall be perjured." That letter sufficiently accounted for a line of conduct which, from first to last, had excited the surprise of the English leaders; and sufficiently fixed upon the court of Gwalior the guilt, if such it might be termed, of the governor's obstinacy. Lord Hastings could not well permit so glaring an act of duplicity to pass unpunished, however reluctant he might be to disturb the good understanding which subsisted between his own government and that of Scindiah. He, therefore, directed the letter in question to be sent to Gwalior, as a keen though delicate reproof to him who wrote it; and causing the English standard to be hoisted on the walls of Asseergurh, annexed it to the possessions which the Company had already acquired in that part of India.

The siege of Asseergurh constituted the last important military operation which can be said with propriety to be in any way connected with the prosecution of the Mahratta war. As soon as the fort surrendered, and the dispositions consequent upon the removal of the garrison were complete, the troops of the three Presidencies returned to their respective cantonments; so that, with the exception of a trifling force which the Bombay government continued to employ in bringing to submission the petty court of Sawintwaree, there was not, ere long, a single British regiment in the field. We cannot pause to describe either the movements

of that force, or the proceedings of a naval expedition which was directed, about the same time, to the suppression of piracy on the Arabian coast, and among the islands of the Persian Gulf. Let it suffice to state, that both expeditions proved eminently successful; and that, at sea as well as on shore, an end was put to that system of rapine and misrule which had so long cramped the energies, and rendered useless the industry of all classes of persons connected with the trade and agriculture of India.

It was not, however, enough to have rooted out the Pindarries, and, by breaking the power of the Mahratta confederacy, to have freed the British provinces from the hazard of immediate molestation. The very successes which attended them in a war of unexampled magnitude had placed the Company's government in a totally novel situation,—forcing upon them, as it were, the adoption of that universal sovereignty which it had been so long and so sincerely their object to avoid. What was to be done with the conquered provinces? Would it be judicious to re-erect them into independent principalities, or, by parcelling them out among the crowned heads that were still left, to render them capable, at some future period, of seriously interfering with the tranquillity of their benefactors? Lord Hastings did not fail to take these questions into his most serious consideration, a measure to which the well-known wishes of the home authorities strongly impelled him;

but, after weighing them in all their bearings, he came to the deliberate conclusion, that the adoption of either course would be productive of the worst consequences. He saw that there was no halting half-way. An attentive reference to the past history of India made him aware that there had always been some one power to which the rest looked up as to a feudal superior, and that in exact proportion to the vigour displayed by the administration of that power, the lesser states enjoyed an exemption from rapine and misery. Like a wise as well as a bold statesman, he determined to assume at once the attitude which could not be shunned except with dishonour. It was publicly given out that the Company's Government had taken the place of that of the Mogul; and the ready acquiescence which was every where given to the announcement showed that it was not only expected, but in some degree desired.

Taking this as his principle of action, Lord Hastings proceeded to dispose of the provinces which his arms had acquired, with a view chiefly to promote the interests of his own country, as far as this could be done, consistently with the welfare of the people at large. Of his determination to re-establish the Rajah of Satara in something like royal dignity, we have elsewhere spoken. That object was now accomplished by allotting to him and his heirs the city of Satara, with just so much of territory annexed, as would enable him to keep up the state of a petty prince, without in any degree releasing

him from the tie of absolute dependence on the English. The number of troops which he should be permitted to maintain was distinctly specified. The mode by which both his fiscal and judicial affairs should be administered was defined; and there was stationed at his court an English resident, to whom he was taught to look up as to his political superior. Finally, as the whole of the Peishwah's dominions, with this exception, were formally taken possession of in the name of the Company, it needed no ghost from the grave to convince even the inexperienced Rajah, that the Mahratta nation had ceased to exist.

Similar, in almost every respect, was the conduct pursued in reference to the Nagpoor state, of which by far the larger proportion became attached to the British empire; while the remnant, under a sovereign of British creation, could claim no more dignified rank than that of a dependent principality. Over Malwa, too, Mewar, Candeish, &c. the supremacy of the Company's Government was established; while to Holkar was left but a fragment of the vast possessions which, a few years previously, owned the sway of his predecessors. Scindiah alone, indeed, of all the Mahratta chiefs, retained his sovereignty undiminished in extent, however much it might be shorn of its greatness; and with Ameer Khan and the Rajpoot princes, as well as with the rulers of Bhopal, Kolapoor, and Sawuntwaree, such arrangements were made as rendered them both osten-

sibly and in fact mere vassals to the British crown.

The effect of these arrangements was to give to the Company's government a direct control over two-thirds of the Indian continent, with a paramount superiority which was felt and acknowledged both by the rulers and inhabitants of the remaining portion. "The Indus," to use Lord Hastings' words, when replying to an address of congratulation presented to him by the merchants of Calcutta, "the Indus was now in effect their frontier," and all within it were attached to them, either from affection or respect. Nor was the prudence of the method pursued, in order to consolidate these important conquests, less conspicuous in all its details, than the hardihood which prompted to the conquests themselves. Warned both by his own experience, and by the representations of such men as Mr. Elphinstone, Sir Thomas Munro, and Sir John Malcolm, Lord Hastings made no attempt to introduce into the new provinces the judicial and revenue systems of Bengal, but wisely placed over them functionaries at once able and willing to give effect to such laws and institutions as they should find already established. At Poonah Mr. Elphinstone resided as commissioner till the close of 1819, when his removal to the government of Bombay threw the power into the hands of Mr. Chaplin, an able and experienced public servant, by whom the provinces wrested from the Peishwah were administered, for some time,

with equal firmness and address. Throughout the territories on the Nerbudda again, and the other tracts acquired from the Bhoonsla, Mr. Charles Arthur Maloney exercised supreme control; while Sir John Malcolm, whose zeal and intelligence had been conspicuous from the commencement of the struggle, took upon himself the management of Malwa, and the countries adjacent. A more judicious selection of agents by whom to bring order out of chaos could not have been made. By studying the tempers of the people, and paying respect to their prejudices, the commissioners found no difficulty in reconciling them to a change of masters, which was indeed perceptible only by reason of the increased security that was given to the persons and property of all classes of the community. It may be necessary to add that this state of things continued till all hazard of disaffection appeared to be removed. The separate machinery under which each province had hitherto worked was then withdrawn, and a partition of the whole being made, the districts to the north and east of the Nerbudda were placed under the jurisdiction of the Bengal Presidency, while those to the south and west were made over to the presidency of Bombay.

The establishment of British supremacy over the continent of India, and the annexation of so many fertile and populous districts to the Company's dominions, may be said to have been the last conspicuous acts of Lord Hastings's administration. For three years longer

indeed he continued to preside at the helm of state; watching with a careful eye over the fabric which he had erected, and suppressing every attempt (and more than one was made) to undermine its foundation, or injure its consistency. But stupendous as were these exploits, and highly conducive both to his own glory and to that of his country, the historian is bound, for other and not less important reasons, to speak of Lord Hastings's government with peculiar respect. Under him were taken the first grand steps towards the religious and moral improvement of the people of India. Hitherto, though neither zeal nor industry had been wanting, the progress of the great work was slow; because it was undertaken without system, and carried forward without concert, by individuals acting upon their own responsibility, and often at variance with the dictates of common prudence. To Lord Hastings belongs the merit of having burst the bond of prejudice which so long restrained even the well-intentioned from the adoption of a better policy.

It will be borne in mind, that in the act of Parliament of 1813, by which the Company's charter was renewed, a clause was inserted for the purpose of compelling the Court of Directors to place the Ecclesiastical establishment within their dominions on a more efficient *footing*; and that a Bishop was soon afterwards sent out with *full* powers to check and control the proceedings of all clergymen, whether chaplains or missionaries, in commu-

nion with the Church of England. From Lord Hastings, the distinguished prelate, who laid the foundation of a Protestant Episcopal Church in India, received every support and assistance. When it was proposed to establish a college at Calcutta for the purpose of educating native converts for the labours of the ministry, his Lordship entered cordially into the scheme, and continued ever after to further the progress of the undertaking with the utmost interest. Nor was this all that he did with a view gradually to deliver the people of India from the thraldom of a gross and debasing superstition. Schools and academies were erected at various points, in which the sciences were taught and moral instruction conveyed, while proficiency was rewarded by the employment of the diligent student in some branch of the public service. We are not prepared to say that these wise measures were adopted as the results of any settled plan for the conversion of the Hindoos and Mahommedans to Christianity: they were, on the contrary, the acts of a sagacious politician, who knew that people can be governed well only through the medium of native agents, and who sought to train up a race of persons whom it would be safe to entrust with power, because their minds had received a bias which would hinder them from abusing it. Still, of the ultimate effect of such institutions upon the religious condition of India no Christian can entertain a doubt. Gradual the pro-

cess may doubtless be, but it is not on that account the less sure; for there can be no more certain preparation for the adoption of a true faith, than an exposure, by indirect means, of the follies and absurdities which disfigure that which is false.

Engrossing as, to an ordinary mind, these important cares might have been, Lord Hastings still found leisure to improve the trade of British India, and to foster and promote a spirit of friendly intercourse between the subjects of the Company and their neighbours. It will be borne in mind that, by the peace of 1814, many and striking changes were effected in the political condition of India. To the French was restored their settlement of Pondicherry; to the Dutch, their colonies in the Archipelago; and as both, especially the latter, brought back with them the old spirit of selfish and exclusive dealing, it became necessary to meet the difficulties which such a temper occasioned, by extraordinary exertions. With this view, a free port was established in the island of Singapore, as an emporium for all merchandise that might be carried to or from the East. It was found to answer every expectation, and increased rapidly from a population of a few hundred Malay fishermen, to many thousands of industrious artisans. In like manner, efforts were made, by missions and otherwise, to draw more closely the ties of commerce and good will with Siam and Cochin-China; and so completely were they

successful, that the trade of England has ever since been admitted, at all events into the latter principality, on the same terms as that of the Portuguese, the French, and even the Chinese.

Such was the flourishing condition of British India when Lord Hastings, to the great regret both of the European and native population, announced his intention of shortly returning to Europe. He carried the design into effect on the 1st of January, 1823; when, after making all proper arrangements for the temporary conduct of the government, he took ship in the Hoogly, and soon afterwards set sail*.

* The reader is, doubtless, aware that Mr. Canning was first put in nomination as the successor of Lord Hastings; and that he was preparing to set out for his province, when the melancholy death of Lord Londonderry, in August 1822, caused a partial change in the cabinet; Mr. Canning then became Foreign Secretary, and Lord Amherst succeeded to the vacancy in the government of India.

CHAPTER VIII.

Lord Amherst succeeds to the Government—Aggressions of the Burmese—The origin of them—War declared—Rangoon taken—Description of the City and the Golden Dagon Pagoda—Skirmishes with the Enemy.

In the month of August, 1823, Lord Amherst, the successor of Lord Hastings, entered on the duties of his office. He found that, though the cholera still raged in various parts of the country, and that the provinces subject to the Madras authorities had been recently visited by a severe famine, there prevailed throughout the vast empire over which he had been appointed to preside, as much of tranquillity as was compatible with the peculiar circumstances of its heterogeneous population. Here and there a petty disturbance would indeed break out, originating in some violation or supposed violation of the prejudices of the natives; and once or twice the services of the troops were required to check the progress of a band of robbers, or hold in check a turbulent zemindar. But these were occurrences which occasioned very little alarm even among the individuals who witnessed them, and of which, if men spoke at all at the capital, they treated them as mere accidents

that were not to be guarded against. Both externally and internally, therefore, his Lordship was justified in representing the state of the Company's empire as one of perfect repose; to which there appeared slender cause to apprehend that any interruption would be offered, either by a foreign or domestic enemy.

His Lordship had not, however, discharged the duties of his high office many months, ere his attention was drawn to the encroachments of a neighbouring power, between which and the government of British India grounds of jealousy had for some time subsisted. The power to which we allude was that of the Burmese, a people of whose early history it will be necessary to give some account; as far, at least, as the slender materials of which we are in possession will enable us to speak peremptorily on such a subject.

The rise and progress of the Burmese empire appear, from the statements of our best authorities, to have kept pace, in a great degree, with that of the English in India. About the middle of last century, the inhabitants of Ava, who had previously paid obedience to the kings of Pegu, placed themselves under the command of a warrior named Alomprah, and rebelling against their masters, defeated them in several encounters, and at last reduced them to the condition of vassals. The better to secure himself against the danger of a revolt, Alomprah caused the whole of the Pegu nobility to be put to death, and then marched with his

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victorious followers into the country of Siam, where, for a time, success attended all his efforts. He was engaged in this war when he died, whether in the field or by the process of disease, we know not; but he left able and energetic successors behind, who did not fail to push with vigour the conquests which he had begun. Mergui, Tavoi, and Tenasserim were soon wrested from the Siamese, and formally annexed to the empire, which began to extend itself in other quarters, till at last Arracan, Assam, Munnipoor, and all the minor states around, were swallowed up in one common vortex. The result was, that in 1823 the Burmese empire extended from the ninth to the twenty-seventh degree of north latitude—from the ninety-first to the ninety-ninth of east longitude; and that it was bounded on the north by Thibet, on the east by China and Siam, on the south by Malaya, and on the west by the bay of Bengal and the British frontier.

It would have been contrary to nature had a people thus prosperous in the wars which they had waged with their neighbours been restrained, by the mere terror of the British name, from making encroachments on the Company's possessions. At first, indeed, their proceedings were marked by the display of considerable moderation; for though, in 1794, they did not scruple to follow into Chittagong certain Mughs who had become obnoxious to their government, they not only abstained from the commission of any excesses there, but re-

tired across the frontier as soon as they were formally required to do so by General Erskine, the officer in command on that station. Nevertheless, the British territory having been once violated by a nation of whom so little was known, it became necessary to ascertain with precision both the views and nature of their government; as well as to secure to the British flag, when carried by merchant vessels into Rangoon, a degree of respect which had not hitherto been paid to it. In order to accomplish these objects, Lord Teignmouth, in 1795, directed Captain Symes, of the 76th regiment, Dr. Buchanan, and Ensign Wood, to proceed to Ava; of which they brought back an account, both political and statistical, which is now in the hands of the public, and proves to be, in every respect, singularly accurate.

From this date up to the year 1797, nothing happened to interrupt the good understanding which Captain Symes's mission had created. From time to time, indeed, more of these Mughs came over, and settled themselves, without either soliciting or obtaining permission, in Chittagong; till in 1797 and 1798, so many of them had poured in, that orders were issued to stop them in their progress, and drive them back again into Arracan, whence they were understood to have migrated. The orders in question were very imperfectly obeyed. The emigrants, indeed, declared that they would not return to Arracan; that the English might, if they so pleased,

butcher them where they stood; but that rather than again commit themselves to the tender mercies of the Burmese, they would go and dwell amid the wild beasts in the great jungles of the mountains. There was no resisting such an appeal as this. After not fewer than ten thousand had taken refuge within the empire, settlements were formally allotted to them, and a supply of provisions issued, sufficient to save from starvation all who had survived the hardships to which they had been exposed at the commencement of their new mode of existence.

When the last emigration of Mughs from Arracan took place, there were not more than three hundred Burmese troops in the city, who were too much intimidated by the extent of the disaffection to think of opposing the movement, or pursuing the fugitives. The Supreme Government, however, was not willing to be deprived of so large a body of slaves, and accordingly dispatched an army of four thousand men to bring them back, at all hazards. These made haste to intrench themselves among the woods of Chittagong, where they carried on, for several weeks, a desultory war with the British troops; during which few advantages were gained by either party, and very little loss was sustained on one side or the other. The Burmese commander, however, did not scruple to hold out threats, that, unless the fugitives were given up, a more serious struggle must ensue. "If you," said

he, in a dispatch addressed to the judge and magistrate of Chittagong, "regarding former amity. will deliver up to us all the refugees, friendship and concord will continue to subsist. If you will keep in your country the slaves of our King, the broad path of intercourse between the two states will be blocked up. Our disagreement is only about these refugees; we wrote to you to deliver them, and you have been offended thereat. We again write to you, who are in the province of Chittagong, on the part of the King of the Company, that we will take away the whole of the Arracanese; and further, in order to take them away, more troops are coming. If you will keep the Arracanese in your country, the cord of friendship will be broken."

To this threatening demand the magistrate, Mr. John Moore, replied, that no negotiation could be entered into so long as a Burmese soldier remained within the British dominions; and that the commander of the invading force must take the consequences, should he persist, in defiance of this warning, in abiding where he was. The Burmese, however, paid to the admonition no regard. They retained their hold upon the country, repelled the attempts of a body of sepoys to dislodge them, and fell back only when it suited the humour of their own chiefs to recall them. A good deal of annoyance was experienced at the seat of the British Government, when a report of these proceedings reached head-quarters. Nevertheless it

was judged expedient not to come to an open rupture, and a second attempt was made, by means of an embassy, to bring the differences between the two states to an amicable conclusion. It so far succeeded, that, in spite of a continued influx of Mughs, whose numbers in 1799 were computed at thirty thousand, of all sexes and ages, no further attempt was made to encroach upon our territories; and the emigrants were quietly settled in a district which they themselves selected, close upon the border line of their hereditary enemies.

Time passed, during which, first, Captain Thomas Cox, and afterwards Lieutenant Hill, proceeded as agents for the settlement of disputes to the capital of Ava. They were both very coolly received, and in the year 1800 a formal demand was made that all fugitives from the provinces subject to the Burmese sovereignty should be given up. Lord Wellesley, who was then at the head of affairs, felt strongly tempted to chastise this insolent threat (for a threat of invasion accompanied the demand) by an immediate declaration of war; nevertheless he restrained his indignation, and was content, after a peremptory refusal, to try whether any satisfactory end might yet be attained by a renewed diplomatic intercourse. Colonel Symes was in consequence dispatched a second time to the Burmese court, which he visited to good effect in 1802, while at the same time a strong force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, was marched down to the Chit-

tagong frontier. No hostile movement was attempted on the part of the Burmese, and from that period up to 1809, the idea of a rupture with this haughty people lay, as it were, in abeyance.

At the period just alluded to, Captain Canning proceeded to the capital of Ava on a special mission. He found the court puffed up with a consideration of its own resources, and full of schemes for the invasion and conquest of Chittagong and Dacca, a project which seems to have occupied the minds of the Burmese authorities ever since their troops first ventured to cross the border. Not, then, however, was any movement made on which it was possible for the Governor-General to fasten a ground of quarrel, though the lapse of two short years sufficed to bring to a point the elements of mortal strife which had long been collecting.

We have said that allotments of territory were granted on the frontier of Chittagong to the Mughs, whom the tyranny of their Burmese masters drove into exile. In the year 1811, there arose among these exiles a chief named Kingberring, who, placing himself at the head of a band of his countrymen, began to make fierce inroads into the Arracan dominions. The troops of Ava immediately took the field, and after driving back the invaders, followed them into their new settlement, an operation which necessarily brought into play detachments of British sepoys, between whom and the invaders frequent skirmishes took place. As a

matter of course, remonstrances were made, as well by the supreme authorities on one side as by those on the other; yet the evil went on increasing from day to day, and at last, in 1813, Lord Minto, who was then at the head of the Company's Government, considered it necessary to prepare the minds of the Directors for a Burmese war. No war, however, ensued, because, though the Burmese put little restraint either on their language or their actions, the English, strong in the conviction of their own superiority, exercised towards them the most praiseworthy forbearance.

Such was the state into which Lord Hastings, when he succeeded to the government of India, found that the relations between the two powers had fallen. He did his best to satisfy his irritable neighbours, by placing under restraint the most active of the Mugh leaders, and though he refused to give them up, by permitting the Burmese troops to follow into Chittagong any bands of marauders whom they might have expelled from their own country. Yet even this sufficed not to meet the wishes of the Rajah of Arracan, who demanded, through agents dispatched for the purpose, that "the Burmese troops, on entering the British territories, should be supplied by the English government with arms, ammunition, and provisions." Such a proposition could not be listened to for a moment, and they who presumed to make it became, as a matter of course, more and more confirmed in their hostile determinations.

The death of Kingberring, which occurred in 1815, was not found to produce any beneficial effect on the sentiments and proceedings of his countrymen. It gave, indeed, a new direction to their atrocities, which, instead of being perpetrated within the limits of the Burmese dominions, were now freely exercised on the subjects of the British government. Nevertheless to their ancient masters they continued to be as much as ever the objects of jealousy, and fresh and reiterated demands were made for their surrender. "The English government," said the Rajah of Remeri, the Burmese governor of certain frontier provinces, "does not try to preserve friendship. You seek for a state of affairs like fire and gunpowder. The Mughs of Arracan are the slaves of the King of Ava. The English government has assisted the Mughs of the four provinces, and has given them a residence. There will be a quarrel between us and you, like fire. Formerly the government of Arracan demanded the Mughs from the British government, which promised to restore them, but at length did not do so. Again the Mughs escaped from your hands, came and despoiled the four provinces, and went and received protection in your country. If at this time you do not restore them according to my demand, or make delays in doing so, the friendship now subsisting between us will be broken."

The dispatch, of which we have here given a copy, came to hand in April, 1816. It tended

only to confirm the conviction which already prevailed in Calcutta, and which a previous attempt, on the part of the Burmese, to contract an alliance with the Rajah of Lahore, had created,—namely, that the first favourable opportunity would be embraced by the King of Ava of bringing the difference between the two states to the arbitrement of a war. Nevertheless no angry notice was taken of it, while strenuous exertions were made to put a curb on the lawless propensities of men, to whom it began very generally to be believed that an asylum ought never to have been afforded. All, however, availed not to soothe the irritated feelings of the Burmese. In 1818, when the Mahratta war was at its height, the Governor-General received a written communication from the King of Ava, in which his majesty laid claim to the provinces of Chittagong, Dacca, Moorshedabad, and Cassimbazar, and demanded that the English should either withdraw or pay tribute for them. The course adopted by Lord Hastings, on receipt of this extraordinary epistle; was worthy of the talents of so distinguished a statesman. Instead of resenting it as an insult, and thereby involving himself with another formidable enemy, he affected to treat the document as a forgery, and sent it to the court of Ava, with a request that the author might be punished, as having been guilty of a grave offence against the honour of the Burmese monarch. The expedient was productive of all the good effects anticipated from it. Intelli-

gence of the total suppression of the Mahratta power having reached the Burmese cabinet, the impolicy of plunging into a contest, which they must maintain single-handed, became apparent; and the loop-hole offered by the good sense of Lord Hastings was at once and thankfully turned to account.

Prompt as the Burmese were, on this occasion, to grasp at a ready excuse for the withdrawal of an extravagant demand, it was apparent to all, who looked with ordinary attention to the relative situations of the two countries, that nothing short of a miracle could long prevent a hostile collision between them. A proud and ambitious people, just sufficiently civilized to believe themselves stronger than they really were, could ill brook the vicinity of a power, the rivals, as they absurdly imagined, of their own renown, and the only obstacle between them and the establishment of a universal Asiatic supremacy. Even during the continuance of the uneasy peace, which prevailed from 1818 to 1823, this feeling was abundantly manifested in the haughty bearing of the chiefs,—while the eagerness with which at last they took up arms, without any reference to negotiation, showed that their minds had never for a moment been diverted from the thought of an English war. The immediate bone of contention was, indeed, worthless enough, but when either individuals or nations are bent on effecting a quarrel, the merest trifle will serve the

purpose just as effectually as a matter of the greatest importance.

At the mouth of the Tiknaaf, an arm of the sea which divides a part of Chittagong from Arracan, there is a small island, or sand-bank, called Shapuree, where it had long been customary for a handful of British sepoys to keep guard, as it were, over the frontier. Towards the close of 1823, a body of Burmese, without any previous announcement of hostile intentions, landed, under cover of a dark night, upon this island, drove off the piquet, and took formal possession of the place in the name of the King of Ava. At the same time other bands, issuing from Assam and Munnipoor, broke into the provinces immediately adjacent, and, while they carefully avoided all encounter with the English troops, drove off many elephant-hunters, and plundered several villages. It was to no purpose that the local authorities complained of these aggressions, and drew together a few companies of infantry in order to resist them. The Burmese not only paid to their complaints no regard, but ventured ere long to meet the sepoys in battle; and as the latter were, for the most part, very widely scattered, such affairs did not always end to the disadvantage of the aggressors. This was particularly the case in an action which Lieutenant-Colonel Brown was induced to hazard on the 21st of July, 1824. The enemy had then penetrated into Sylhet, to the number of 2000

men, and stationed themselves at a place called Doodpulee on the frontier, — when Colonel Brown attacked them with somewhat too much ardour, and was repulsed with the loss of five officers, and one hundred and fifty men. It was no longer possible to overlook a series of outrages which led to so calamitous and humiliating a result. A manifesto was put forth by the Governor-General in Council, in which the causes of complaint against the Burmese were stated at length; and a declaration of war being published immediately afterwards, the most active preparations were made to carry it on with vigour and effect.

The first matter of discussion that presented itself to the notice of Lord Amherst related to the point from which it might be advisable to commence that series of offensive operations which circumstances appeared to recommend. After giving to the subject a somewhat hasty consideration, it was resolved to open the campaign upon the coast, and establishing at Rangoon a depôt of stores and ammunition, to penetrate into the interior along the course of the river Irawaddy. This plan, which originated, we believe, with Major Canning, rested not a little on the belief, that there would be found at Rangoon an ample supply of boats, with watermen ready to take service under the invaders. It was suggested, moreover, that in all probability the occupation of Rangoon alone would bring the king of Ava to terms, more especially if a force could

be marched at the same time across the country by Umrapoora towards the capital. But the event proved that there existed a great deal of ignorance both as to the resources of the country, and the temper of the people; the former being as much under-rated as at one period it had been over-estimated, while the latter was entirely misunderstood.

Having determined to try, in the first instance, the effect of a maritime expedition, orders were issued for the assembly of a formidable army, both at Calcutta and Fort St. George. At the former port two of the king's regiments, the 13th light infantry and 38th, eighteen hundred strong, with a battalion of Bengal sepoys, and two companies of foot artillery, came together. At the latter, about 6600 fighting men, of whom 1750 were Europeans, were warned for embarkation. The guidance of the Madras contingent was committed to Colonel Maclean; that of the Bengal division to Colonel M'Creagh; while to the command of the whole was nominated Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, an officer who had served in the Peninsular army with much distinction. A powerful squadron of armed vessels, consisting of his majesty's ships Liffey and Larne, Sophie and Slaney, together with several Company's cruisers, was directed, under the command of Commodore Grant, to accompany the transports; and Port Cornwallis, a convenient harbour among the Andaman islands, was specified as the place of general rendezvous.

On the 17th of April, the last division of the Bengal fleet cleared the Sand-heads at the mouth of the Hoogly. On the 26th the vessels made the land; and on the 3rd of May, sailed triumphantly into Port Cornwallis, where a large part of the Madras squadron was already waiting to receive them. Here some days were spent, during which other vessels continued to arrive, among which was a steam-boat, called the Diana, a novelty in naval architecture, in which certain speculative individuals had embarked, and which the supreme government now bought up for service in the Irawaddy. By the 4th of May, the commodore having completed his arrangements, a signal was hung out to weigh, and on the 7th, a fair breeze having sprung up, the fleet quitted the roadstead. No accident befel any of the craft during their rapid and agreeable voyage; which brought them at a late hour in the evening of the 10th to the embouchure of the Rangoon, one of the many channels into which the Irawaddy diverges, and by which it carries its prodigious mass of water into the sea.

Having anchored here for the night in order that the heavier vessels might close up, the fleet began again to move at noon on the 11th, and passing a couple of rude batteries from which a few harmless shots were fired, arrived in the evening, before sunset, abreast of Rangoon. It presented no appearance either of wealth or prosperity, being built entirely of wood, and its defences, on the water-

side at least, consisted solely of three barbette batteries, which seemed to have been recently thrown up on certain jetties that protruded a little way into the river. From one of these, which contained twelve pieces of cannon, a fire was opened upon the Liffey as soon as she rounded a point of land and became exposed to observation; but a couple of broadsides sufficed to dismount all the guns, and to drive a crowd of people who had assembled round them back into the town. Not a moment was then lost in conveying the troops to land. They reached the shore without giving or receiving a shot, and took possession of the town, which, to their great surprise, they found entirely deserted. Here certain Europeans, whom on the sudden approach of the fleet the authorities had placed in confinement, were discovered, and their chains being filed off, the single cause of uneasiness which prevailed at head-quarters was removed.

We have said, that the city of which the British army were now in possession, exhibited no very flattering example of Burmese opulence or splendour. "Its shape," says the intelligent author of 'Two Years in Ava,' "is oval; and round the town is a wooden stockade, formed of teak planks driven a few feet into the ground, and in some places twenty feet high. The tops of these are formed of beams transversely placed, and at every four feet is an embrasure at the summit of the wall, which gives it a good deal the appearance of

an ancient fortification. A wet ditch protects the town on three sides; the other is on the banks of the river."

While such is the nature of the works by which this emporium of Burmese trade is protected, "the interior, we are told, consists of four principal streets intersecting each other at right angles, on the sides of which are ranged, with a tolerable degree of regularity, the huts of the inhabitants. These are solely built of mats and bamboos, not a nail being used in their formation; they are raised invariably two or three feet from the ground, or rather swamp in which Rangoon is situated, thereby allowing a free passage for the water with which the town is inundated after a shower, and at the same time affording shelter to fowls, ducks, pigs, and pariah dogs, an assemblage which, added to the inmates of the house, place it on a par with an Irish hovel. The few brick houses to be seen are the property of foreigners, who are not restricted in the choice of materials for building, whereas the Burmese are, on the supposition that, were they to build brick houses, they might become points of resistance against the government.

"But even these buildings are erected so very badly, that they have more the appearance of prisons than habitations. Strong iron bars usurp the place of windows, and the only communication between the upper and lower stories is by means of wooden steps placed outside. Only two wooden houses existed

much superior to the rest, and these were the palace of the Maywoon, and the Rondaye, or Hall of Justice. The former of these, an old dilapidated building, would have been discreditable as a barn, in England, and the latter was as bad."

Throughout this wretched city, of which the population is represented as exceeding fifty thousand souls, not a native of any age or sex was to be seen. They had all, in obedience to the peremptory orders of their chiefs, fled on the arrival of the invaders; and though in a day or two afterwards a few stragglers ventured to return, they came only to ascertain how the foreigners conducted themselves, and returned again as soon as that object was accomplished. It was to no purpose that proclamations were issued, assuring the people of protection to life and property. The King had commanded them to make a desert of the country in the face of their enemies, and they were too much under the control of him and his representatives to disobey. Thus was the absurdity demonstrated of the rumours which led to a belief, that from the natives themselves every assistance would be procured in navigating the river; for though one or two boats fell accidentally into the hands of General Campbell, not a boatman appeared to undertake their management.

The effect of this discovery was to derange entirely that portion of the plan which was founded on the idea of an advance by water.

There was not throughout the fleet small craft sufficient to transport a single division; and had the contrary been the case, seamen enough to man a large flotilla could not be spared. Had the troops arrived a couple of months earlier, or the expedition been delayed till the monsoons were over, then, indeed, the experiment of a march along the banks of the river might have been hazarded, though even then the difficulties attending the conveyance of stores and ammunition would have been considerable. But, unfortunately, the rains set in within five days of the debarkation, and the whole of the country to the distance of many miles from the banks of the river became ere long one vast and impassable swamp. Under such circumstances there seemed but one course for the general to adopt. He determined to halt where he was till a cessation of the rains should have opened out a passage for his troops by land, or till boats should be procured, either in the country or from the British settlements, capable of containing such a force as might be deemed adequate to undertake a movement upon the capital.

About two miles to the north of the city, and on the highest point of a low range of hills, stands a stupendous pagoda, of which the same author gives the following splendid account. "The approach to it on the southern face is through a fine row of mango, cocoa-nut, and other beautiful trees, leading from the town and shading a capital road, at each side

of which are monasteries or kioums, of great antiquity, and carved all over with curious images and ornaments, whilst here and there the attention is attracted by huge images of griffins and other hideous monsters guarding the entrance to different pagodas. At the end of this road rises abruptly the eminence on which the Golden Dagon stands. It is encircled by two brick terraces, one above the other, and on the summit rises the splendid pagoda, covered with gilding, and dazzling the eyes by the reflection of the rays of the sun. The ascent to the upper terrace is by a flight of stone steps, protected from the weather by an ornamented roof. The sides are defended by a balustrade representing a huge crocodile, the jaws of which are supported by two colossal figures of a male and female palloo, or evil genius, who, with clubs in their hands, are emblematically supposed to be guarding the entrance of the temple.

"After ascending the steps, which are very dark, you suddenly pass through a small gate, and emerge into the upper terrace, where the great pagoda, at about fifty yards distance, rears its lofty head in perfect splendour. This immense octagonal gilt-based monument is surrounded by a vast number of smaller pagodas, griffins, sphinxes, and images of the Burmese deities. The height of the Tee, three hundred and thirty-six feet from the terrace, and the elegance with which this enormous mass is built, combine to render it one of the grandest

and most curious sights a stranger can notice. From the base it assumes the form of a ball or dome, and then gracefully tapers to a point of considerable height, the summit of which is surmounted by a Tee or umbrella of open iron work, from whence are suspended a number of small bells, which are set in motion by the slightest breeze, and produce a confused, though not unpleasant sound."

Of this building, which is represented as not less beautiful in its interior decorations than magnificent in its exterior, Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to take military possession, and to convert it into the key of a very strong position, by means of which he might protect Rangoon and his supplies from molestation. Two companies of infantry were accordingly thrown into the temple, round the base of which a couple of battalions found quarters, while the remainder, with the exception of one regiment of native infantry, to which the occupation of Rangoon was entrusted, occupied the streets, of which we have already spoken as connecting the city with the pagoda. The whole were, of course, covered both by day and night with a connected chain of piquets, as these, again, were guarded against the hazards of a surprise by the vigilance of their advanced sentries.

Such was the attitude which, for some time, General Campbell maintained, still hoping that his proclamations might produce an effect; and that the people, wearied out with so long a

continuance in the jungles, might be induced to return to their homes. It appears too, from the statements of those who shared his dangers and anxieties, that as yet the delay created no feeling of dissatisfaction; because the sky continuing cloudless, there was so much to admire in the outward face of nature, that men found ample and agreeable employment in indulging the mere sense of sight. To the north-east lay the mountains which overhang the Setang river, between which and the pagoda extended one mighty plain, diversified here and there by the intervention of a wood, and beautifully intersected by the winding courses of the Pegu and the Morree. To the south were seen the fort and pagoda of Syriam, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest. Then came the Rangoon covered with innumerable shipping; the city with its countless temples and avenued approaches; and last of all, beyond both the river and a small but romantic lake that bounded it, the rich plains of Dálla, shaggy with eternal foliage. Nevertheless, though abundantly interesting as long as the weather continued favourable, this magnificent panorama lost all its attractions as soon as the rains began to set in; while even before this took place there occurred one or two events well calculated to turn men's thoughts into a different channel.

As yet no intelligence had been received of the enemy's preparations, nor had the invitations of General Campbell to the peaceable inhabitants been attended to, when, on the

15th of May, a few boats which had proceeded up the river, for the purpose of reconnoitring, were fired at by a party of men from behind a breastwork in a village called Kemadine. Next day a second reconnoissance, consisting of the grenadier company of his Majesty's 38th regiment was pushed under Captain Beck upon the same place; the troops landed, drove the enemy from their breastwork, and followed them to a second, which also was carried, though not without some hard fighting; during which Lieutenant Ker, of the 38th regiment, was killed, Lieutenant Wilkinson, Royal Navy, severely wounded, and two and twenty non-commissioned officers and privates put *hors de combat.* But the most remarkable feature in this case was the part which a fine young woman, the wife of the Rayhoon of Rangoon, took in the action; for she was found after the retreat of the Burmese in a dying state, having been pierced through both legs by a musket ball. On the whole, therefore, though the detachment returned victorious, and gratified by the destruction of three of the enemy's posts, they brought with them a report of the obstinate gallantry of the defenders, which led both officers and men to look forward with increased interest to the probable chances of a speedy trial of strength.

While the English government was preparing the expedition to Rangoon the court of Ava turned its undivided attention to the side of Chittagong, whence, and whence only, it seems

to have anticipated that any hostile movement would be made. The preparations of its military chiefs were not, however, calculated to meet the exigencies of a defensive war alone. A large army was assembled, which began immediately to cut roads through the forest, for the avowed purpose of facilitating an invasion of the Bengal territories; and it was openly given out that in the event of a refusal to relinquish Shapuree, thirty thousand men would cross the border, and march upon Calcutta. The sudden appearance of a British force on the coast of Pegu gave a totally novel cast to the aspect of affairs. Extraordinary exertions were made to arm the native population, while seven thousand men were hastily recalled from the western provinces, and the command of the whole was given to a warrior of lofty reputation, by name Sykiah Woonghee, the newly-created viceroy of Pegu. It was not, however, till towards the end of May that any indications of the approach of an enemy's army were perceived within the limits of the British camp, which, excepting in providing for the reconnoissance alluded to in the last paragraph, and prosecuting, on the same day, a similar excursion by land, was wholly exempt, during three weeks after the period of its formation, from the hurry and bustle of active warfare.

We stated that on the 16th the rainy season set in, and that its effects were such as to preclude, during the continuance of the monsoon,

all possibility of moving a body of troops by land. From that day, however, a system of annoying the outposts began, which was persisted in, during a full fortnight, with unremitting activity; the sentinels being continually fired at from sunset till dawn, and the piquets frequently obliged to turn out, in order to repel an attack. At the same time the enemy began to launch down the stream fire-rafts of a very formidable description, which it required all the activity and vigilance of the seamen belonging to the fleet to intercept and turn aside; while the appearance of columns of smoke at various points in the forest seemed to indicate the approach of a Burmese army, and the establishment of a camp in our front. This opinion gained additional strength, in consequence of the occupation, by ten or twelve Burmese, of an open space within cannon-shot of a British piquet, and the carelessness with which, on the advance of a strong patrol, they fell back only to a stockade which had been erected in their rear. It is true that the stockade was carried by a bold dash on the part of the English; nevertheless, the general aspect of affairs was such as to convince Sir Archibald Campbell of the necessity of pushing, with as little delay as possible, a strong reconnoissance to his front.

On the 28th of May the movement in question was effected, Sir Archibald Campbell, his staff, and the heads of departments superintending its execution. Three hundred Eu-

ropeans, with a select body of natives, supported by a couple of six-pounders of peculiarly light construction, marched from the Pagoda at dawn of day, and drove from the ruins of the stockade which had been captured on the preceding evening, a detachment of troops who were busily engaged in repairing its breaches. They followed up this success in spite of an incessant deluge of rain, till the artillery became perfectly immoveable, and even then, leaving the sepoys to protect the guns, the English pressed forward. All this while their route led through the centre of a forest, from the recesses of which concealed marksmen fired repeatedly upon the patrols, while beyond it a dense mass of the enemy were seen drawn up, as if to dispute the passage of a narrow wooden bridge, which was thrown across a swamp, and communicated with a village. It was here that the guns came, for the first time, into play, so as to disperse, by a few rounds, the Burmese column; after which the infantry traversed the defile in perfect safety, and emerged into a wide plain, over which a luxuriant crop of rice was beginning to spread. Now, at last, a full view was obtained of the enemy's preparations. A line of infantry became visible at the further extremity of the plain, supported, as the rising of a dense smoke seemed to imply, by stockades on the left; which, if any judgment could be formed by the rapid movements of mounted officers along its front, would not fall back till it had measured its

strength with its enemies. In a moment the Europeans were thrown into a new formation, and continuing the advance in echellon, held the entire line in check, while the light company of the 38th, which composed the left, opened out the profile of the work, and made ready to storm it.

The affair which ensued was singularly desperate, whether we look to the resistance offered by the Burmese while the assailants were advancing, or to the obstinacy with which they continued the combat after the 38th had surmounted the defences. It seemed, indeed, as if the enemy neither expected nor desired to receive quarter: nor was the case different on the right, where another stockade was found, which a company of the 13th attacked and carried, with the most devoted gallantry. The line, on the other hand, made no resistance whatever; and it was regarded as a curious fact, that neither in the plain nor within the intrenchments was a single piece of artillery discovered, for the jingals, or wall-pieces, do not deserve to be so accounted. Nevertheless, though everywhere victorious, the British troops fell back to the Pagoda with undiminished respect for the bravery of their opponents. It needed but the occurrence of a few more rencounters to satisfy them that, even in this respect, the Burmese were nowise superior to other Asiatic nations.

CHAPTER IX.

The Army at Rangoon—Rendered immoveable by the absence of means of transport—Flight of the Inhabitants—Take up a position in front of Rangoon—Affairs with the Enemy—The Burmese collect in force—Progress of the War—The Bundoolah—Successful in Arracan—Recalled to defend Pegu—His offensive operations and defeats.

For two days after this reconnoissance there occurred nothing of which it is necessary to give a minute account. It was easy to perceive, indeed, from the increasing fires in the woods, that the enemy were assembling in force in the vicinity of the British position; and a patrol sent out ascertained, beyond the possibility of doubt, that new stockades were in progress, wherever a convenient opening presented itself. Under these circumstances General Campbell determined to drive in the Burmese posts all along his front. He advanced, with this view, at the head of two thousand four hundred men, divided into three columns of eight hundred each; but by some unfortunate mistake, two of these sustained a repulse, and the third drew back without fighting. Nevertheless, the spirits of the troops were in no degree damped, nor the

confidence of their leader diminished; and preparations were forthwith made for a second advance in increased force, and on a more scientific principle. It was resolved to employ this time a water-column with a view of turning the enemy's position, which was flanked by a strong stockade in front of Kemundine on the river; and in the event of success, to cut off that line of retreat which had hitherto been most conveniently followed by fugitives, both civil and military.

While the arrangements for this enterprise were going on, there arrived a war-boat at Rangoon, in which were embarked certain personages, the bearers of a flag of truce, and of a demand from the King of Ava that the English should explain the motives of their invasion of his dominions. The emissaries, who came evidently rather as spies than as agents of their government, were treated with great civility but with equal coolness; for their remonstrances produced no relaxation in the preparations which were in progress, and which attained on the day of their return perfect consistency. On the 10th of June, at two o'clock in the morning, a large body of infantry, supported by a squadron of boats, in which were embarked a train of heavy guns, began their march in the direction of Kemundine, and at nine arrived in front of a series of stockades, which were breached, stormed, and taken with great gallantry. The army then pushed on till it arrived in front of the

main position, which the enemy seemed determined to defend with greater obstinacy, and on the fortifications of which the fire even of the eight pounders was seen to produce very little effect. Nor was this all: General Campbell, anxious to make the most of his manœuvre, abstained from giving the assault till he should have invested the stockade both by land and water; and found, in the endeavour to do so, that it was supported by other works in the rear, too extensive for him, with his limited means, effectually to embrace. He therefore contented himself with firing a few rounds from his heavy cannon, which penetrated the bamboos without leaving almost any trace behind, and bivouacked for the night in the full determination of fighting a great and decisive battle on the morrow. The scene of that bivouac is described as having been peculiarly striking. "The shouts of the Burmese had a curious effect, much heightened by the wild scenery of the dark gloomy forest that surrounded us: first a low murmur might be heard, rising, as it were, gradually in tone, and followed by the wild and loud huzza of thousands of voices;—then again all was silence, save now and then a straggling shot or challenge from our own sentries, and soon afterwards another peal of voices would resound through the trees. This they continued all night; but towards morning the yells became fainter and fainter, and at daybreak they totally ceased." Nor was the conclusion of

the enterprise less remarkable than the incidents which attended its progress. On pushing forward his columns next morning, after three or four salvos from his batteries, Sir Archibald found that the works were abandoned; and that the enemy had carried off with them even their dead, conducting the retreat with the greatest order and regularity.

Leaving a regiment to keep possession of Kemundine, the General returned with the rest of his army to Rangoon, which Brigadier M'Creagh, who had been detached to reduce the island of Chituba, regained about the same time, after executing his mission with success. Not long afterwards, information came in that Sykia Woonghee, the Burmese commander, was about to be superseded,—a circumstance which led General Campbell to anticipate a speedy attack on his own lines; and if a miserable attempt to drive in the piquets can be regarded as an aggressive movement, such a movement was unquestionably made on the 1st of July. But so perfectly harmless were the demonstrations of the enemy, that the line turned out only, in part, to observe them, while two companies of Native Infantry sufficed to drive away the few that had ventured to push back the sentinels on their support. It was understood three days afterwards that Sykia Woonghee was gone, and that Shumbah Woonghee, a warrior of much more illustrious name, had arrived to take upon himself the guidance of the army.

Successful as they were in every rencounter with the enemy, and sustaining little comparative loss from the skirmishes which they found it necessary to maintain, the army of Rangoon was nevertheless far from enjoying an exemption from the ordinary calamities of war carried on in a country decidedly hostile, and at a distance from the depôts whence the necessities of the troops might be supplied. The slender stock of fresh provisions which it had been esteemed necessary to transport from India was very soon exhausted, and the continued absence of the Burmese population left the commissaries without any ostensible means of making good the deficiency. Why a strong foraging expedition was never undertaken is a question which yet remains to be answered, though, doubtless, there were excellent reasons, however difficult of discovery they may be to persons ignorant both of the nature of the country, and the impediments which stood in the way of turning its resources to account. Be this, however, as it may, the absence both of vegetables and fresh meat soon began to tell upon the health of the troops. Multitudes, especially of the Europeans, sickened every day, and out of these there were comparatively few whose natural constitution proved sufficiently good to carry them through the crisis of the disease. The mortality, indeed, became, ere long, very alarming, and there were no means at hand by which to render it less so.

From the space of three weeks after the

date of this affair, there did not occur, on either side, any movement of which it is necessary to give a detailed account. The enemy, indeed, closed up again to the British sentinels, and continued to press the out-posts by a series of vexatious attacks, most of which resembled rather the enterprises of professional robbers than the bold proceedings of an avowed and warlike enemy. Individuals likewise would steal into the quarters of the troops and carry off arms, knapsacks, or any other articles which came to hand; nay, so daring were these marauders, that even the great pagoda received from them at least one visit, of the results of which the following ludicrous account is given.

"The soldiers for several nights previous had missed some arms, although a sentry was before the door, and they generally slept with their firelocks by their sides. This evening every one was on the alert, extra sentries were posted, and every precaution taken to secure the marauders, when on a sudden, the alarm being given, the officer on duty, who was reposing in one of the little temples, ran to the door, and inquired what had occurred; but hearing that only a knapsack had been found in the grass, and that no other traces existed of the depredators, he turned round to lie down again, and to his infinite astonishment found that his bed had vanished! A light was in the room, and a servant sleeping near it, yet, notwithstanding, the impudent thieves had also

ransacked every basket and escaped with the contents. We afterwards learned that the robbers were Burman soldiers belonging to the camp at Kumaroot, whither they carried their spoils."

Meanwhile the new Burman commander, besides animating his followers to carry on a brisk war of posts, was busily engaged in the construction of a line of intrenchments, which commanded the town at a point where the Lyne and Panlang streams meet, about seven miles above the town of Rangoon. On the 8th of July, in defiance of the continued fury of the monsoon, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to attack him there, and embarking a portion of his army in boats, and directing a part to proceed by land, pushed forward in full assurance of a complete, if not a bloodless, victory. Nor in any respect were these anticipations—the results, not of vanity, but of observation—disappointed. The water-column, of which he himself was at the head, after silencing the enemy's guns by its superior artillery practice, disembarked on the flank of a formidable stockade and carried it by assault; while the land division, under General M'Bean, though unsupported even by field-pieces, stormed and took not fewer than six redoubts at the point of the bayonet. It is impossible adequately to describe the confusion and dismay which prevailed among the Burmans as stockade after stockade was entered. They fought not for victory, but in despair; and

they died by hundreds, their leader, Shombah Woonghee, being numbered among the slain. Between ten and twelve thousand men, composing the army by which the position was manned, sustained this signal defeat from less than four thousand British troops; while the trophies which they left behind, including standards, muskets, swords, ornaments, and even guns, made up no inconsiderable booty, of which the conquerors received the full value.

The loss of the defeated in this action was computed at a thousand men killed and wounded; that of the conquerors scarcely exceeded fifty. So great a disproportion in the amount of casualties, while it struck the Burmans with dismay, increased the confidence which already prevailed in the British ranks, and convinced the soldiers that their enemies, however individually brave, were deficient in the discipline and mutual confidence which can alone convert a mass of brave men into an army. Nor was this the only effect produced by it. The fall of Shumbah Woonghee releasing his followers from the restraints of authority, they availed themselves, almost to a man, of the liberty thus obtained, and dispersing to their homes, left the old Rayhoon of Rangoon with scarcely three thousand men to watch the invaders. He took post at Coghee and Kykloo, two villages on the other side of the forest, but as he did not venture to commit himself in the presence of an English picket,

the rest of the month passed over without the occurrence of any adventure.

All the while the rain continued to fall in torrents, and the country became in every direction little better than a swamp. Of fresh provisions too, and even of vegetables, the troops were entirely destitute, for the fleet had brought only as much as appeared sufficient for consumption during the passage, and the inhabitants kept as completely aloof as ever. Occasionally, indeed, when Sir Archibald esteemed it safe to risk a reconnoissance beyond the line of his advanced sentries, the detachments succeeded in procuring a few heads of cattle, but these scarcely sufficed to supply the demands of the hospital, and were in no instance served out as rations to the army at large. The consequence was that sickness made every day greater ravages in the ranks. Both officers and men sank under the united influence of a pestiferous climate and unwholesome diet, and the hospitals became crowded with patients, of whom by far the greater proportion perished. Nothing, indeed, except the indomitable patience which forms a prominent feature in the character of British troops could have sustained the army of Ava in the state of inaction to which it was subjected; for we need not add that when sickness prevails in a camp, it finds no more efficient ally than the absence of all excitement. Almost any army in the world, except an English one, would have been utterly disorganized in Rangoon.

Thus baffled in his attempts to break the spirit of the Burmese government, and unable to open with it the kind of negotiation which he had been led to anticipate, General Campbell determined to follow up that article in his instructions which directed him, in case a fitting opportunity should offer, to effect the subjugation of certain maritime provinces. Of these Tavoy and Mergui, both on the coast of Tenasserim, were by far the most important, not only by reason of the excellence of their harbours, but because they offered convenient shelter to privateers and cruisers, while employed in harassing the trade of the Bay of Bengal. Lieutenant-Colonel Miles of his Majesty's 89th regiment was detached with a body of troops to reduce them; and he succeeded without difficulty, the people surrendering their towns as soon as they were summoned. It was not so with a second expedition, which proceeded soon afterwards to Martaban, a strong town upon the river Thalnegur, which was held by a garrison of four thousand men. The place stood a species of siege, if the term may with propriety be applied to an investment of twenty-four hours continuance; and was taken by assault on the 30th of October, with a loss to the storming party of twenty-one men. Immediately the province of Tenasserim, with all the towns and villages belonging to it, sent in its submission, and the whole line of coast which had formerly owned the sway of the king

of Ava, became annexed, at least temporarily, to the British dominions.

In the mean time the authorities of Ummarapoora, to whom every event of the war appears to have been faithfully reported, were by no means idle. Previous to the formal commencement of hostilities they had assembled a large army on the Chittagong frontier, which was placed under the command of Mingee Maha Bundoolah, by far the most skilful, as well as the most honoured of their generals. He had obtained some successes, in the month of May, over a body of sepoys encumbered rather than supported by a levy of Mughs; driving them back from a position which they had taken up at Ramoo, and dispersing them with the loss of their cannon, and of several European officers. Had he followed up the blow with vigour or activity, Chittagong itself would have fallen; for there were few troops to defend it, and among these so great a respect for Burmese valour had arisen, that their resistance, if they offered any, would have been very feeble. But Bundoolah delayed so long in the vicinity of Ramoo, that he gave time for the arrival of a fresh army, before which he fell back, slowly indeed, but without risking a battle, till the British territories were entirely delivered of his presence. Nor was this the only bad effect to the Burmese cause, which may be attributed to the over-caution of the Bundoolah. Brigadier-General Macmorine was enabled, with a

force of which he was in command, to march upon Gawahate, the capital of western Assam; and though he himself soon afterwards fell a sacrifice to cholera, his successor, by a series of conquests, gave a new direction to the tide of events. The minds of the native merchants in Calcutta, which had become all but distracted by alarm, rapidly recovered their tone, and the peasantry around returned to their labours, from which the anticipation of a Burmese invasion had, for a while, driven them away.

Notwithstanding the absence of enterprise which his long halt at Ramoo displayed, the Bundoolah's reputation obtained so great an accession by the victory which threw the place into his hands, that it was determined to recall him from Arracan, and to employ him in expelling the invader from Pegue. The order of recall was gladly received both by the chief and his soldiers, who were thus enabled to quit, with untarnished honour, a field which they began already to perceive that they were not sufficiently strong to maintain. They hastened by forced marches across a difficult country, moving, as their custom was, independently and without order, and arrived in the midst of the rains at Denobin on the Irawaddy, where, at the distance of seventy miles from Rangoon, they began to strengthen a very favourable position. At the same time other armies were organized, and other posts put in a defensible station, for the purpose, as the Bundoolah gave out, of providing against the occurrence of

any possible disaster. Not that the chief warrior of this nation of conquerors entertained any idea of acting on the defensive. It was, on the contrary, his determination to destroy the white men in their lines as soon as the return of dry weather would permit his columns to move; but, as he judiciously argued, some accident might occur to prevent this, and it therefore became him, as a prudent commander, to provide even against accidents. Hence the zeal and activity with which troops were enrolled and stockades constructed, so as to cover all the approaches to the capital, while the prince Sarawaddy himself, the king's brother, quitted the palace for the purpose of giving a general superintendence to operations of which he does not appear to have understood either the uses or the importance.

It was now the month of August, and Rangoon continued to present the extraordinary spectacle of a large city occupied only by armed strangers, and totally denuded of its inhabitants. No intercourse, moreover, had as yet taken place between the troops and any portion of the rural population, and hence the same degree of knowledge prevailed about the condition of the country as was possessed by the leaders of the expedition when it quitted Calcutta. A remarkable personage, a native of Madras, the son of an English father and a low-caste mother, called Gibson, who had spent all his days in Ava, and stood high in the confidence of the government, had, indeed, been

brought into head-quarters. But this man, though he astonished the heads of departments by his knowledge of general history, and his acquaintance with the English, the Portuguese, the French, and a whole host of Eastern languages, added little, by means of a rude map, to the information of which Colonel Symes's work had already made them masters. The consequence was that the greatest anxiety prevailed to open, at almost any hazard, some communication with the interior, and to gain the confidence, were it only of a few individuals, through whom the proclamations addressed to the nation at large might be circulated. There is no reason to believe that the Burmese were rendered otherwise aware of this feeling than by their own surmises as to its probable existence; nevertheless they made of it exactly the sort of use which a people determined to wage a war of total extermination would be apt to make. There came over from Dalla, a village situated on the margin of a creek of the same name, three or four men, who represented the population of the district as disposed to favour the English, and requested that a force might be sent to deliver them from the guard which kept them in subjection. The request was somewhat incautiously acceded to, and on the following day, 200 Europeans and as many sepoy infantry were embarked in row-boats, which proceeded up the creek as if they had been in the heart of their own territories, without so much as landing a patrol to scour the

banks. All at once a heavy fire of grape was opened on them, which caused some loss, and greater confusion; and when the troops, leaping on shore, began to form, it was found that they were surrounded by stockades, and exposed to an enfilading fire from all quarters. Three officers and fifty men were killed or wounded, yet the survivors lost not their confidence for a moment. They stormed and took the redoubt which annoyed them; found in it the body of a single dead Burman; and returned, without having accomplished anything, to Rangoon.

The attack on Dalla was not, however, the only enterprise which enabled the troops to speak of the month of August as being more prolific of interesting events than its predecessor. On the 4th, a brigade, consisting of a portion of the 41st King's regiment, the Madras European, and the 12th Madras native infantry, proceeded, under Colonel Smith, to Syriam, where it carried, in the most gallant manner, a redoubt and fortified pagoda, neither of which seems to have been very obstinately defended. Affairs of posts, too, began to occur, the piquets being occasionally attacked and compelled to defend themselves, while to pass beyond the lines, except in strong bands, was no longer prudent. Several stragglers were, indeed, cut off, including the crew of a small boat which had ventured to leave the ship General Wood without arms; and of their sad fate the appearance of the bodies, which the

tide floated down next day, left no room to doubt. The gunner, who formed one of the party, had his head severed from his body; the feet were perforated by nails, the legs bore the marks of having pieces of flesh forcibly torn from them, and the back-bone had been sawn in two. In like manner, all the rest, more or less, had suffered mutilation, of which it would only shock the reader's taste were we to give a description.

Towards the end of the month, a persuasion became prevalent throughout the army, that the Burmans would ere long hazard a general attack. The increasing quantity of smoke, which began to rise on various points in the forest, indicated, indeed, the gradual assembling of troops, while it was ascertained from certain spies, who had been won over by heavy bribes, that the 27th was accounted a fortunate day for military enterprises. General Campbell took the precaution to cut down much of the jungle in his front, and to plant guns in the pagoda and at other commanding posts in his line; while the men were directed to sleep accoutred, and all things put in order for battle. He had scarcely done so, when a Burman was taken at one of the out-posts. He proved to be one of a corps of 300, called the Invulnerables, — a charmed cohort which had sworn to rescue the Golden Pagoda from the strangers, or to perish in the attempt,—and gave information, which was fully confirmed within the space of four-and-

twenty hours. The Invulnerables did make the attack with great fury during the night of the 28th; and were not beaten off till a storm of grape from the cannon in the pagoda had cut down a large portion of them. We must describe what went on at another part of the line in the words of one who was present. "A piquet of 100 sepoys was likewise attacked, and while the men were drawn up to receive the Burmahs in front, some of these latter contrived to creep to the rear, and enter the house which the piquet occupied, from whence they carried off the sepoys' knapsacks!"

Besides this affair, there occurred a sharp action in the Dalla creek, between one of the gun-boats belonging to the squadron and the Burmese. The boat in question, commanded by Mr. Crawford, had been left to support a garrison, which Colonel Evans, after reducing the enemy's works, threw into the place, and was attacked so fiercely, that the enemy were for a moment in possession of the deck, from which the desperate valour of the little crew succeeded in driving them. Nor was an attempt to recover Dalla itself attended by any better success. The assailants were driven back on all hands, and Captain Marryat arriving opportunely with a division of armed launches, several of their war-boats were sunk. But more important events were already hurrying forward. Towards the end of September the clouds began to break, and there was a promise of dry weather, of which the Burmese, if

any judgment might be formed from the continual progress of their works in the direction of Rangoon, seemed determined to take advantage; while General Campbell, not less prompt to avail himself of a season for action, made ready either to meet them by counter-projects, or to measure his strength fairly with theirs.

On the 4th of October three hundred men of the 38th regiment were embarked in boats, and placed under the command of Major Evans, with orders to penetrate up the Lyne river, and to dislodge a portion of the Kee Woonghee's army, which was stated to have entrenched itself on the bank. To distract the enemy's attention, and to hinder them from concentrating on one point, a light brigade, eight hundred strong, consisting entirely of sepoys, was directed to push along the Pegue road. The latter corps began its march at day-break, supported by a couple of howitzers, and passed at the village of Kokien a large unfinished stockade, of the preparation of which, though it was within two miles of the outposts, not so much as a suspicion had been entertained. Nothing daunted by this discovery, Colonel Smith, who commanded the troops, moved on, and soon became involved in a thick country, where his people received and replied to several skirmishing volleys. At last, however, after clearing a ravine, another stockade opened upon him; from which, as well as from a wood on the left, a fire was opened, and a gallant officer, Lieutenant Campbell of the pioneers, fell. But

Colonel Smith, by a judicious arrangement of his force, turned the work, and the enemy immediately evacuated it without resistance. A few prisoners were taken, from whom the Colonel learned that at Kykloo, a fortified pagoda about five miles in advance, two chiefs, the Chudd Woon and the Rayhoon of Rangoon, had established themselves with 3000 men, some cavalry, elephants, and guns. Colonel Smith immediately halted, and sending back for a reinforcement both of infantry and guns, resolved, as soon as they should arrive, to hazard an attack.

In due time three hundred men of the Madras native infantry, with two additional howitzers, joined their comrades, but no Europeans accompanied them. To what cause this sad error was owing, whether it originated in an oversight, or was the result of a special request on the part of Colonel Smith himself, it is not worth while to inquire; but its effects were exactly such as some slight experience in the peculiar qualities of the native troops might have led any officer, whether King's or Company's, to anticipate. Colonel Smith moved forward. He disposed his men to the best advantage, throwing skirmishers into the jungle, and pushing two columns, with scaling ladders, against two faces of the stockade. But though the officers led nobly, and threw their lives away with the most devoted heroism, the men, seeing no English company in their front, faltered and hung back. They did not disperse

and flee—sepoys very rarely disperse—but they stood, afraid to advance yet unwilling to retreat, under a fire which swept them down. Colonel Smith saw that the day was lost. He caused the recall to be sounded, and retreated to Rangoon with a loss of two officers and forty men killed, four officers and sixty men wounded. Great, indeed, was the rejoicing within the Burman lines, when a dispatch was drawn up, which represented the English as overthrown with the slaughter of 1000 men; and while this receipt at Ummerapoora was welcomed by a salute from all the cannon mounted on the walls, General Campbell, on the other hand, determined that the enemy should not long be permitted to boast of a success which they had accidentally obtained. He dispatched Brigadier-General M'Creagh at the head of a thousand Europeans to avenge the defeat of the sepoys; and the most strenuous exertions were made, both by the General and his men, to fulfil the wishes of the chief. But fortune declared against them. After accomplishing a toilsome march, and passing the dead bodies of the sepoys, horribly mutilated and suspended upon gibbets, the Brigadier found that Kykloo was deserted; and though he pushed forward to the extent of twenty miles, he failed to overtake the victors in their flight. He was, therefore, sorely to the disappointment of the men, whom the spectacle of their abused comrades had excited to the highest pitch of fury, compelled to retrace his steps to Rangoon, where he

was met with the agreeable intelligence that Major Evans had entirely succeeded in driving the enemy without loss from all their works. On the 13th of October, therefore, the English army was again united within its lines, under the assurance that, for the present at least, the vicinity of Rangoon was everywhere cleared of the enemy.

We alluded, a short time ago, to the expeditions under Colonels Miles and Goodwin, and to the perfect success which attended both. In coupling the exploits of the last-mentioned officer with those of Colonel Miles, we somewhat anticipated the course of events: for it was only now during the interval of repose which ensued upon the reconnoissance described above, that he set out for Martaban. But to the narrative of his proceedings we have nothing to add, further than that they displayed great judgment, and were crowned with the most perfect success. From Colonel Miles's exertions, likewise, the troops in position at Rangoon began, ere long, to derive serious advantages. The country around Mergui and Tavoy abounded in cattle and grain, and ample supplies of fresh provisions were derived from it; and the sickness which had hitherto committed such havoc in the ranks began in consequence to diminish. Nor was this all. The climate of Tenasserim was found to agree so well with the constitutions of Europeans, that many of the worst cases, when removed thither, recovered; and not a few, who might have

possibly lingered on unfit for duty during the war, were restored in the course of a short time to their usual health. Under such circumstances, it was judged expedient to establish in the province a permanent garrison of sepoys; though his Majesty's 89th was ordered to return to head-quarters.

Time passed, and every day brought in some fresh report that the enemy, who had organised a very powerful army, were closing in upon the position. As there was good reason to believe that these rumours were well founded, General Campbell made ready to give battle, by cutting down some of the jungle, constructing here and there a breast-work, and throwing abattis in front of such points in his line as appeared to be most assailable. He was not, however, deterred from pushing a strong reconnoissance up the Pegue river, with orders to proceed as far as the ancient capital of the province. On the 27th of November, eight hundred men, of whom one-half were Europeans, embarked in a flotilla of forty boats, under the guidance of Captain Chads; and succeeded, without meeting with any opposition, or sustaining the loss of one man, in reaching Pegue. They found it wholly deserted, as was the case with every town or village that lay along the course of their route; and they quitted it again, after spending four-and-twenty hours amid its desolate dwellings, full of admiration at the size and magnificence of the Shoemadoo pagoda,

to which that at Rangoon appears to have been scarcely superior.

Meanwhile, Bundoolah, who had enlarged his force to somewhere about sixty thousand men, broke up from his camp at Denobin; and marching without a halt during five consecutive days, arrived on the 30th in front of the Shoe-Dagon. So rapid were his movements, and so strict the vigilance of the police, that no suspicion of his approach prevailed at head-quarters; indeed, it was from one of his own patrols, which happened to encounter their advanced guard, when close upon the line of sentries, that Sir Archibald Campbell became first aware that the enemy were moving at all. But the arrangements necessary to meet the crisis, having been long made, there was neither confusion nor delay in acting up to them; because every man and officer knew his place in the line, and the cannon were already in position. And well it was that this perfect order and discipline prevailed; for the enemy with whom they had to deal was active and full of enterprise, however deficient he might be in the science of modern warfare, and the art of wielding his formidable masses with the best effect.

The main body of the British occupied at this time a sort of double line; that is to say, the formation of the troops was on a triangle, of which the golden pagoda constituted the apex, and the line of Rangoon the base. There

was likewise a strong post at Kemundine, on the western bank of the river, which was supported by the ships of war and gun-boats; while here and there (as convenience offered) a house or other building was filled with troops, care being taken to intermix at all points of importance Europeans with sepoys. This was the more practicable, as there had arrived a short time previously the 47th King's regiment, and a battalion of the Royals, two veteran and well-trained corps, which served in a great degree to supply the vacancies which disease, more than the sword of the enemy, had occasioned. Nevertheless, the numbers both of Europeans and natives were very inadequate to cover an alignment so extensive as peculiar circumstances required them to defend; nor could that object have been attained at all had not Sir Archibald connected one part with another by means of posts. This, however, he judiciously did; and the consequence was, that besides amply providing against all the exigencies of a passive defence, he retained in hand one or two moveable columns, which he calculated on being able to apply either as a reserve, or in active operations, as the events of the battle might seem to demand.

The day was far advanced, when the patrol returning gave notice of the enemy's approach, whose presence in the forest was soon afterwards denoted by a curved line of smoke which rose above the trees from one flank of the British position to the other. A constant hum

of voices, too, went on for a time, as if they had established themselves for the night: but darkness scarce set in when it ceased; and there was heard in its room a sound as of heavy columns marching, which drew onwards till it seemed to approach the very edge of the jungle. The utmost degree of watchfulness, it will readily be imagined, prevailed within the Golden Pagoda, where both officers and men anticipated a furious assault as soon as the dawn should return; nor was there any disposition to relax, notwithstanding that the woods began to resound ere long with blows of the axe and hammer, and the crash of falling trees. Yet, the day broke without realising, in this quarter at least, the expectations which men had formed. The enemy continued perfectly still, under cover of the forest, contenting themselves, as it appeared, with watching the manœuvres of the English, and hindering them from detaching to support the point against which their first efforts were directed.

It might be about an hour after day-break when a heavy firing of cannon and musketry, in the direction of Kemundine, gave notice that the battle was begun. It lasted for some time without intermission, and came up upon the wind mingled with the yells of the Burmese, and an occasional hearty cheer from the British seamen. Nothing, however, could be seen from the pagoda, except a dense cloud of smoke, which shut out every object beyond the great forest, and continued to darken the air for some

minutes after the tumult of the fight had subsided. But the anxiety of those who occupied the flanks of the position was in due time removed, when, the thick canopy dispersing, the masts of the vessels again became visible, ornamented as they had been prior to the commencement of the struggle, with British streamers and ensigns. By-and-by their attention was drawn to other and not less deeply interesting spectacles. The Burmans began to move in heavy columns across the plain of Dalla, and to entrench themselves on the bank of the river opposite to Rangoon. While one body was thus occupied, another issued from the forest, about a mile in front of the eastern face of the great pagoda, and deploying into line, embraced the whole extent of country from the Puzendown stream to a point within long gun-shot of the city. "These," says Colonel Snodgrass, "formed the left wing of the Burmese army. The centre, or the continuation of the line from the great pagoda up to Kemundine, where it again rested on the river, was posted in so thick a forest as to defy all conjecture as to its strength or situation. In the course of a few hours we thus found ourselves completely surrounded, with the narrow channel of the Rangoon river alone unoccupied in our rear, and with only the limited space within our lines which we could still call our own. The line of circumvallation taken up by the enemy obviously extended a very considerable distance, and divided as it was by the river, in-

judiciously weakened his means of assailing us on any particular point; but as far as celerity, order, and regularity are concerned, the style in which the different corps took up their stations in the line reflected much credit on the arrangement of the Burmese commander.

"When this singular and presumptuous formation was completed, the soldiers of the left columns also laying aside their spears and muskets, commenced operations with their intrenching tools, with such activity and good will, that in the course of a couple of hours their line had wholly disappeared, and could only be traced by a parapet of new earth, gradually increasing in height, and assuming such forms as the skill and science of the engineers suggested. The moving masses which had so very lately attracted our anxious attention had sunk into the ground; and to any one who had not witnessed the whole scene, the existence of these subterranean legions would not have been credited: the occasional movement of a chief, with his gilt chattah (umbrella) from place to place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant observer, the hills covered with mounds of earth would have been taken for anything rather than the approaches of an attacking enemy; but to us, who had watched the whole strange proceeding, it seemed the work of magic or enchantment."

The manner in which the Burmese push their approaches is very curious. Their trenches were found, on examination, to consist merely of a succession of holes, each capable of containing two men, and excavated so as to afford shelter both from the weather and the fire of an enemy. "As it is not the Burmese system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel, for its inmates; and under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood was prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When one line of the trench is completed, its occupiers, taking advantage of the night, push forward to where the second line is to be opened, their place being immediately taken up by fresh troops from the rear, and so on progressively, the number of trenches occupied varying according to the force of the besiegers, to the plans of the general, or to the nature of the ground."

It was perfectly evident from the nature of their proceedings, that the main attempt of the Burmans would be upon the pagoda. For this the English were every way prepared; nevertheless, as it was essential to ascertain how the assailing force was arranged, Sir Archibald directed Major Seale, at the head of the 13th light infantry, to attack these trenches, and if possible to drive the enemy back upon their reserves. The service was performed in the most dashing and creditable manner. In spite

of a severe loss, the 13th fairly overleaping the intrenchments, dislodging the working party with great slaughter, and penetrating to the edge of the forest, were with difficulty held back by the superior prudence of the officers. Nothing more, however, passed that day, if we except a second attack, which ended in failure, on the Kemundine; and the English retiring to their lines, the enemy re-occupied their holes, which, during the night, were considerably advanced as well as improved.

Aware that a general movement to the front, however effectually it might remove all appearance of investment, must, from the nature of the country, fail of leading to any marked advantage over the enemy, Sir Archibald Campbell, with great judgment, directed all his evolutions to the attainment of one end; namely, to the creation of a belief among the leaders of the Burmese army that he felt himself inferior to the assailants, and was unwilling to risk any disaster by venturing beyond his intrenchments. An occasional sortie or two, executed on the 2nd of December, though they served to keep up the spirits of his own troops, could scarcely operate to diminish the confidence of a barbarous enemy, who contrived to push their approaches till they were everywhere within half musket-shot of the posts and stations which connected one portion of the line with another. Nor was it by working their zigzags only that they endeavoured to cut off all chances of escape from

the invaders. Multitudes of fire-rafts were sent down the river, which it required all the courage and skill of the British seamen to evade; while the cruisers were continually obliged to maintain a somewhat unequal struggle with batteries well armed and not contemptibly served, which assailed them from the shore.

Having endured this state of things till the 5th, on which day the whole of the enemy's left wing was thrown out upon the plain, Sir Archibald, who had with great difficulty restrained the ardour of his troops, determined to throw the reins loose, and to hazard an attack. That it might be the more effectual in its results, Captain Chads, with a flotilla of armed boats, was directed to ascend the river, and to place himself so as that his shot might fall upon the enemy's rear, and distract their attention, This done, two columns, one under Major Seale of the 13th, the other under Major Walker of the Madras army, were ordered to force the intrenchments, and they obeyed their instructions with a degree of hardihood and success which could not be surpassed. Regardless of a heavy fire, which cost Major Walker his life, the men rushed on, and swept over the Burmans and their trenches with the fury of a hurricane. Nevertheless, though dislodged from various favourable points, the Bundoolah thought not as yet of retreating. He devoted the 6th to rallying and restoring the courage of his troops; and

on the 7th was in a condition to receive, though not to repel, a still more serious attack which General Campbell directed against him.

At dawn on the day just specified the British troops moved from their lines in three separate columns. The enemy met them with a heavy fire both of cannon and musketry, and stood in many instances till they were bayoneted in the trenches; but to withstand such an assault for any length of time was impossible. They were pierced, thrown into confusion, and cut down with prodigious slaughter, which was arrested only by the intervention of the jungle, into which it was judged inexpedient to thrust the troops. Long before sunset, indeed, the whole of the space in front of the pagoda was opened, and there seemed only a multitude of dead bodies to mark the course of what had formerly been the position of the besiegers. With the close of day, however, the labours of the British soldiers were far from ending. As soon as it became dark, a part of his Majesty's 89th regiment, with the 43rd Madras infantry, were thrown across the river in boats, and immediately opened their fire upon that portion of the enemy which had hitherto placed Kemundine in a state of siege. The Burmans were quite incompetent to withstand these attacks. They fled in great confusion, leaving guns, equipage, and ammunition behind, and melted away almost as much by desertion as by the loss which they sustained from their enemies.

About four miles in rear of his scene of operations for the reduction of the Golden Pagoda, the Bundoolah had established an army of reserve, which was busied all this while in stockading and otherwise rendering defensible a position of which the village of Kokien formed the key. To it he now retreated, where considerable reinforcements meeting him, he found that he could still muster five and twenty thousand men under arms, with which he determined to risk another action, should the English venture to attack. Not content, however, to rely upon the valour of his soldiers, he bribed some of the few inhabitants which had returned to Rangoon to set fire to the city; under the idea that, amid the confusion attendant on such an event, an opportunity might present itself of acting again on the offensive. The fire, however, was speedily extinguished, and on the 15th the army advanced for the purpose of attacking, at three different points, the intrenchments at Kokien. Never was movement attended with more perfect success. The enemy maintained a heavy fire so long as the troops were rushing on, but fled whenever the heads of the columns began to penetrate the works; and the line of intrenchments was carried with comparatively little loss to the assailants, the slaughter among the fugitives being absolutely appalling. It is computed, indeed, that from the 1st to the 15th of December, there fell of the Burmese not less than six thousand men, of whom many

were chiefs and officers of rank; while the total of casualties in the British ranks amounted to no more than forty officers, and five hundred rank and file. As a matter of course the courage of the worsted party began everywhere to evaporate, and it was felt in Rangoon, that, had the means of transport been present, a march upon Ummerapoora could have been attended with no difficulties which the valour of those engaged would have failed to overcome. Unfortunately, however, these were not present, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of the Madras government to supply them; and the operations of the army were in consequence confined for the present to undertakings of very inferior importance.

CHAPTER X.

Alarm at Calcutta—Mutiny at Barrackpore—Advance of Sir Archibald Campbell—Reaches Sarawah—Hears of General Cotton's failure at Denobieu—Marches back—Denobieu invested—Burmese sortie—Junction of the land and water columns—The Bundoolah slain—Denobieu evacuated—March to Prome—it is occupied—Manners and Customs of the Burmese.

It will be necessary to revert for a short time to the progress of the war on the eastern frontier, as well as to certain events connected with it, which caused, at the moment, uneasy sensations in various quarters. We have spoken elsewhere of the successes obtained by the Bundoolah in Chittagong; and we have hinted at the absurd alarm which arose among the native merchants of Calcutta, and which was not, we believe, confined entirely to them. Had the feeling spread no farther, it would have supplied food rather for ridicule than regret; but unfortunately, a persuasion became prevalent among several of the sepoy regiments, that the Burmese "wore charmed lives," and that neither lead nor steel would suffice to dissolve the enchantment. To this was added an order to curtail, on the ground of economy, certain allowances for transport which had hitherto been granted to troops about to take

the field; and both together proved too much for the courage or fidelity of portions of more than one regiment whose services were called for.

In the cantonments of Barrackpore there were quartered the 26th, the 47th, the 62nd, and the 10th regiments of Bengal infantry. They were all under orders for service, some being directed to march upon Arracan, others to prepare for embarkation; but when directed to parade on the morning of the 31st of October, in order that their appointments might be inspected, the 47th positively refused to turn out. Every exertion was made by the European officers to overcome the spirit of disaffection, but without effect. Portions of the 62nd and of the 10th joined the mutineers; and for a few hours, matters wore an extremely unpleasant appearance. But the Royals, and the King's 49th, which had not yet quitted Calcutta, were promptly moved to the scene of difficulty, and a brigade of guns was planted so as to command the rear of the malcontents, when drawn up upon the esplanade. Another effort was then made to lead them into submission; they rejected it, and the guns immediately opened. Nearly two hundred men were cut to pieces where they stood; and the remainder being disarmed, the ringleaders were put to death, the No. 47 erased from the army list, and the mutiny effectually suppressed. There was no longer the slightest reluctance manifested to proceed either to Ar-

racan or Pegue; nor was any bad impression left upon the minds either of soldiers or people, by the act of terrible, but necessary severity, which had been perpetrated.

We return to the operations of Sir Archibald Campbell's force; which became, from various causes, more and more effective every day, as well as more eager to push its successes to the utmost. The repulse of the Bundoolah, together with the prevalence of a belief that the English would speedily advance, operated like a charm upon the inhabitants of the province. They broke through all the restraints of the police, and began to return in crowds to their homes, bringing with them numerous articles both of provision and conveyance, which proved eminently useful to the invaders. By the commendable exertions, too, of the governments of Bengal and Madras, (and, without any disparagement to the former, we may venture to say more especially of the latter,) boats, and Mugh boatmen, draught bullocks, horses, and elephants, arrived day after day in considerable numbers. Still there was a sad lack of means by which to move an army of ten thousand men through a country where it was felt that no reliance could be placed on the aid of the inhabitants; and where any deficiency of provisions, or interruption of the line of communication, might be attended with the worst consequences. As it was manifest, however, that the war would be protracted for ever, unless an attempt were made to penetrate into the interior,

Sir Archibald Campbell resolved, let come what might, to make it; and his arrangements being completed, he put, on the 15th of February, 1825, three columns in motion. Of one of these, he himself took the guidance; Brigadier-General Cotton assumed the command of another; and Major Sale, of the 13th King's regiment, was nominated to direct the movements of the third.

The service which Major Sale was instructed to accomplish comprised the reduction of Bassein, an important town on the western bank of the Bassein river; where an idea prevailed, that draught animals could be procured in abundance, so as to facilitate a subsequent march across the country, and a junction, somewhere on the Irawaddy, with head-quarters. Sir Archibald Campbell's and General Cotton's divisions again were to proceed in the direction of Prome, the former by land, the latter by water; that is to say, while Sir Archibald ascended the left bank of the Lyne river, General Cotton, embarking his people in boats, was to penetrate by the Paulang branch, and enter the main stream of the Irawaddy, at Yangain-Chan-Yan. This done, the divisions were to unite at Denobieu, provided the land-column should find it practicable to attain to that point; while, in the event of a failure, Sarawah, a town considerably farther to the north, was fixed upon as a point of rendezvous accessible to both parties. These arrangements being well digested, and provisions, ammunition, and all things necessary provided,

on the 15th of February the advance began, the head-quarter division leading, and those of General Cotton and Major Sale taking their respective lines with as little delay as possible.

The progress of the land-column, which consisted of thirteen hundred Europeans and a thousand native infantry, of three hundred cavalry belonging to the Governor-General's body-guard, and artillery and rockets in proportion, was marked by no event worthy of special notice. The troops passed through a country interesting from the novelty of its appearance, whose inhabitants, a rude but industrious race, proved exceedingly friendly; and found, on reaching Meondaga, an extensive village upon the Lyne, that there was neither ford nor bridge by which to pass the river, nearer than that which was opposite to Sarawah. This intelligence was rendered of comparatively trifling importance, in consequence of repeated rumours which came in of the evacuation of Denobieu, whence the Bundoolah was stated to have fled in great alarm as soon as the movement up the Lyne became known to him. The march was accordingly resumed, and on the 23rd, having seen very little of the enemy, whose patrols fell back as his advanced guard pushed on, Sir Archibald established his head-quarters in the town of Lyne. It was the capital of a province of no mean wealth, and proved well disposed to favour the invaders, for the people remained in their houses, and freely

brought into camp buffaloes and other necessaries. On the 24th, however, the advance was resumed, and on the 1st of March, the Lyne being forded at a place called Theeboon, the head of the column turned in a westerly direction towards Sarawah.

A journey of sixteen miles, performed principally through the heart of a well-wooded country, brought the army to Sarawah, a large town on the right bank of the Irawaddy; important in itself as a place of inland trade, and doubly so as containing the main depôt of the Burman monarch's war-boats. The troops appear to have been greatly struck with the magnificence of the river, which now, for the first time, rolled its mass of waters before them. Of great depth, and exceedingly rapid in its course, it is described as measuring, even during the droughts, about eight hundred yards in width; nevertheless, the admiration with which all ranks were disposed to regard it, suffered a serious interruption when it was discovered that the population had hastened to place its channel between them and the strangers. Sarawah, indeed, like Rangoon, when first approached, was entirely deserted. It was evident, moreover, that the migration had only now been completed, inasmuch as crowds still lingered on the opposite bank, whom all the efforts of the General, though exercised through the agency of one or two old priests, failed to bring back to their homes. They were distinctly seen to hold converse with the mes-

sengers, to what purpose became manifest in a few minutes, for they turned their backs upon Sarawah, and moved slowly towards a forest, amid the deep shades of which they gradually disappeared.

For the first time since they parted company at Rangoon, Sir Archibald had received the day before a communication from General Cotton, which announced the capture of Paulang, and the entrance of the water-column into the great channel of the Irawaddy. As the dispatch was of old date, however, it tended in no degree to shake the belief that Denobieu had also fallen; and hence, anticipating from day to day the arrival of the boats, the further progress of the army was suspended. During this interval of repose, both the bodily wants and the curiosity of the officers found ample sources of indulgence.

The country round Sarawah proved to be fruitful in a breed of small cattle; and the gardens attached to many of the houses were well stocked with vegetables; but that which seems most worthy of notice was a discovery of which an eye-witness speaks in the following terms. "At Sarawah," says the author of 'Two Years in Ava,' "were many handsome kioums, or monasteries, containing large collections of Gaudinas, of different sizes and materials; these were ranged on stands, richly ornamented with stained glass and gilding, fancifully disposed in several grotesque shapes, and surmounted by canopies, on which the same species of orna-

ment bore a conspicuous part. About the apartments were numerous offerings of the pious; and in one of the houses a book was found, which may be considered as of great importance, as showing the estimation in which this nation was held by a very insignificant power in Europe, at a time when we, its immediate neighbours, must have been enveloped in shameful ignorance of every thing concerning it. This was a plain and simple exposition of the Christian faith, in the Latin and Burman languages, and printed at the press of the Society for the Propagation of the True Faith at Rome, in 1785." The same authority goes on to inform us, that "on inquiry, I found that about that period some Italian priests were settled near Ava, and taught Latin to several people, and among others, to Mr. Gibson." "For many years past, no persons of the Roman Catholic persuasion have visited Ava as missionaries; but the religion is still followed by a few individuals, and is represented by priests of that race, miscalled Portuguese, who, from their intermarriage with the natives of India, now retain but little trace of their origin, except the dialect which still remains to them of the language of their forefathers."

The troops had occupied Sarawah without receiving any further communication from General Cotton's column, when, on the evening of the 7th, a heavy firing was heard in the direction of Denobieu. This circumstance sufficed to contradict all the rumours which had

hitherto circulated; yet it excited no apprehension in the mind of any one; for all, from the General to the drum-boy, seem to have looked upon success as certain. Instead, therefore, of marching to the assistance of the water-column, General Campbell determined to press forward in the direction of Prome, his anxiety extending no further than to prevent the escape of the Bundoolah; and the delays and difficulties which might be expected to follow, were the Burmans to anticipate him in the occupation of that place. He had not, however, accomplished more than two days' journey when a messenger overtook him, bearing the unwelcome information that the attack on Denobieu had failed. Now then arose the question, what course it would be judicious to follow:—whether to prosecute the advance, and recall the Bundoolah by threatening his communications with the capital; or to return to Denobieu, expel the enemy's garrison, and establish there a sort of base of future operations. A reference to the state of the magazines determined the General to adopt the latter of these expedients. He retraced his steps to Sarawah; crossed the Irawaddy on rafts and by means of canoes, and after an abortive attempt to surprise a body of the enemy, which had taken post between Henzeda and Lamina, turned all his attention to the state of affairs at Denobieu.

It was late on the 24th, when the column, after a twelve miles march through a wilder-

ness of long jungle grass, arrived at a village whence the position of Denobieu became for the first time visible. The spectacle was very striking, for the works were extensive and apparently full of troops; while the river was crowded above the stockade by swarms of Burmese war-boats. As the army approached, bodies of cavalry hovered along its flank, and the war-boats, starting from their anchorage, came in close to the brink of the river and opened their fire. Nevertheless, no check was made; and on the 25th a position was taken up within cannon-shot of the stockades; while General Campbell, attended by his chief engineer, proceeded to reconnoitre. He found that they embraced an oblong square, which measured about a thousand yards in length, by five hundred in breadth; and that they masked the brick walls of an old Pegue fortress, round three sides of which a moat was drawn, the river washing the fourth. It was therefore quite impracticable to accomplish, with his limited means, even an imperfect investment; and the camp was in consequence pitched so as to rest one flank on the river, and leave the other to be protected, as it best might, by the piquets.

The day passed over quietly enough; for an occasional attempt to annoy by a fire from the war-boats scarcely sufficed to disturb the tranquillity of any one. The piquets too were strong and well posted; and as the night brought with it a bright and cloudless moon,

both men and officers lay down to rest without any apprehension of danger. Considerable uneasiness had indeed, prevailed, since morning, not because of the proximity of the enemy, but because as yet no intelligence of General Cotton's approach had been received, and the exhausted stock of the Commissariat threatened, in the event of his protracted absence, to occasion little short of famine in the lines. But these causes of care and care itself were alike forgotten, when the rapid discharge of thirty or forty muskets, and the immediate running in of the piquet on the right flank, suddenly called the men to their guns, and caused them to prepare for battle. In a moment there arose a discordant yell, while a crowd of Burmans rushed towards the camp, and began a desultory fire on all sides. It was a bold manœuvre on the Bundoolah's part, and well worthy of his established reputation; but it failed to produce any effect. The British troops stood to their arms, and forming with the 38th regiment *en potence*, soon drove back the assailants with loss; who could not be brought, by all the exertions of their leader, to renew the attack. After standing therefore in their ranks till all was quiet, the men once more lay down, and slept not the less soundly that their repose had been interrupted by a visitation so little to be desired.

It so happened, that, while the sortie went on, several flashes, such as might proceed from the discharge of mortars, were observed, at a

considerable distance beyond Denobieu, and, as it seemed, down the stream of the Irawaddy. Hopes were in consequence entertained that General Cotton had seen the firing, and had thrown up these signals in order to make his friends aware that he was within reach of them; and it was resolved, as soon as daylight should return, to dispatch a strong patrol for the purpose of ascertaining the truth. This was effectually done, and though the detachment found itself unable to return to camp, the long wished for communication between the two columns was restored. General Cotton instantly got his flotilla under weigh; and, with the steam-boat leading, appeared at dawn on the morning of the 27th, in proud advance up the river. It was to no purpose that seventeen Burmese war-boats offered all the opposition in their power, and that the batteries from the stockade opened a heavy fire. The former were routed, pursued, and captured, to the amount of thirteen, by the steam-vessel, while to the latter an effective reply was made, both by the guns of the flotilla, and the field-pieces on shore. In like manner a sortie, in which seven elephants took a part, was repelled with great slaughter; the body-guard charging both elephants and cavalry, and overthrowing them in quick succession. The result was, that mortars, battering guns, and all things else of which the army stood in need, were landed that night, and that a heavy bombardment was immediately

commenced, with the most destructive effect. This was followed by the erection of batteries, which opened a steady fire on the 1st of April, and on the 2nd, dispositions were made, as soon as the breaches should be deemed practicable, to carry the place by assault. But the day had scarcely dawned, when a couple of prisoners escaping from the fort came in with intelligence which excited no trifling degree of astonishment. It appeared that the Bundoolah had been killed on the previous day by a fragment of a shell; that the troops refused to obey any other officer, or to remain in Denobieu, and that the works were evacuated in the dead of night, with a degree of regularity which set the vigilance of the besiegers at defiance. Nothing, therefore, now remained but to take possession of the abandoned redoubt; and after making such fresh arrangements as the altered condition of the army required, to recommence, with as much celerity as possible, the march to Prome.

The forward movement began on the 4th of April, and like the first advance to Sarawah, was, for awhile, productive of no memorable occurrence. There was much variety in the country through which the army passed, and the scenery, after ascending to Lang-wah, is described by Colonel Snodgrass as extremely beautiful. But except in abandoned stockades and villages consumed to ashes, no trace of the enemy was discovered; who retired with great precipitation, carrying, as far as possible, the

whole population along with them. It is true that an attempt was made to delay the progress of the troops by two separate proposals of treating, and that a request was urged that the town of Prome would not be occupied, "there being space enough in the plain for the British and Burmese armies to meet," if the strangers were determined to try the chances of another battle. But to demands so ridiculous the General paid, as might be expected, no heed, while his columns, both by land and water, continued to press steadily forward. On the 25th the high grounds around Prome were for the first time distinctly seen, entrenched up to their very crests; and it was, of course, anticipated that a resolute stand would be made, where so much labour appeared to have been bestowed on the formation of a position;—but the case proved otherwise. Not a gun was discharged, nor a blow struck, for the enemy, after setting fire to the town in several places, abandoned it and fled. That day Sir Archibald Campbell took military possession, and having extinguished the flames by dint of great exertion, the troops proceeded to make arrangements for passing there the rainy season, which was now at hand.

We gladly take advantage of this season of repose, to vary our detail of battles and marches, by giving a brief description of the manners and customs of the people with whom a British army had come thus unexpectedly into contact. The government is represented by those who

have had the best opportunities of studying it, as an absolute monarchy; tempered indeed by the existence of a standing council, which, though not authorised to dispute, far less throw out the decisions of the monarch, may demand time for deliberation as to their wisdom, and suggest either changes or improvements. Of the members, which compose this council, sixteen in all, the rank and influence vary, four taking precedence next to the younger of the blood royal, and enjoying the privilege of voting on all such questions as may be submitted to them. The next four may give an opinion, but they have no vote; and the remaining eight are permitted only to register and publish such decisions as their superiors may have made. Strange to say, however, there is, in addition to this senate, a privy council, of which the numbers are indefinite, and which seems to exercise more real influence over the administration of public affairs, than the body to which, in point of rank, they cannot be compared.

For the management of provinces, towns, and villages, we find the usual machinery provided, that is to say, governors with unlimited power, chief magistrates, whose duties resemble in many respects an English mayor, and a Hindoo potail.

The religion of the country again is that of the Bhudhists, which the people profess to have received from the Cingalese, and its rites are superintended by a class of priests

who shave their crowns, wear rosaries, live in monasteries, and take the oath of celibacy. That vow, however, as well as the priestly office, they may alike renounce at pleasure, with the distinct understanding that the abjuration is eternal, no renegade, if we may venture to use the expression, being on any account permitted to return into the order of priests.

In their domestic habits the Burmese differ very widely from the inhabitants of India, and display in numerous respects a great superiority over them. They recognize no such institution as that of casts; they admit their women, both married and single, to all the intercourse and varieties of social life; and though their religion forbids the destruction of life, they eat freely of animal food. Their principal amusements are dancing and stage-plays, wrestling, and boxing, with chess, and a species of drafts, in which they make use of a coloured cloth instead of a board. The men are a fine, athletic race, not tall, but remarkably robust, and in youth, and even to middle age, generally handsome; the women are short, with a complexion fairer than that of the Bengalese, a thoroughly Tartar cast of features, black eyes, and thick and luxuriant tresses. Many of them deserve to be styled good looking, in spite of a constant use of the betel leaf and cheroot; and even the strange custom of turning the inside of the elbow out, as if the joint were dislocated, does not always take away from the symmetry of their figures.

Both men and women of all ranks and stations are exceedingly musical, after a fashion which to European ears is not very intelligible. Occasionally, indeed, a genuine musician is to be found among them, as the following anecdote shows:—"I chanced one day," says the writer whom we have so often quoted, "to meet with a young Burman who had been stone blind from his birth, but who, gifted with great talent for music, used to console himself for his misfortunes by playing on this species of guitar *, and accompanying his voice. When I expressed a wish to hear him perform, he immediately struck out a most brilliant prelude, and then commenced a song in a bold tone, the subject of which was a prophecy which had been current at Rangoon before we arrived. It predicted the appearance of numerous strangers at that place, and that two-masted ships would sail up the Irawaddy, when all trouble and sorrow would cease. Animated by his subject, his voice gradually became bolder and more spirited, as well as his performance, and without any hesitation he sang with much facility two or three stanzas composed extempore. Changing suddenly from the enthusiastic tone, he commenced a soft, plaintive love-song, and

* "This is an instrument made in the fantastical shape of an alligator; the body of it is hollow, with openings at the back, and three strings only are used, which are supported by a bridge, as in a violin."—*Two Years in Ava*, page 216.

then, after striking the chords in a wild but masterly manner, retired. I confess I felt deeply interested in this poor fellow's performance, he seemed so deeply to feel every note he uttered; particularly at one time, when he touched upon his own misfortune, that it appeared Providence, in ordaining he should never see, had endowed him with this soul-speaking talent in some measure to indemnify him." We have only to add to this, that the crews of the war-boats always sang while rowing; and that their airs and choruses were strikingly plaintive and inspiring.

Marriage among the Burmese is not accompanied by any religious ceremony, and may be dissolved at the option of either party. Unless, however, the husband have just cause to repudiate his wife, he must, when putting her away, settle upon her half of his revenues; and the wife, if injured, may lay claim to a maintenance, at the same time that she demands a divorce. But among the wrongs done, infidelity to the marriage bed is not always reckoned. A man's wife, indeed, or his daughters, may be seized for debt, and become the absolute property of the creditor, from whom they can be redeemed only by payment of the sum due, either by themselves, or their husbands, or their relatives. It is worthy of remark, however, that marriages are not entered into in Ava, in obedience to arrangements previously made by the parents. The young of both sexes being allowed freely to intermix,

they generally settle for themselves a matter in which, in other oriental countries, those most deeply interested are allowed to have no voice."

The funerals in Ava are attended with a good deal of ceremony, though monuments to keep alive the memory of the deceased are, excepting among the nobles, unknown. "The corpse is deposited in a curious coffin, three feet deep, covered with a profusion of cut paper, tinsel, and other ornaments, and borne on men's shoulders. This is preceded by several priests, dressed in their yellow robes, with a black-beaded rosary in one hand, and a fan in the other, who now and then chant a prayer in concert with some of the attendants. The chief mourners sob, cry, and howl in a manner that would reflect credit on the most perfect adepts in the mourning art in the Emerald Isle, and a large concourse of the friends of the deceased form a long string in the rear. On arriving at the place of interment, the body is either buried, when the gaudy coffin is placed outside the tomb, most probably with the view of preventing the attack of dogs, who often scratch up the corpses; or else is burned, with its attendant paraphernalia, and the ashes deposited in a grave."

Notwithstanding the mortality which prevailed among the English troops on first landing, a misfortune which appears to be mainly attributable to unwholesome food and hard duty, the climate of Ava is described as sa-

lubrious, and its soil as fertile in the extreme. During the rainy season the Irawaddy overflows all the level country far and near, destroys the roads, and isolates the dwellings, but leaves, as the Nile does in Egypt, a blessing behind it. All sorts of grain thrive, and for the cultivation of rice, no more is needed than the scattering of the seed upon the earth, and the passage of a rude harrow over the glebe, for the purpose of covering it. Elephants, buffaloes, deer, cattle, every species of animal, indeed, tame and wild, are to be found here, with the single exception of sheep, of which there is but one flock in the empire, belonging to the King, and kept solely for his use. No particular reverence seems, however, to be paid to any of these except to the elephant when he chances to be white, and he is then treated with all the deference with which the Egyptians regarded the god Apis. Yet it is not in this particular that the customs of the Burmese assimilate the most with those of ancient Egypt. The ornaments of the religious houses correspond with those which travellers have found at Memphis; for they are invariably sphinxes, griffins, crocodiles, and other devices, such as are not to be met with in any other part of India. How can this fact be accounted for, unless we are to imagine that there did exist between the Burmese and the inhabitants of the banks of the Nile, some intimate connexion in ages long anterior to the arrival of Europeans among them?

There are two distinct languages in Ava, as there are in Hindustan; namely, the vernacular, which is diversified in its idioms only, and the sacred or original, called the Pali, which is understood by the priests alone. The people are, however, invariably taught to read and write, for the very girls attend school equally with the boys; and the priests are everywhere the teachers. The consequence is, that in all the large towns there are public libraries; attached in every instance to one or other of the religious houses, but accessible to all who choose to consult them. The books are composed generally of slips from the Palmyra leaf, about three inches wide, and a foot long, which, being pasted together, are tied between two japanned boards—a rude, but not inefficient binding. For ordinary purposes, however, the Burmese use a sort of coarse paper, blacked over, on which they draw characters with a white chalk pencil; whereas, for inscribing the Palmyra leaf, a sort of stylus is employed, the letters being written from left to right with great distinctness and attention. Like other barbarous races, they are all the slaves of omens, reposing implicit confidence in the agency of the stars, and believe that no misfortune can overtake either an individual or a nation, without some manifest sign having been afforded.

The distinctions of rank among this remarkable people are very rigidly observed, and are pointed out by the superior richness of the

clothing, the equipments, the arms, and the house-furniture of individuals. Gold is used only by the chief nobility in their sword-belts and scabbards, silver by those next in dignity; and the umbrellas are either gilt or plated, according as the sword is mounted in one or other of these metals. By the number and quality of the umbrellas too, the dignity of the chiefs may be detected; for except when attending on the court, the most elevated are protected by gilded chattas; which, in the royal presence, they exchange for screens of scarlet cloth. But the most accurate test of a man's position in society is to be sought for in the quantity of gold chains which adorn his person. The king wears twenty-four, princes of the blood royal eighteen, the Woonghees and chief officers twelve, and so on, to nine, six, and three. Whenever gold ceases to ornament the person, the rank of a noble is wanting.

There is no such thing as hereditary rank among the Burmese. It is wholly official, and those who enjoy it do not appear to be less venal than the native magistrates and judges of the Indian continent. Their punishments, moreover, are most barbarous, comprising torture of every description; and the trial by ordeal is among them a thing of daily occurrence. Yet are they a mild, and even a generous race, quick to take offence, at the same time easily appeased; and of their honour, some idea may be formed after the following anecdote shall have been perused. It was considered

a point of the first importance by Sir Archibald Campbell, and the heads of departments, to open a communication with General Morrison and the army of Arracan, with the view of ascertaining how far any co-operation might be relied upon, in the event of an advance towards the capital. After various disappointments, a young Burmese was hired to make his way across the country, and to carry a letter to Arracan. He received a certain sum of money as an earnest of the reward which awaited him whenever he should bring back an answer, and he used his best exertions to satisfy his employers, as well as to enrich himself. But he soon found that the impediments on his way were so numerous, that to pass beyond Prome was impracticable. He therefore returned to the British head-quarters, then established in Rangoon, threw down the money, and said that he could not accomplish the service for which he had been hired. We need scarcely add, that his well-earned pittance was not taken from him; however much we may be inclined to doubt, whether the native of a more civilized part of the world would have placed it at the disposal of any other party than himself.

With these peculiarities in the manners of the Burmese, the British officers found ample means of making themselves acquainted during the three or four months which they spent at Prome, in a state of absolute freedom from the anxieties and fatigue of war. Though at first the people fled, they soon returned to their

dwellings, and finding themselves treated with the utmost kindness, their feelings underwent a marked change. They became friendly, confiding, and joyous. They supplied the markets regularly, furnished boats, cattle, and other means of transport and subsistence, and vied with one another in their endeavours to make manifest the respect in which they held their new and beneficent masters. There was no longer the slightest danger to be apprehended in making excursions from village to village; for the peasantry, wherever an English officer appeared, bade him welcome; and both officers and men, by dealing justly with the people in return, hindered any interruption to this good understanding from taking place. Thus, by mutual acts of kindness was the intercourse between these strangers rendered agreeable to both parties, and a considerable portion of the monsoon passed over amid scenes of rude festivity, which will probably never fade from the memories of those who were so fortunate as to witness them.

Before concluding this chapter, it may be well to state, that while the main army was thus employed, the subordinate operations of the campaign went on with great vigour, and for a while at least, with marked good fortune. Instead of withdrawing the troops from Rangoon, an idea which, during the height of the sickly season, was seriously entertained, the Bengal government directed three different corps to operate a diversion by moving into

Assam, Cachar, and Arracan. On the 1st of February, Rungpoore, the capital of Assam, submitted by capitulation to Colonel Richards; and the whole province became reduced under the authority of the English. In like manner, General Shuldham, though retarded in his progress by the jungly nature of the country, pushed forward some way through Cachar in the direction of Munnipoore; while General Morrison, after a series of brilliant affairs, which occupied the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th of March, succeeded in clearing Arracan entirely of the Burmese. He then detached a force under Brigadier-General M'Bean, which occupied, without resistance, the islands of Rameree and Sandowey. Had he found it practicable to cross the hills, so as to winter any where rather than amid the swampy forests of Arracan, the results of his campaign would have been as satisfactory as they were honourable. Unfortunately, however, this was not the case; and hence an army, which had carried all before it in the field, became so thoroughly disorganized by disease, that, in order to preserve the lives of the survivors, it was of necessity broken up.

CHAPTER XI.

Depôt formed at Prome—The Burmese assemble a large army—Amuse the English with proposals of peace, which are abruptly withdrawn—Prome invested by 70,000 men—The enemy defeated—March to Melloon—Renewed negociations—Again broken off—Battle of Melloon—Advance to Peragahim Mew—"The King of Hell"—Battle of Peragahim—Consternation of the Court of Ava—The army within three marches of the capital—Peace—The country evacuated—Affairs of Bhurtpore—The city besieged and taken—Concluding remarks.

It is not to be imagined that the rainy season was spent by Sir Archibald Campbell and his followers exclusively in the indulgence of their own humours, and in cultivating the good opinion of their new acquaintances. Day and night, on the contrary, whenever the state of the weather would permit, boats were plying on the river, the seamen belonging to the fleet, with many native volunteers, being occupied in carrying from Rangoon to Prome all things requisite for the opening of the next campaign. An occasional reconnoissance, too, was executed for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the country, as well as to assure the inhabi-

tants that the strangers were willing to protect them; and more than once a plundering band of Burmese being overtaken, was dispersed to the great joy of the peaceful villagers. On a great scale, however, no offensive operations were undertaken; though the activity of both parties was abundantly displayed in the preparations which they respectively made to equip their forces for a renewal of the struggle.

On the side of the English little more could be done than to establish a depôt at Prome, and to bring up all the men and cattle which could be spared from Rangoon to the other posts along the river. The government of Ava, on the other hand, spared no exertions to enroll and organize a fresh army, which, by calling in the contingents of Shaan troops on the borders of China, was swelled ere long to the amount of nearly 70,000 men. These, amply supplied both with muskets and wall-pieces, took up a position at Maday, which, with their usual skill and diligence, they proceeded to fortify, till they had constructed such a line of stockades, breast-works, and batteries, as, in their own extravagant opinions, could not be penetrated by any troops in the world. Nevertheless it was not alone by enrolling soldiers and constructing entrenched camps that his golden-footed majesty strove to arrest the progress of the invaders. A negociation was opened with the English General, and an armistice requested and obtained, with a view, as was given out, of settling, by an amicable arrangement, a quar-

rel which had brought so much evil on the two greatest nations in the world. It is not necessary to give any minute account either of this treaty or of the interview between the principal officers of the hostile armies to which it led. Enough is done when we state that Sir Archibald Campbell, attended by his Brigadiers and personal Staff, met at the village of Neoungburzeik, about twenty-five miles above Prome, a deputation from the Lootoo, or high council of Ava; and that several days were spent in conviviality and good humour, to which neither the endeavours of the Burmese to deceive, nor their frequent exposure, were permitted to give any interruption. As often, however, as the main object of their meeting came to be discussed, Sir Archibald saw that there was little disposition on the part of the enemy to consider themselves as a humbled nation. They steadily refused to purchase his departure from the country by any sacrifice either of territory or money, and, while liberal in their declarations that peace was ardently desired, endeavoured to convey an impression that their strength was yet unbroken.

The English officers, after a sojourn of three days, returned to Prome, upon which marauding parties began immediately to close with increased activity. Against this proceeding, as being contrary to the armistice which existed, repeated protestations were made. But no notice was for a while taken of them; and when a reply did at length arrive, it proved to be the

reverse of amicable. "If you desire peace," such was the Laconic communication with which the General was favoured, "you may go away; but if you ask either money or territory, no friendship can exist between us. This is Burman custom." There was no mistaking the temper and inclinations of the men from whom such a message came, and Sir Archibald accordingly prepared to recommence hostilities as soon as the state of the roads and the weather would permit.

Reinforced by the return of Major Sale's brigade, which had proved completely successful in its attack on Bassein; and strengthened by the return of many recovered sick, the British army was now in a condition to offer battle with 5000 infantry, of which 3000 were Europeans, one troop of cavalry, and a considerable detail both of foot and horse-artillery. The Burmese, again, mustered in all, as we have already said, nearly 70,000 men, which were divided into three *corps d'armée*, under the chiefs Sudda Woon, the Kee Wongee, and their oldest and most experienced general, Maha Nemeow. Of the men, about 15,000 were Shaans, whose confidence had not yet been weakened by any trial of European valour, and who were encouraged to dare every hazard by the presence of three of their countrywomen, the professors of an art which enabled them to render English bullets harmless, by sprinkling them as they passed through the air with water. They were, therefore, eager to commence the

fray; and expressed their satisfaction in no measured terms when, in the beginning of November, there arrived orders from the King, that his invincible army should proceed to annihilate the strangers. Nor was any delay exercised in carrying these orders, as far as it was possible to carry them, into execution. The Burmese, leaving a garrison to protect the lines at Maday, advanced in three columns; one of which moved along the western bank of the Irawaddy, while the other two, though separated by a forest of ten miles in width, closed in both on the front and right of the British cantonments. Thus were the invaders threatened on all sides, while their more remote stations were kept on the alert by the march of a corps in the neighbourhood of old Pegue, where a desultory warfare was still carried on, almost to the outskirts of Rangoon itself.

On the 10th of November it was ascertained that the enemy were within sixteen miles of Prome, and that they were marching in a north-east direction, as if for the purpose of turning the cantonments by the right. As the accomplishment of this object, by interrupting the communications with the rear, might have proved very inconvenient, Colonel M'Dowal, with two brigades of native infantry, was directed to prevent it, and he moved through an inclosed country, with the design of falling on them, while their attention should be occupied by a demonstration elsewhere. It so chanced, however, that Maha Nemeow also commanded

here, and had taken the very route which Colonel M'Dowal followed, and the heads of the columns unexpectedly meeting, a fierce skirmish began. For a while the sepoys carried all before them. They drove the enemy from the wood, and one brigade even penetrated to the foot of a stockade, where unfortunately Colonel M'Dowal was slain, and his followers began, as is too much the custom among the sepoys, to falter. A retreat was in consequence determined on, and conducted with great regularity. But the effect of the whole operation was to give fresh courage to the Burmese, who immediately changed their plan of campaign, and instead of acting upon the communications of the English army, made a movement to attack Prome itself. Maha Nemeow, who directed the centre division, pursued a similar course. No opposition was made to their manœuvres, which, as well as the advance of Sudda Woon on the opposite side of the river, General Campbell viewed with perfect unconcern. But when the enemy had come, as was believed, sufficiently within reach, preparations were made to bid him welcome; and by attacking his armies in detail, to destroy them one after another.

Several partial engagements had taken place, and the enemy had drawn their circle completely round the town, when Sir Archibald, having effected his final arrangements, on the 30th, led out, at dawn, on the 1st of December, his troops to the attack. His plan was

an exceedingly judicious one, and proved eminently happy in the accomplishment. The ships' boats, moving up the river, opened so heavy a fire that the enemy's attention was drawn wholly to their centre and right columns, while Sir Archibald, making a *détour* to his right, came down suddenly, with all his disposable strength, on the left. Maha Nemeow, as well as his brother officers, displayed great courage and conduct, and the Shaans, animated by the presence of their charmed countrywomen, fought well; but the stockades were one after another stormed and taken amid prodigious slaughter. The old General himself fell from a random fire: one of the Amazons was shot in the breast, and died in a cottage whither she was conveyed; and the principal leaders, most of them grown grey in war, died with their swords in their hands. A complete rout followed, and the victors bivouacked that night amid the ruins of entrenchments which the left wing of the Burmese army had occupied when the day began.

The night of the 15th was spent by Sir Archibald and the officers of his staff in preparing for a renewal of the combat; to support which, the garrison of Prome, together with the armed boats, were directed to move forward at a given signal. By dawn, therefore, on the 2nd, the troops were again in motion, and after a laborious march of two hours through the jungle which had effectually cut the Burmese army in the middle, they debouched

into the plain, at the extremity of which the Kee Woonghee was drawn up. He occupied a position of commanding strength, which he had fortified with great skill, and presented for a time a very determined countenance to the assailants; but against the disciplined valour of such a force as proceeded to attack him neither his numbers nor his works proved of any avail. Ably supported by the fire of the gun-boats, the soldiers rushed forward with fixed bayonets, received, without returning, a volley, and scaled and carried the stockades in a moment. A prodigious carnage ensued, as the fugitives, crowding one upon another, strove vainly to escape from their own inclosures; while the loss by desertion, which immediately began to take place, proved enormous. Thus, in the course of two days, was the main body of the Burmese army, which it had taken four months to assemble, entirely destroyed; while of artillery, between forty and fifty pieces, with ammunition and stores to a large amount, remained in possession of the conquerors.

The corps of Sudea Woon was still, however, unbroken, and to leave it so would have accorded ill with the projects of the English general. Detachments from the several regiments were accordingly embarked in the flotilla, and a brigade of rockets with a few mortars accompanying them, the whole crossed the Irrawaddy on the morning of the 5th. To land, to attack the stockade upon the river in flank and in rear, and to drive the enemy from their works,

was the work almost of a moment. More than half-defeated by what they had seen on the other side, the Burmese made, indeed, a very feeble resistance, evacuating their lines almost before they were penetrated, and fleeing to a second position at the skirts of the forest. Even there, however, they were allowed no time to breathe. One vigorous rush broke through entrenchments which a crowded and disorganized garrison knew not how to defend; and as the retreat lay through jungles of the most dense description, the utmost disorder attended it. Hundreds died upon the bayonets of the pursuers, and thousands dispersing sought their own homes, from which no commands of the King or his chiefs could afterwards entice them.

Having thus cleared his front of the hostile swarms that threatened it, Sir Archibald Campbell began seriously to mature his plans for an advance upon Ummerapoora. His first measure was to settle the provinces of which he had become master, by placing them under the general superintendence of British officers, whose residences were fixed at Rangoon, Pegue, Bassein, Prome, and Sarawah. Care was, however, taken to interfere as little as possible with the machinery of the native government, nor were any hopes held out that the Peguese would be restored, even at the close of the war, to a state of independence. Against such a step, indeed, the General had been particularly warned, as tending to cumber the Company

with an additional extent of territory; for it was clear that the power that bestowed independence on a nation which had once been thoroughly conquered, must, if it desired the work of its own hands to continue, persist in upholding it by force of arms. But in giving something like vigour to the system which already prevailed, and assuring the magistrates of support and the people of protection, he acted only as a regard to his own interests seemed to dictate; while, at the same time, he rendered the provinces fit to receive, and perhaps to value, any boon which it might be judged expedient hereafter to bestow upon them.

This done, and a train of bullocks and cars having been organized, Sir Archibald Campbell distributed his army into divisions, and assuming in person the command of one, while General Cotton directed the movements of the other, he struck his tents on the 9th of December, and moved forward. At every step the soldiers discovered traces of the havoc which war and disease had made in the enemy's ranks. Among the ruins of villages, which the Burmese had themselves destroyed, the dead and the dying were found huddled together, while, in stockades abandoned and the relics of hasty bivouacs, the best proofs were afforded that the *morale* of the fugitives was broken. Even Meeaday, on which so much labour was understood to have been expended, offered no resistance. Multitudes of putrefying corpses, intermixed as usual with sick,

alone occupied its area; for of the mighty army, which was said to be organized for its defence, not a vestige remained.

The troops sustained some inconvenience from the occurrence of an unlooked-for storm, soon after they quitted Prome. Except in this instance, however, neither the land nor water columns (for the flotilla kept pace with the soldiers) met with any thing calculated to incommode them, till, on the 29th, a halt was ordered, in order that the proposals of certain emissaries, which met them, from the Burmese chiefs, might be taken into consideration. It soon appeared, however, that these men had no other object in view than to occasion delay. On the 29th, therefore, the march was resumed, and the same evening ground was taken up in front of a fortified position, which the Burmese had laboriously constructed for the protection of the town of Malloon. In a moment the river was covered with boats of all shapes and sizes, which endeavoured to escape from the dangers of capture by paddling against the stream, but which a few discharges from the British artillery brought-to, and compelled to return. Never had the Diana steamer proved more strikingly useful than now. She breasted the current nobly, passed the enemy's flotilla and batteries, and taking up a position in rear of their lines, effectually cut off all chance of flight from those who looked to the river as affording a highway of escape.

Previous to the advance from Prome, Sir

Archibald Campbell had dispatched to Ava a Brahmin, called Raj Gooroo, who had visited Calcutta some time previously, and now affected, if not to espouse the cause of the invaders, at all events to deprecate the continuance of war. He was the bearer of a letter to the King, and, as was afterwards proved, delivered it—indeed it was that epistle which produced the abortive negociation on the 28th; and now confirmed by the same authority on which his fellow-functionaries had acted, he himself came in with an assurance that the King desired nothing so much as peace. As there appeared to be sincerity in this man, General Campbell consented to treat, and a barge was moored in the middle of the river, on board of which the conference might be carried on. It was attended with much less of pomp and the parade of office than that which had taken place a few months previously, but it led not to a more happy result. The Burmese commissioners, indeed, after exhausting all the resources of argument and finesse, accepted the terms which were proposed to them; and agreed to surrender the provinces demanded, as well as to pay one crore of rupees as an indemnity for the expenses incurred during the war. They even signed the preliminary treaty, and requested and obtained an armistice, in order that the deed might be forwarded to Ummerapoora for ratification. Nevertheless, though the most unreserved intercourse forthwith began, between both the officers and men

of the opposing armies, there were never wanting circumstances which induced the British General to suspect that peace was as far from being established as ever. Day by day fresh columns of smoke, rising in rear of Malloon, gave notice of the arrival of strong reinforcements, and the constant sound of the axe and the hammer told that the labour of fortification was not for an hour intermitted. No surprise, therefore was experienced when, on the expiration of the armistice, an evasive answer was given to a demand touching the King's determination; and a wretched excuse of illness was set up by the Burmese commanders to avoid meeting, as they were pledged to do, Sir Archibald and his staff. On the contrary, the anticipations of all ranks were perfectly verified; and by none was the slightest regret experienced, when, on the 20th of January, the heavy guns were landed, and strong working parties ordered out to erect batteries and to arm them.

The defence of Malloon, in spite of all the care which had been bestowed on its fortification, was less obstinate by far than that either of Dinobeu or the lines in front of Prome. The batteries opening soon after midnight, caused terrible slaughter within the stockades, and reduced the defenders to the necessity of crowding for shelter under their rude bomb-proofs; while a body of troops embarked in the flotilla sailed quietly up the river, and prepared to assault the intrenched camp, wherever it might appear

least defensible. As the water-column was not numerous, and chanced to fall unexpectedly under the range of a well-served battery, some loss was sustained; nevertheless, a landing was effected, and after a sharp affair, the intrenchments were surmounted by his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, which immediately charged with the bayonet and carried all before them. No exertions on the part of the Burmese officers could rally or restore order among their men; they fled in the utmost confusion, leaving behind guns, stores, treasure, wounded, and a curious collection of papers, both public and private. Among the former, we need only mention the identical treaty which the Commissioners had signed on board the barge, and which, as was now apparent, never had been, nor ever could have been submitted to his Golden Majesty for approval: among the latter was a private communication from the wife of one of the chief warriors, in which she requested him to send her without delay a few of the white English as slaves—so profound was still the ignorance which prevailed in Ummerapoora as to the turn which events had taken. Among the booty were eight gilded war-boats, 300 of a meaner description, 30,000 rupees in hard cash, with gold chains, gilt umbrellas, and swords innumerable. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the money and chains proved particularly acceptable to the soldiers; as to the ammunition, that, with the wood-work which composed the stockades, was committed to the flames.

A halt of a few days sufficed to restore to the army its consistency, and on the 25th the march was resumed, which carried them through an exceedingly interesting country, abounding, among other curiosities, with "oil wells"—in other words, with numerous reservoirs of petroleum. As had been the case in approaching Malloon, however, every village and cabin was in ruins; while here and there, along the roadside, the bodies of men and women were attached to gibbets—terrible proofs of the ferocity of those who seemed determined on waging war even to extermination. Occasionally, too, the advanced guard fell in with the enemy's rear, when a skirmish more lively than destructive ensued; and on the 30th, the wreck of the body-guard, now reduced to thirty troopers, was so fortunate as to surprise 500 men in bivouac, and, by a brilliant charge, to overthrow them. But the most memorable occurrence that befel was the appearance, on the 31st, of a boat direct from Ava, in which were embarked Dr. Sandford, of the Royals, three European soldiers, who had been taken early in the war, the master of a little gun-boat, and Dr. Price, an American missionary. These were accompanied by one or two Burmans of rank, who came with full powers to negociate and conclude a peace, and who, on Sir Archibald Campbell's positive refusal to abate one jot of his former demands, assured him, without hesitation, that they would be granted. Not all their entreaties could, however, prevail upon him to suspend his

march. He agreed, indeed, not to pass Pagahun Mew within the space of twelve days, (and he could not, by any exertion, reach it under ten;) but further than this he would not go, and the emissaries departed, to all appearance satisfied. The lapse of a few days, however, sufficed to prove that his Golden Majesty had not yet learned wisdom, and that one more defeat was requisite in order to convince both him and his courtiers that they had engaged in a contest for which their means were not adequate.

When the messengers quitted Ava the king's desire for peace was sincere and ardent. They were scarcely gone, however, when an individual of low birth, whose official rank was far from elevated, aware of the support which he would receive from the queen and the war-faction, undertook, with 30,000 men, to put an end to the war, by destroying utterly the "rebellious strangers." The weak Prince closed with the offer, conferred upon the boaster the strange title of Narwon Barem (that is, "King of Hell,") and placing under his orders about 15,000 men, all that could be assembled from the wreck of former armies, sent him forth to redeem the tarnished honour of his country. The King of Hell took post among some ruined pagodas which abutted upon Lodagune pagoda, three miles in front of Pagahun, where he drew up in a crescent 7000 men, the *élite* of his army. The remainder he kept within the walls of Pagahun itself, as a reserve, in case of

disaster. Now the whole amount of Sir Archibald Campbell's force amounted, at this time, to less than 2000 men. He had found it necessary to send out numerous detachments, few of which had yet returned; nevertheless, so firm was his confidence in the valour of this handful of heroes, that he did not hesitate to give battle. It was a warm affair, and on the part of the enemy well contested, for they fought (and they had never done so on any other occasion) in the open field, hazarding more than one charge of cavalry, and manœuvring with considerable skill to surround the 13th regiment while in skirmishing order. But it ended, as every contest with the British had yet done, in the total defeat of the enemy. Many of the principal officers were among the slain; and Pagahun itself being stormed immediately afterwards, the last hope of the Burmese government, as far as their hopes rested on the application of military means, ceased to operate.

Out of the army which thus endeavoured to protect the capital, only 1300 men, with their leader, "the King of Hell," returned to Ava. The fate of the latter was a very tragical one. Notwithstanding his disaster, he had the audacity to present himself before his sovereign, and to assure him, that if his Majesty would grant him a thousand men more, and allow him again to try his fortune, he would positively defeat us. The King heard him with patience, and allowed him to finish his tale; but it was no sooner

concluded, than making a motion with his javelin to his surrounding attendants, they seized the unfortunate chief and dragged him off to punishment. He was instantly hurried forth, and whilst on his way to the place of execution, suffered every indignity which the infuriated guards could inflict. Yet even at this awful moment a fine sentiment of loyalty burst from him; for when on the point of losing sight of the imperial palace, he suddenly turned round, and inclining his head, said, "Let me make one parting obeisance to the residence of my sovereign." A few moments more terminated his existence: he was thrown under the feet of horses and elephants, and trampled to death.

A few days sojourn at Pagahun Mew having enabled the most important of the detached corps to rejoin, the army, on the 16th of February, resumed its march; and though met on the 18th by Dr. Price, with six lacs of rupees and several European and sepoy prisoners, made no pause to receive or reply to his proposals. The money, on the contrary, was sent back with a peremptory announcement, that unless the conditions required at Prome were accepted at once,—twenty-five lacs paid down, all prisoners released, and their losses made good to them,—the capital itself would be occupied; and then the peace, if granted at all, would only be purchased by cessions both pecuniary and territorial, much more humiliating. Never was the declaration of a victorious invader pro-

ductive of more immediate and peaceable results. At Yandaboo, on the banks of the Irrawaddy, and within three stages of Ava, Dr. Price again made his appearance, accompanied on this occasion by accredited plenipotentiaries from his Golden Majesty, as bearers of the money demanded; whose manner was now as subdued as it had formerly been violent, and who expressed their willingness to ratify any engagements into which the English chief might condescend to enter. There was no great difficulty in bringing matters to a satisfactory conclusion under such circumstances as these. On the 24th a treaty of peace was signed, by which all the demands of the English were conceded, and the first instalment being paid up, the prisoners released, and their losses made good, a general salute was fired both by cannon and musketry to denote that the war was at an end.

By this treaty, which included eleven articles, besides a twelfth or supplementary clause, explanatory of one or two which had gone before, the King of Ava renounced his right of sovereignty over Assam, Cachar, and Jylna; permitted Munnipore to be erected into an independent kingdom, recognized the mountains of Arracan as the boundary between his dominions and those of the Company, and gave up the whole of Tenasserim to his conquerors. He pledged himself to pay in four instalments one crore of rupees; engaged not to molest any of his subjects on account of any part which they might have taken against him during the

war; agreed to include the King of Siam in the general pacification, and granted to British vessels, trading or otherwise, which might visit his ports, the same privileges which were enjoyed by his own ships. The English, in return for all this, undertook to fall back to Rangoon immediately; to evacuate the country altogether as soon as the second instalment should have been paid; and to send in all the prisoners taken during the war, with as little delay as might be compatible with their removal from a distance. We have only to add, that in every particular was the compact thus entered into discharged, with a promptitude and good faith which would have done no discredit to a more civilized court and nation.

On the 5th of March, an adequate supply of boats having been provided, Sir Archibald Campbell began his retrograde movement, which was not marked by any incident worthy of repetition. The complete success which had attended his operations caused one or two failures on less important points to be forgotten; and the army, on its return to the scene of its first difficulties and dangers, felt, and felt truly, that it had done its duty. But the whole of the army did not attain to that point. A battalion of sepoys with a few elephants, being supplied with Burmese guides, received orders to penetrate across the country of Arracan, and it accomplished the service with comparatively little trouble, and a total absence of all suffering. Thus was the fact ascertained that Ava might be approached from other quarters than

the sea-coast; and that General Morrison's corps, if judiciously and promptly carried forward, would have arrived in time to share the glories of which its more fortunate comrades obtained a monopoly.

While the Burmese war was thus brought to a triumphant conclusion, the arms of England were crowned with equal glory in the West, where an outrage offered to a prince who stood towards the Company in the relation of dependent ally, rendered it necessary that they should interfere for his protection. The successful resistance which they had formerly offered to the British arms was not, however, forgotten, either by the people of Bhurtpore or their neighbours, and it was necessary to deal with them with even more of vigour than with other natives.

It will be borne in mind that after the repulse of Lord Lake in 1805, the Rajah of Bhurtpore entered into a treaty of alliance with the Company, which being faithfully adhered to on both sides, gradually ripened into friendship. Nowise elated by the successful termination of the siege, Buldeo Singh (so the Rajah was called) carefully refrained from giving umbrage to his powerful neighbours; and expressed on all occasions an anxious wish that the good understanding which happily existed between the two nations might be perpetual. In these feelings he was not joined by a considerable proportion of his subjects, upon whom, as well as upon the inhabitants of other native principalities, the failure of Lord Lake had pro-

duced a strong impression, and who ceased not to repeat, till the expression became in the end a sort of proverb, that "India was not yet conquered, for Bhurtpore had never been taken." A member of his own family, moreover, his nephew Doonjia Sal, had shown himself ready to take the lead in what may be termed the anti-English faction; and soon began, by numerous petty inroads upon the neighbouring provinces, to sow the seeds of future disagreements. Buldeo Singh did his best to suppress these outrages, and his good disposition being well known, no blame was attributed to him. Yet were the British troops more than once called upon to drive away the marauders, and even to follow them, for the purpose of depriving them of their plunder, across the Bhurtpore frontier.

Time passed, and in his extreme old age the Rajah, who had hitherto been childless, was made happy by the birth of a son. Aware of the ambitious temper of his nephew, and foreseeing that the child would receive at his hands no fair play, Buldeo Singh made haste to secure for him the especial protection of the English, by soliciting from them, while he was yet alive, the khelhaut or robe of inauguration for his son, and proclaiming him, under their sanction, heir to the throne. He had not long done so, when a mortal disease overtook him, and he died, leaving the prince Bulwunt Singh in his sixth year, surrounded by enemies.

As the old Rajah had anticipated, the ceremonies of interment were scarcely ended, when Doonjia Sal put himself at the head of the troops and seized the palace. With great difficulty the guardians of Bulwunt Singh saved the life of their charge, and, flying to Calcutta, solicited the assistance of the Governor-General in restoring him to his rights. Had there been no political reasons to direct them in this case, a sense of honour alone would have led the Bengal government to receive the application favourably; but when to that powerful motive was added the desire of putting an end to the delusion which prevailed touching the impregnability of any Indian fortress, it was no more than might have been expected that they would embrace the opportunity with thankfulness. Sir Edward Paget, then Commander-in-chief, received instructions to equip forthwith such an army as he might consider adequate to the reduction of Bhurtpore; and as he well knew the importance of the service in which he was about to embark, he took care that the means of accomplishing it should be ample. Five-and-twenty thousand men, including two regiments of European infantry, and two of European cavalry, with a train of two hundred pieces of artillery, were ordered to assemble; and on the 10th of December, 1825, the whole sat down before the place, not, indeed, under General Paget, for after completing all the arrangements he was recalled, but under Lord Combermere, who arrived just in time to reap

the benefit of his predecessor's skill and judgment.

We have given, in another place, a general description of Bhurtpore, as well as of the fortifications with which it is defended. The city itself stands in a plain, and is begirt by an extensive forest, of which, till the summer of 1824, the trees extended to the crest of the glacis. That forest constituted, in former times, a sort of preserve for the Rajah's game, but on the first threatening of hostilities, care was taken to level a considerable portion of it, so as to leave an open space of six or seven hundred yards on all sides round the ditch. The ditch again, as has been already stated, is enormously wide and deep; and there is a jhul or lake hard by, on piercing a narrow embankment on the side of which, the whole may be filled with water to the depth of many feet. A wall surrounds the town, flanked at proper intervals by towers and bastions, but the curtains are low, while the bastions, by reason of their circular form, stand more exposed to the fire of a besieging artillery than they would be, were their construction such as the rules of modern science require. Finally, there is a citadel, kept apart from the town by a ditch and ramparts, distinct from those which form the *enceinte* of the whole, of which the position is such as to hold the town completely at its mercy.

Before this place the advanced guard of the British army made its appearance on the 10th

of December, just in time to disperse a body of workmen who had begun to cut through the embankment, though too late to hinder the opening of a sluice, and the introduction of a small body of water into the ditch. The following day was spent in reconnoitring the defences, under a dropping and irregular fire of cannon and small-arms from the walls; while the several brigades and divisions as they came up were disposed round the town, till the investment was complete. Then began the usual business of a siege, driving in the enemy's outposts, and felling trees, constructing fascines and gabions, breaking ground and digging trenches,—occupations at all times laborious and attended with great danger, though little interesting in the description except to military readers. Nor was an occasional sortie or an affair of cavalry wanting to relieve the monotony of a close blockade; while the batteries being constructed and in due time armed, were made ready to open their fire. We will not pause to describe the effects of each day's practice, which, as on a former occasion, caused little damage to the singularly constructed walls. It is sufficient if we state, that after many days' cannonading, the bastions attacked presented scarcely the semblance of a breach; and that it became necessary to aid the operations of the battering guns by running a couple of mines under the counterscarp. Even these failed, for a time, of the desired effect, being exploded too soon, and scarcely damaging the

surface of the works, and though they alarmed Doonjia Sal into an offer of surrender, no disposition was evinced to take advantage of it. On the contrary, the reduction of Bhurtpore by force of arms being at least as much to be desired as the restoration of the young sovereign, Lord Combermere determined, let the expense of time and labour be what they might, never to interrupt his operations till the place should be carried.

Acting under orders issued to this effect, both men and officers exerted all their energies, and the siege went on with surprising vigour. Fresh batteries were opened, fresh mines dug and charged, and on the 17th of January the latter were found to be in such a state as could not fail of opening out, when exploded, a safe and easy passage into the heart of the town. Dispositions were in consequence made to storm, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 18th, two columns, headed respectively by the 14th and 59th King's regiments, moved into the trenches opposite to the point about to be breached. They had been warned to rush on as soon as the firing of the great mine should give a signal that all was ready. But hour after hour passed by without bringing with them the wished-for explosion; and when day dawned, the prospect of an advance appeared to be as remote as ever. From that moment till about 9 A.M., the very drums of the men's ears tingled with the noise of a cannonade as heavy and as ceaseless as ever

was heard. From the British lines, upwards of one hundred pieces of ordnance vomited forth fire; while, on the side of the enemy, every thing that could be brought to bear, from the huge 84-pounder down to the matchlock, replied to the salute.

Such was the situation of the troops when Lord Combermere, of whose personal exertions every eye-witness has spoken with enthusiasm, arrived in the trench. He advanced to the spot where the 14th regiment stood, and observing that the mouth of the mine was but a few yards removed from the grenadier company, he anxiously demanded of the engineer whether all were safe? He was answered that the men ran no risk, and departed. But it seemed as if there rested in his mind a conviction to the contrary, for he returned in about a quarter of an hour, and having again repeated his question, was a second time assured that not a hair of the soldiers' heads could be injured. Of what followed, we give an account in the words of an eye-witness.

"The general had departed but a few minutes, and we were all in that state of breathless excitement which our situation was calculated to produce, when a spectacle was presented to us, to which I have never beheld, and shall probably never behold, any thing akin. I had fixed my eyes intently on the angle of the bastion, beneath which I was aware that the mine had been formed, when, suddenly, the ponderous wall heaved as if

shaken by the power of an earthquake. There was no noise, no explosion, and, as it happened, the very firing had for the instant ceased, but the wall rocked like a ship lifted upon a wave, and then sank down again. This occurred twice, and then, with a sound, to which the loudest thunder were soft music, stones, earth, logs of wood, guns and men, flew into the air. Of more I cannot speak, except that shrieks and groans burst upon the ear, as soon as that tremendous crash was over, giving evidence, but too decisive, that the engineer's assurances as to the safety of our position were groundless; but as to seeing the objects from whence they came, that was out of the question. A dense cloud of smoke and dust was over us; to breathe, far less to command the sense of sight amid which was no easy matter."

Through that awful cloud the soldiers pushed forward, trampling, as they went, on the mangled remains of nearly one hundred and fifty of their comrades. Both breaches (for two of them were effected by similar processes) proved to be excellent, and the resistance, though singular for its displays of personal gallantry, was neither obstinate nor well sustained. The Bhurtporeans stood, it is true, here and there, till their pikes came into contact with the bayonets of the assailants, and their artillerymen, in particular, are described as fighting to the last, and dying beside their guns. But such individual exertions could offer no effectual bar to the orderly and

cool charge of the British columns, which, taking different directions, swept the ramparts till they met, victorious and, comparatively speaking, little injured, on the opposite side of the town. A loud and joyous cheer proclaimed that the place was their own. The disgrace of a former repulse, the only repulse of consequence with which the British arms in India have ever been tarnished, was washed away; and the proverb so long in use among the disaffected natives rendered for ever devoid of meaning.

In this manner was Bhurtpore besieged and taken, for the citadel held out only till noon next day. The loss had been severe to the enemy, — nearly ten thousand men having perished; while among the English the list of casualties scarcely exceeded one thousand: but had the proportions been reversed, though we might have lamented the fall of so many brave men, we should have been still compelled to acknowledge that the victory was worth its cost. A more important service, indeed, has never been accomplished since India became an appendage to the British crown, for it is now well known that had the besieging army sustained a reverse, there would have been a general rising all over the country. The capture of a city, however, which they taught themselves to regard as impregnable, caused an immediate change in the dispositions and views even of the most turbulent. They felt that against the superior discipline and courage of the English neither their troops nor their castles would

avail; and they made up their minds to bear, with resignation, a yoke which they were destitute of power to throw aside.

It is scarcely necessary to wind up this narrative by stating that the fall of the capital was followed by the immediate submission of all the other towns and villages in the principality. The young Rajah Bulwunt Singh was then conducted to the palace, and seated by Lord Combermere, in the presence of an English regiment, on the throne of his ancestors, while Doonjia Sal, who had been seized while endeavouring to escape, was carried as a state-prisoner to the fortress of Allahabad. There he has continued ever since to subsist on a pension allowed to him by the generosity of the Company's government.

Having thus brought down the narrative of Anglo-Indian history to a period when both at home and abroad "the sound of war ceased to be heard," we might at once lay aside the pen, were we not tempted to offer a few general remarks on the nature and probable fate of an empire the most extraordinary, in whatever light it may be regarded, which has yet arisen among men. To compare the sovereignty of the English in the East to that of Rome (and we are not acquainted with any other empire, either of ancient or of modern times, with which it can, with the shadow of propriety, be contrasted,) is to take a very

limited view of the peculiarities which are to be traced in the condition of the two empires throughout all their stages. It is true that the mode adopted by the English to extend their dominion over the provinces of India resembles, in many respects, that pursued by the Romans in Europe. By both has the system of subsidiary alliances been adopted; and they have equally contrived, so soon as their power became established, to render the subjugated nations the instruments of their own continued degradation. But there is this wide and remarkable difference between them: that whereas the Roman conquests were all pushed forward in obedience to the commands of the authorities at home, those of the English have taken place in direct defiance of the wishes of their supreme rulers. The Roman conquests too, if we except those which occurred in the infancy of the city, originated in ambition, and flowed out of a thirst for power; the conquests of the English have invariably been forced upon them by the most influential of all motives, the instinct of self-preservation. Again, though both powers may be said to have used their vassals as self-acting instruments of continued degradation, by the English alone has the hazardous experiment been tried how far the system of arming men that are governed only by the sword may be adopted with safety in their own country. Be it remembered that the Romans, after embodying their legions of allies, took care to remove them to a distance from their native

land; and thus held in subjection Britain, for example, by means of Spanish cohorts, Spain through the terror of British soldiery. But the English put weapons into the hands of Hindoos and Mussulmans, that they may keep the yoke of their masters on the necks of their brethren; and up to the present moment, at least, no mischief has resulted from the experiment either to the rulers or the governed. How far the practice will continue to produce like results, time, and time only, can determine.

Striking as the dissimilarities are in the military systems of the two powers, we shall find, when we turn our eyes to contemplate their modes of civil management, contrarieties still more glaring, and, in many respects, perhaps, much more startling. The Romans, as is well known, interfered very little with the internal management of the nations that submitted to their authority. The Proconsuls and the Prefects exercised in their several provinces a mere general superintendence; all details in the administration both of judicial and fiscal affairs were committed to the hands of native functionaries. The Romans, moreover, threw open, under certain restrictions, the honour of citizenship to all their subjects; and received, in later times, both senators and emperors from countries which their arms had reduced. Look now to the mode of proceeding which the English adopt, in dealing with the natives of India. All

the institutions of that great country have been either overthrown or so completely remodelled as to have entirely lost their value in the eyes of the people. There is scarcely an office of trust, profit, responsibility, or honour to which a native can aspire; we deal with eighty millions of our fellow-creatures as if there was neither an honest nor an able man among them; and we remind them, when all this is done, of the blessings which they derive from our authority. Now when we come to inquire into the nature and extent of these blessings, to what do we find that they amount? India is certainly more tranquil than it ever was since the decay of the Mogul empire. The people are efficiently protected from foreign violence and internal dissensions; but are eighty millions of persons likely to be satisfied with a bare protection from evil? We suspect not. A consciousness of security can hardly be supposed to compensate for the loss of power, dignity, and honour to the descendants of families which once enjoyed all, to the fullest extent. Still the machinery of government has hitherto been kept in motion; though, unlike that of the Romans, it is guided, even to its most minute springs, by a handful of strangers, differing in language, manners, complexion, dress, and religion from the myriads for whose benefit it is supposed to work.

Again, the Romans, let them conquer where they might, failed not to establish colonies in every province; by means of which the man-

ners of the subjects were gradually, but surely, assimilated to those of the masters. There existed between them and the natives whom they had brought under subjection no bar of separation either in their civil or religious observances; nor were the instances unfrequent in which even a Roman knight, after spending a certain number of years among the barbarians, ceased to look elsewhere for a home. How different, in all respects, are the proceedings of the English with reference to their fellow-subjects in the Eastern hemisphere! Our countrymen proceed to India either as traders or in some official capacity; but the objects which they have in view are, in either case, the same. They calculate on enduring the inconveniences of exile for a certain number of years, under the idea that they shall be able, when the term of absence expires, to return to Europe with at least a competency. No man dreams of spending his days in India, far less of establishing a family there. That mighty portion of the globe is treated as a mine from which treasure shall be dug, which the patient workman may carry off and spend in another country. Let any thinking person consider how such a state of things is likely to operate among the multitude who are treated as mere instruments by which the favoured few are to be enriched. We shall probably be reminded that, hitherto, the people of India have borne the drain very patiently. We admit the fact; but for what length of

time has the drain, in its fullest extent, been experienced?

Perhaps there is no particular in which the two empires which we have ventured to bring into contrast differ more widely, the one from the other, than in the length of time which was required to carry each from its rude beginnings to its consummation. Seven centuries of war and conquest scarcely sufficed to render Rome mistress of a moiety of Europe, and to establish her supremacy over a strip of Africa, and a few provinces of Asia Minor. As many decades have raised the East India Company from the rank of a body of adventurers,—dependents on the caprice of the native princes, to be the sovereigns of a territory, to which, in point both of extent and population, there is to be found in history no parallel. Is it contrary to the laws which regulate human affairs in general, to presume, that an edifice which is run up, as it were, in a moment, must contain within itself the seeds of rapid decay, much more abundantly than a structure in the consolidation of which hundreds of years have been expended? Nor is this all. Rome stood in the very midst of her dependencies. She was the reservoir from which issued the streams that kept all the fountains in play; the heart which sent out and received back again continually the great current of vitality and vigour. England, on the contrary, is separated from her gigantic dependency by half the circumference of the globe;

her means of retaining that dependency in subjection are limited to the resources which lie within the immediate reach of her provincial functionaries. What are these? About thirty thousand European soldiers, with half as many civilians, aided, indeed, by the profound respect which their superior talent and good fortune have created; in other words, a mere handful of troops, backed up by that most uncertain of all coadjutors, public opinion. To speak plainly, Rome maintained her supremacy by enlisting on her side the leading men of the countries which she succeeded in reducing. England maintains hers by preventing any of the native population of India from rising in the scale of political importance, or acquiring an influence among their countrymen. Once more we are ready to admit, that, hitherto, the device has answered; whether it will preserve the empire of England in India, as long as the Roman system preserved the empire of Rome in Europe, we take it not upon us to predict.

Are we then arguing against that system of rule which has, for more than sixty years, kept one of the fairest and most populous regions under heaven in obedience to the British command? By no means. While yet the English empire in India was struggling to maturity, it may be that considerations of prudence demanded that, as much as possible, authority, both civil and military, should be taken out of the hands of the native gentry. This may be true;

though, for our own parts, we make the concession as one of hypothesis only. But admitting that it is so, he must be a bold reasoner, indeed, who will contend, in the face of all experience, that, as a principle, it is either just or prudent to shut out the inhabitants of any country from the hope of attaining to rank or station in the land of their birth. Still, in introducing changes even into a system confessedly imperfect, the greatest caution ought to be observed. Granting that the people of India have been thus far unfairly dealt with, and that a long continuance of their existing disabilities were alike incompatible with the honour and welfare of their rulers, it does not therefore follow that they are all at once to be intrusted with power, or that an order of things to which they have become to a certain extent habituated is to be set aside in a moment. It is certain that our jealousy of native interference has had the effect of rendering the natives incompetent to interfere advantageously; and hence that to thrust them suddenly into situations which they are incapable of filling would be productive only of mischief. But if there be any truth in history, if there be any lesson which we may learn from the study of human nature, however modified by circumstances, it is this: that no empire has ever yet long hung together which was not based upon the affections as well as upon the fears of the people. Now, to engage the affections of a conquered people, you must not only teach

them that they are protected slaves, but you must admit them to a participation in the dignities and emoluments which attend the administration of their own affairs. In few words, you must enlist their ambition not less than their respect in your service, by opening to the high-minded and the able among them the door to political importance.

Up to the present moment, few attempts have been made to deal thus with the people of India. Of Lord Cornwallis's system it was the main principle to assume, that the natives of India were every way unworthy to be employed in the government of one another, as if there had never been a government, and a good government too, in that extensive region, till a handful of islanders from the outskirts of Europe established it. In like manner, the custom has too much prevailed of speaking and writing of the inhabitants of India as of a race utterly depraved; and, as a necessary consequence, unfit to be intrusted even with the most limited species of power. Far be it from us to stand forth as the advocates of Indian morals or Indian rectitude. They are both loose enough; but we would venture to suggest, that to include in a condemnation so sweeping one hundred millions of human beings, of men who for ages have carried on among themselves all the intercourses of social and even civilized life, is to act with very little regard to the dictates of the only true philosophy, common sense, and every-day ex-

perience. Sir Thomas Munro, no mean authority in such matters, held of the people of India a widely different opinion; and the measures which he recommended, had they been followed up with vigour, might have carried conviction, by this time, to every unprejudiced mind, and given increased stability to the fabric of English power in the East.

From the observations which we have ventured to make, an inference will probably be drawn that we do not regard the British empire in India as destined to any very lengthened duration. We freely confess that such is our persuasion. Totally disconnected with the feelings of the people, and anxious only to preserve order among them, the English have rendered their supremacy less and less secure, by every addition which they have made to the extent of their dominions. Already are their northern frontiers pushed to the very borders of China; while in the west, Persia, and the single European power which Persia has been taught to respect, regard them with jealousy, perhaps with hostility. That they will long be permitted to retain their present position on either side no one can venture to hope. Yet it is not so much from foreign violence as from intestine discord that we anticipate the infliction of that blow which must, sooner or later, fall. In India, as well as in other countries, civilization is making rapid progress; and exactly as the people become enlightened and capable of reasoning aright, the sort of

superstitious reverence with which they have hitherto regarded Europeans will die away. The influence of a relaxing climate, and of a diet singularly spare, may, indeed, retard the progress of this calamity; for however it may affect the people of India themselves, we are bound to regard it as such; but to speak of it as very far removed, were to treat history as "an old almanac," and all the examples which it sets forth as "old wives' tales." If the present system be persevered in, our descendants in 1935 will probably have ceased to remember that India was ever a portion of the British empire.

The truth indeed is, that our authority in Asia is, and always must be, insecure, so long as it depends entirely on the dread which the people entertain of our superior discipline and prowess as warriors. To think, on the other hand, of introducing into the administration of that great empire any system borrowed from the usages of Great Britain would be an act of positive insanity. Local parliaments, a free press, trial by jury, and a code of written laws, however admirable in theory, and however well adapted for the latitude of England, could produce no other than the most mischievous results in British India. What is wanted there may be described as a return so far to primitive usages as shall place in the hands of the natives, subject to European inspection, a large share in the administration of their own country; and so open out to the able and aspiring among

them, a legitimate field of exertion, with the prospect of an adequate reward. This, with a due attention to the moral training of the people may be expected, if any thing can, to attach them to their rulers; whom they will learn to regard not as griping and selfish task-masters, but as persons interested in their welfare, and every way anxious to promote it. And even should this expectation be defeated, should they still abhor our yoke, and labour to cast it from them, at least we shall enjoy the satisfaction of knowing that we have striven to render them capable of ruling themselves; and hence, that whatever the results may be, no charge can by possibility be brought against us, that we neglected the first and most important duty which a government owes to its subjects.

There are many other matters on which, as in some degree connected with the subject of this history, we might, perhaps, be permitted to touch; such as the constitution of the Indian army, the state of the half-caste population, the structure of the Company's government both at home and abroad, as that is displayed by the machinery of Leadenhall-street, Whitehall, and the Government-House at Calcutta. To some of these we have, throughout, taken care not to allude; partly because we consider them as too delicate for public discussion, partly because the limits of our work would not permit our doing to them the justice which they merit. With respect, again, to others, enough has been incidentally intro-

duced, during the progress of the narrative, to mark the sense which we entertain both of their excellences and defects. It is beyond dispute, that the constitution of the Indian government presents, throughout, one of the most remarkable anomalies which is to be found in the social arrangements of any nation. We have, indeed, at the India-House, a secondary parliament, dependent, and scarcely dependent, on that at Westminster; while in Bengal, the Governor-General enjoys, at least, as much of pomp, and more of real power, than is enjoyed by the sovereign at home. Yet the system, though contrary to all the dogmas of speculative politicians, has undeniably worked well. How long it will be permitted to remain as it is now is a question which few will presume to answer. But whatever changes may be introduced, one fact appears certain, that any attempt to convert India into a source of ministerial or royal patronage will inevitably hasten the crisis to which we have already alluded. Even as matters stand at present, it is no easy matter to carry on the affairs of that great country through the agency of men trained from boyhood in the service, and dependent on their own talents and exertions for promotion. Let the minister once be empowered to reward his political friends by appointments in the East, and India will soon cease to own the sway of England at all.

That such must be, and probably at no remote date, the result of all our wars and

conquests, no thinking man can doubt; yet let us not hasten the catastrophe. Much still remains to be done ere we can, with honour, dissolve a connexion which, however largely it may have contributed to the wealth and prosperity of Great Britain, has in a moral, perhaps even in a political point of view, operated but little for the improvement of the condition of the people of India.

APPENDIX

TO

THE HISTORY OF INDIA.

APPENDIX.

Since the Second, Third, and Fourth Volumes of this History were printed off, Colonel Gurwood has given to the public the first portion of a work, which cannot fail to command the attention of all classes of readers, no matter whether they be soldiers or civilians. The Dispatches of his Grace the Duke of Wellington may be expected to contain an almost uninterrupted narrative of the great events, political as well as military, in which Great Britain has taken part, from the commencement to the close of the war of the French Revolution. To the reader of Indian history they will prove particularly valuable, throwing light upon various transactions which have hitherto been obscure, and supplying links in a chain which, till they made their appearance, can hardly be said to have hung perfectly together. Had the volume come forth somewhat earlier, we should have availed ourselves of its contents while compiling our narrative. As it is, we can only give to our readers, in the

shape of an Appendix, such selections from it as appear to bear most forcibly upon our subject; and we do so the more willingly because we are happy to find that, while on many disputed points an authority so high bears us out, in no important instance are we contradicted by it.

Extract from the private Diary of Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief of the British Army marching in the Mysore country in the year 1799, *between the* 4*th and* 8*th of April.*

'4*th April.*—Commissioned General Baird to form a party of not less than the flank companies of his brigade, supported by the piquets, to beat up a tope in front of the ground the piquet was on, and said to have had parties of men with arms assembling on it. It appears to me, from the report, they are only intended for rocketing; but our beating them up, instead of their attempting us, will have the best effect, for if our intelligence is true, his whole army are in a complete state of terror—of course we should keep it so.

'5*th April.*—Marched to Seringapatam; rocketed a little on the march. Took up our ground nearly for the siege. Concluded the arrangements for detaching General Floyd and General Stuart. Formed parties for the attack of the post occupied formerly by the Bombay troops, and the tope of Sultaunpettah. Lieut. Colonel Shawe to command the detachment for the Bombay post; Colonel Wellesley that of the tope, as being composed of his own people. Remained under great anxiety till near twelve

at night, from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieut. Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the two native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that in the dark they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, his Majesty's 12th regiment scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near twelve, Colonel Wellesley came to my tent in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion and could not be formed, which was great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. General Baird's expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a small party of the enemy's horse, and cut up eight or ten of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible; no wonder night attacks so often fail.

'6*th April*.—Determined to make another attack on the tope, Lieut. Colonel Bowser's and Halyburton's corps, with the Scotch brigade (supported by the 25th dragoons and 2nd regiment native cavalry, on seeing the Sultaun's cavalry appearing from the fort), were destined to assist in this service, and, with scarcely any opposition, carried it.

'*Sunday the 7th.*—Yesterday evening walked down to the advanced post with Baird and Macleod. Found it very strong against so contemptible an enemy as we have to deal with, and such as may, with a little trouble, be made very strong against any. How fortunate thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands! The fort fired a great deal yesterday, with no other effect than furnishing shot to us. A long line of cavalry coming out of the fort about twelve; reported at three by Colonel Wellesley to have come more round our right, and that he has therefore ordered the battalions we spoke of when looking what they were about, on the road which leads to Periapatam. Our foraging party coming in fast; but this cannot be their object, and they would move more rapidly than they have done. Great many of us much fatigued. Beatson, among the rest, very much relaxed and weak. Our duties pretty severe; but if the whole is not pressed on with vigour we shall fail, for no doubt there will be more difficulties to overcome than we yet foresee.

'*Monday, 8th.*—Visited the post taken possession of by Colonel Wellesley on the 6th inst. Found it a continuation of the nullah which makes Shawe's post, but not so favourable in that part for keeping hold of. Directed a burnt village, on a rise above the nullah, to be made the right hand post, by barricading the streets and cutting down the walls to six feet, thickening them next the fort, and putting a banquette within. Brisk cannonade from the fort. Co-

lonel Close brought Dallas and Hart to speak about the bullock drivers, &c.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Mr. Webbe.

'Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

'My dear Webbe—I have received a letter from Lord Mornington, in which he offers me the command of the troops intended against Batavia, provided Lord Clive can spare me from this country. I have written to Lord Clive upon the subject, a letter which he will probably communicate to you; and I have left to him to accept for me Lord Mornington's offer or not, accordingly as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period at which he would propose to depart from the coast upon this service.

'The probable advantages and credit to be gained are great; but I am determined that nothing shall induce me to desire to quit this country, until its tranquillity is ensured. The general want of troops, however, at the present moment, and the season, may induce the Admiral to be desirous to postpone the expedition till late in the year. In that case it may be convenient that I should accompany him; but I beg, if you have any conversation with Lord Clive, you will assure him, that if it should be in the smallest degree otherwise, I shall be very sorry to go.

'It appears by Lord Mornington's letter to me, that the order for the attempt upon Batavia

comes direct from the King, and that it is reckoned a matter of some importance in England. I think it probable that it will be made; although not immediately, on account of the great want of troops, and the employment already cut out for those we have at command.

'Believe me, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'P.S. I have just received your letter of the 24th, and you will perceive that I have decided upon the offer in the manner that Lord Clive would wish. Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and from the importance of the object, in England, one from which I may derive some credit; but I put all that entirely out of the question, and I leave it to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the public convenience.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

'Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

'My Lord—I have just received a letter from Lord Mornington, by which he offers me the military command of certain troops intended to be sent on an expedition against Batavia, provided your Lordship can spare me from this country.

'I am fully aware of the advantages which may attend, and of the credit which may be gained by the attainment of the object proposed in sending troops to that place; but

under the present circumstances of this country, I cannot express a wish to quit it.

'From the information which your Lordship will have of the time at which Admiral Rainier would prepare to go to Batavia, you will be enabled to judge whether it may possibly be convenient to the public service that I should accompany him. I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will give Lord Mornington an answer, whether I am to be employed on this service or not, according to your Lordship's view of the public interest and convenience, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Earl of Mornington.

'Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

'My dear M.—I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I am very much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of sending me with the Admiral to Batavia. I do not deny that I should like much to go; but you will have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous that I should remain in this country until its tranquillity is ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have desired him to accept your offer for me or

not, as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go with him. I do not know which of the services will answer best; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, than it is at this moment.

'Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government, or that of their allies; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favourable to their views. The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Marhattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not,

it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case before the troops were collected; and although I was certain that it was the only mode of saving this country from being plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord Clive's orders. It was clear that when an army should be collected to oppose a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the government would be committed with that of the Marhattas, and our honour would require that we should go through with the business until that man should be given up to us, or that we should have some adequate security for his good behaviour.

'If, then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may be possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage or of credit to be gained shall induce me to quit this country. Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. The attainment of these might be given in charge to other people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the expedition to Batavia until matters are settled on the Marhatta frontier.

'Ever yours, most affectionately,

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

'Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

'My Lord—I had the honour of writing to you on the 29th instant, after I had received a letter from Lord Mornington upon the same subject with that from your Lordship of the 26th. Since I wrote to you on the 29th, I have received your Lordship's instructions of the 25th, which I am proceeding to put in execution; and I beg leave to decline to accept the command of the troops destined to sail with the squadron under Admiral Rainier.

'When I wrote to your Lordship on the 29th, I imagined that, under the present circumstances, it might have been desirable to postpone to send troops on this service until a late period of the year, when it might possibly have been convenient that I could accompany them; but as it appears that the Admiral will be prepared to sail in three weeks, I cannot think of relinquishing the command with which your Lordship has intrusted me at this interesting period, for any object of advantage or credit to be gained in another place.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract.)

'Fort William, 6th June, 1800.

'My dear Arthur—Lord Clive has pressed for your continuance in Mysore with an earnestness so honourable to you, that I think you can-

not accept the command of the forces destined for Batavia; indeed, I suspect that you could not quit Mysore at present. Your conduct there has secured your character and advancement for the remainder of your life, and you may trust me for making the best use of your merits in your future promotion.

'Ever, my dear Arthur,

'Yours, most affectionately,

'WELLESLEY.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

'On board H. M. S. Suffolk, 21st Feb. 1801.

'My dear General—I have just received a letter from Lord Wellesley, dated the 24th of January, by which I am informed that you are appointed to take the command of the body of troops which have hitherto been under my orders; that you were likely to leave Calcutta for Trincomalee towards the end of the month; and that the object was an expedition against the Dutch settlement in Java. You will probably be much surprised to find that I have left the island of Ceylon with the troops, and have gone towards Bombay: and I write you this letter to explain the motives which urged me to take this step without waiting for orders from the Governor General.

'On the 7th of February, I received from the Governor of Fort St. George a copy of a letter from Mr. Dundas to Lord Wellesley, dated the 6th of October, calling for the co-

operation of a body of troops from India in an attack upon Egypt. As the troops were collected in Ceylon, partly with a view to be prepared to answer this call, I conceived it to be my duty to proceed immediately towards the rendezvous pointed out by Mr. Dundas; and I go to Bombay because I understand that it will not materially retard the arrival of the fleet in the Red Sea; because I know that the troops are in want of provisions, which can be furnished at Bombay only; and because I am desirous of receiving the orders of the Governor General before I proceed finally to the Red Sea.

'In my opinion, the letter from Mr. Dundas, which I have above-mentioned, will make a considerable alteration in the plan which the Governor General had on the 24th of January; and that he will in consequence be obliged either to relinquish the attack upon Batavia entirely, or to provide another body of troops for that purpose. I therefore proceed on my voyage, notwithstanding that I have received his orders of the 24th of January.

'It is true that the number of European troops, called for in Egypt, is not equal to that which I have with me at present, although the number of natives is greater; and I might immediately send back to Trincomalee some of the European troops, in order to give Lord Wellesley an opportunity of sending both expeditions, if he should think it proper. Upon this last notion I must observe, that I do not

think it probable that he will wish to send both expeditions; if he should wish it, I shall know it upon my arrival at Bombay, from the tenor of his orders to Mr. Duncan; and I can immediately send back to Ceylon the troops which it may be intended to employ upon the expedition to Batavia. These will arrive at Ceylon long before the period for sailing will come round.

'As I before observed to you, I do not think it probable that Lord Wellesley would wish to send both expeditions; he will send that to Egypt only: and as I know that it was his intention to give you the command of this body of troops, in case they should go to Egypt, I recommend you to come to Bombay and take the command of them without loss of time. If Lord Wellesley should determine to send both the expeditions, and if he should wish that you should command that to Batavia, you will be with the troops which must go on that service. On the other hand, if he should determine to send troops to Egypt only, you will be late, unless you proceed to Bombay immediately.

'Believe me, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Memorandum on the Operations in the Red Sea.

[Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major Gen. Baird.]

The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—

'1st, To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

'2ndly, To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

'3rdly, To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition; or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

'The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to bedirected,in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

'The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke, and to act on our side. The success of this measure it is evident will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

'From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that after

the Turkish army was beaten by General Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable that when Sir Ralph Abercrombie commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his own sense of his own interests may point out.

'I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes: and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English; and showed his power of doing injury to the French, by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under General Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

'It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him; and from his own experience of their fidelity in

adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence. Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him; and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him; and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

'The possession of the port of Cossier, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English.

'The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

'The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cossier at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

'It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert; they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment which

may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted. It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably no forage: and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which may cross, a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of cattle, and that is the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

'Upon this point, I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which

he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with well-water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

'This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

'It may be imagined that, supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be ex-

pected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

'But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history, from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

'I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke, and to co-operate with us. The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cosseir, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the depôt of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

'On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

'I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent. 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Memorandum upon Operations in the Marhatta Territory.

'1. As before long we may look to a war with the Marhattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the

operations of the army in case of such a war, as I have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Marhattas is that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western Ghauts, fill. This happens generally in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th of June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time.

'The reasons why I think that the most favourable season for operations against the Marhatta nation are as follow:—

'First. The Marhatta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavour to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible, to procure, the fulness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw across a small body, or rather that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army.

'The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers

by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling; and, in fact, they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Marhattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

'Secondly. The Marhatta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain

for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Marhatta territory, and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

'The Marhatta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile, and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time, the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axle-trees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them.

'The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore, or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication.

'The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Marhatta territory; but if its European force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and in any case supplies from thence of the latter.

'It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and

of this there is an abundance everywhere; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

'The means of defending this country are trifling, and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps, Darwar or Kooshgal; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken, if attacked by resolute troops.

'Having thus detailed my observations on the Marhatta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigour, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Marhatta war, commenced in the season which I think most favourable to a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior objects, as might be held out.

'I would propose then to assemble the troops at Chittledroog; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

'The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice

and arrack in the Marhatta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses for arrack and for military stores ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the supply of the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times, without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

'The army being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between those two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogerry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross

the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogerry, and the boats must therefore be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country.

'It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah as a guard for the boats, which otherwise it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

'The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should be from Savanore to Bindigerry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable even in rainy weather.

'In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhow's and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the north-west angle.

'The assailants might move under cover of the back of that tank to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite

the hills above-mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a round work in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalade the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalading the inner wall.

'After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank it is said there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than twenty feet high, and might easily be escaladed. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches.

'At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face.

'There are other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above-mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than twenty feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

'If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same.

'The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above-mentioned, on which the Bhow's batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

'Having by one of these modes got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the depôts in that place.

'The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hullihall, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely.

'Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwaur and Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.

'The river Malpoorba is more rapid than

the Werdah or the Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gulpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which on this route is worthy of attention is Belgaon; this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaon lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaon, otherwise it will be useless.

'The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about seventy or eighty miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

'After the enemy should have been driven across the Gulpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Malpoorba,

somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

'*Jan.*, 1801.—Since the commencement of this memorandum was written, the Company have got possession of the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Marhattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

'1st. The treaties by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, have allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Marhattas, which might create a necessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Marhattas.

'2ndly. The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam's army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Marhatta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army

of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness's frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Marhattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries immediately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Marhatta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence.

'There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

'1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Marhatta territory; a body of Marhatta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within sixty miles of Seringapatam, without the chance of danger or molestation.

'2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the Western Ghauts, as far as Koorg; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company's dependents in those provinces would take arms.

'3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves, are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn,

when it enters the Marhatta territory; and this rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

'4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra (suppose at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah of the detachments of the enemy which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

'In case it should be determined to enter the enemy's country by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam's army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are above thirty-five feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is a flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escaladed with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway also, on the north

face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

'The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather; but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there are about twenty miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned.

'If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

'Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly to Darwar. This place is strong from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground. There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by two walls, two ditches, a covert way, and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face there is a dam of some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch.

'It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other man-

ner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah.

'Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

'Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 15th instant, enclosing the copy of one which you had written to Lieut. Colonel Collins on that day.

'When I heard the report that the northern Marhatta chiefs intended to confederate, for the purpose of obstructing the Treaty of Bassein between the Honorable Company and his Highness the Peshwah, I was of opinion that it was necessary for the British government to lose no time in bringing those chiefs to a decision whether there should be peace or war, and in obliging each of them to place his troops in their ordinary position.

'The grounds of this opinion were that two of the chiefs at least were in a state of determined and inveterate hostility against each other, which it would require time to pacify. The season in which the rivers fill was approaching, during which the Marhatta armies find it difficult to carry on operations; and some of the most valuable of the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be exposed to our attacks. On the other hand, the rivers would cover the territories of the Com-

pany and of their allies, in a great degree, from the incursions of the Marhatta horse, and would protect our convoys.

'The most proper time, therefore, to press Dowlut Rao Scindiah to decide whether he would remain at peace with the Company, and to induce him to withdraw his army to Hindustan, as the only proof which he could give of his pacific intentions, would have been in the month of May; and as it appears that the peace between that chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not yet concluded, and at all events that Holkar is not yet united in councils with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it is very probable that if Scindiah had been obliged to decide between peace and immediate hostility, he would have found himself under the necessity of adopting the former alternative. Since that period, six weeks of valuable time have elapsed; during which some progress must have been made in pacifying the hostility between Scindiah and Holkar, and in uniting their councils. We have gained nothing: on the contrary, we have consumed our resources, and the supposed enemy is nearer to the frontier which we have to defend than he was. But still, to bring the question of peace or war to an immediate issue is attended with many advantages. It is certain that the councils of the chiefs are not yet united. Holkar's army is to the northward of the Taptee; and supposing him to be inclined to hostility with the Company, which I think there is reason to doubt, it is not

possible that he can bring his forces to co-operate with those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for a length of time. The swelling of the rivers still exposes to an attack many valuable points in Scindiah's possession, and protects the territories of the Company and those of their allies, and the convoys going to the British armies.

'It is obvious, however, that every day's delay to bring Scindiah to a decision, and to force him to give the only proof of his pacific intentions, deprives us of part of these advantages; and therefore no time should be lost.

'The declarations which have been drawn from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in their letters to the Governor General, are favourable, so far as they deprive those chiefs of their favourite pretence of hostility, viz., the injury they apprehended from the treaty of Bassein. They prove also most clearly, that the chiefs are aware of the disadvantages under which they will labour by the immediate commencement of hostilities.

'According to these sentiments, and finding by your letter of the 10th instant that you agreed in opinion with me, I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a letter, a copy and translation of which have been already transmitted to you, and one to Lieutenant Colonel Collins, of which also you have a copy. You will observe that in the former I have apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah of my intention to take advantage of the position of the Company's troops to attack

his possessions, if he should advance one step towards the Nizam's frontier after the receipt of my letter; or if I found that he did not withdraw his troops to their usual stations north of the river Nerbudda.

'I have not fixed when he should withdraw: First, because I wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities will be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary: Secondly, there is every reason to expect instructions from the Governor General, applicable to the present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe. His Excellency must have received by the 20th of June the dispatches from England of the month of March, the intelligence of my march from Poonah, of the state of affairs at the Peshwah's durbar at that period, and of the state of the negotiation with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the end of May. Excepting that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made a pacific declaration, the sincerity of which must be doubted as long as their actions are not conformable thereto; that those chiefs have approached nearer to the Nizam's frontier; that more progress has been made in effecting the pacification between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Holkar, and more of the resources of the British troops have been consumed,—circumstances are nearly in the state in which they were at the period of which the Governor General then received accounts.

'By avoiding to fix a day on which Scindiah must retire, I have it in my power to alter my course of action, in conformity to these instructions, in case that measure should be necessary.

'I have the honour to be, &c.,

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to his Excellency General Lake.

'Camp at Sangwee on the Seenah,
'29th July, 1803.

'Sir,—You will have received copies of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General addressed to me on the 26th and 27th ultimo, by which you will have been made acquainted with the means by which his Excellency proposed to bring to a close the important questions at present depending with the northern Marhatta chiefs.

'I had long been of opinion that the only mode by which those questions could be brought to a close was to urge forward the decision whether there should be peace or war. This opinion was founded upon the knowledge I had that the territories of the Company and the allies would be protected, during the monsoon, by the temporary swelling of the rivers which rise in the western ghauts; that several important points in the territories of our enemies were exposed to our attacks during the same period; and that from the nature of their troops and mode of warfare compared with ours, that season was most unfavourable to

their operations, and, although inconvenient in some respects, most favourable to ours. As soon, therefore, as I received the Governor General's instructions of the 26th June, I wrote to Colonel Collins to desire that he would call upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to separate their armies, and retire to their own territories from the position which they had taken up contiguous to the Nizam's frontier, and to withdraw from their camp if he should find them disinclined to attend to this requisition. I had previously written to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject, and had given him every assurance which he had required in his different conferences with Colonel Collins upon points which he stated that he entertained doubts; and from the result of different conferences between Scindiah's ministers and Colonel Collins's native servants, I am induced to hope that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will retire to their respective territories. In one in particular which Colonel Collins's moonshee had with Scindiah's ministers on the 24th, it appeared that he was not confident in the strength and power of the confederates to contend with the British Government, although he had been the person most anxious to form the confederacy; and he appeared to prefer the disgrace and advantage of a retreat at the present moment, of the extent of which he was perfectly aware, to the risk to be incurred in a contest with the British Government.

'But although the confederates may promise

to break up and retire, it will not answer to allow them to delay that measure: particularly as, if they should not be sincere in their intentions to perform their promise, we shall lose the advantages which we now hold. I have, therefore, this day written to Colonel Collins to desire that he will write to apprize them, that if they do not separate and retire to their own territories on the day after they receive that letter, I shall commence operations in this quarter; and that I should acquaint your Excellency, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of this my intention, and of the circumstances which had occasioned it.

'The troops under my command are stationed as follows:—the Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, are posted at Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my immediate command, including about 3000 Marhatta horse, and 2000 excellent horse belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, are at Sangwee upon the Seenah, about twenty miles south eastward from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah: there are two battalions of native infantry under the command of Colonel Murray at Poonah.

'In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to make any impression on Guzerat; but since the troops in that province have been placed under my command, I have not been able to get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal en-

trance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our troops; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat north of the Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah.

'The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of Holkar's army is to the northward of the river Taptee; his troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

'Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 20,000 horse, 6000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear of the Adjuntee pass near the Nizam's territories.

'Scindiah has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjuntee hills.

'My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam's army upon the defensive upon his highness's frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.

'As the passes through the Adjuntee hills are difficult, particularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy have, it is probable that Colonel Stevenson may be able to succeed in preventing them from deploying their force

on this side of the hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the Godavery.

'The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and after having got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render necessary.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Memorandum.

'6th August, 1803.

'His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein with the Honourable Company a treaty, by which the British government bound itself to defend his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should attack him.

'The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this treaty, which is purely defensive; and it contains an express stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to attack the great Marhatta jaghiredars, unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies.

'Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British government to give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud: subsequently, when informed that the relations between the

Honourable Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd of March, to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities against the British government or its allies.

'Notwithstanding this declaration, accounts reached the British government, from various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined with the Rajah of Berar, and with other Chiefs, for the purpose of hostility against the British government and its allies.

'The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th of May; and that Chief was called upon to state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and other Chiefs; and was called upon to retire with his troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to the British government or its allies.

'In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British resident, that until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, he could not decide whether there should be "peace or war;" but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united Chiefs, as soon as their meeting should take place.

'The Chiefs met in the neighbourhood of Mulkapoor on the 3rd of June; and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just demands of the British government till the 8th of July.

'Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or their allies, or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the Honourable Company would not prevent the execution of the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and those Chiefs: they still, however, manifested an intention of advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his Highness's boundary.

'Major General Wellesley therefore, on the 14th of July, wrote a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprized that Chief, that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the Rajah of Berar, and if both Chiefs did not retire with their troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when the united Chiefs should have retired: but he informed them, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain with

their troops in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, Major General Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their possessions; an event which he most anxiously deprecated.

'Major General Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, "that it was not consistent with the treaty of Bassein, or the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty;" and, therefore, he might be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his government.

'Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared themselves to be satisfied with this declaration; and the former acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major General Wellesley, that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they usually occupy; but instead of retiring with their troops, these Chiefs have persevered to retain the position which they took up for the purposes of hostility against the British government and their allies; and they have written letters to propose to Major General Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the rights and territories of the allies; while they should keep their troops united in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, and in readiness to take ad-

vantage of the absence of the troops of the British government and its allies, to carry into execution their hostile designs.

'Major General Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, peace on terms of equality, and honourable to all parties: they have preferred war, and they alone must be considered responsible for the consequences.

'Under these circumstances Major General Wellesley is obliged to commence operations against them, in order to secure the interests of the British government and its allies.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

'My Lord,—I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

'I was near Colonel Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command

* M. Dupont.

on the 24th in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route round the hills between Budnapoor and Julna.

'On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

'I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

'We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the

British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

'The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack: it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

'Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last-formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands ninety pieces of cannon.

'The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great; and in that of Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted. I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops: they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

'I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Harness and Lieutenant Colonel Wal-

lace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades; and to all the officers of the staff for the assistance I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them.

'I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

'The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuntee Ghaut, and I propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns and wounded in security.

'Colonel Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Memorandum on the Battle of Assye,
Subsequently transmitted.

'1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack, is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up

the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ as hircarrahs the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

'2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun.

'I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Colonel Stevenson their right.

'Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to Assye, where was its left; it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

'3. My march of the 23rd was so directed, as that I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnoitred. I could not have reconnoitred without taking the whole of my small force; and when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

'4. When I found the intelligence I received

at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning according to the plan.

'5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it.

'During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

'6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night.

'I therefore determined to make the attack.

'7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed; from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and consequently my coming too near them on the 23rd with my camp, baggage, &c.

'8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan.

'The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Pepulgaon and Warsor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Pepulgaon.

'I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

'9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Pepulgaon: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

'10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat.

'Orders were given accordingly.

'11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the

right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the second line, and were ordered to support the piquets, followed them.

'There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regiment we sustained the greatest part of our loss.

'One company of the piquets, of one officer and 50 rank and file, lost one officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

'12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost; it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

'13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon by the centre

and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

'14. The annexed plan is correct, excepting in the following instances: 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward—it ought to be where I have marked in pencil. 2ndly, the formation of the Marhatta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna; and the 74th was not in an echellon, as represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

'N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses. 'A. W.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.

'Camp at Cherikain, 1st November, 1803.

'My dear Munro,—As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. Before you will receive this, you

will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jalna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary,—first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended, that if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than eight miles. As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous, that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who

were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

'The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun. I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry was about to follow, but was still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if it remained still upon the ground. I apprized Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

'When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning; and at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp, in which they should know it was: I therefore determined upon the attack immediately.

'It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on: but some were; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

'Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one-half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the picquets which were on the right of the first line.

'When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the picquets to keep out of shot from that village; instead of that, he led

directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the picquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies. Another evil which resulted from this mistake, was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the picquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

'After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made.

'However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the picquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge, that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against Assye.

'After the action, there was no pursuit, be-

cause our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

'Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

'The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never stopped till they had got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men. I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I

knew that the enemy had passed the Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference. Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry Ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjuntee Ghaut, and stopped Scindiah. Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army. I ascended the Ghaut on the 25th, and have marched a hundred and twenty miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If that is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there.

'But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have anything to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

'Believe me, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. H. Wellesley.

'Camp 50 miles North of Aurungabad,
'3rd Oct. 1803.

'My dear Henry,—I wrote to you on the 17th of September, and since that time I have completely defeated the enemy, and have taken from them ninety-eight pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, &c. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor General on the subject, which will give you an idea of the action.

'I have little to add thereto, excepting to tell you, that Scindiah's French infantry were far better than Tippoo's, his artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could use Tippoo's. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, was the most severe that ever was fought in this country; and I believe such a quantity of cannon, and such advantages have seldom been gained by any single victory in any part of the world. The enemy had twelve hundred men killed on the field of battle, and I suppose about four times that number wounded. They plundered one another after the action, and many of their troops have deserted—the whole have fled to Burhampoor, about eighty miles from hence, in the greatest confusion.

'I lost two horses. Diomed (Colonel Aston's horse, who has carried me in so many campaigns) piked, and another horse shot under me. Almost all the staff had their horses either killed or wounded, or were struck in some place or other.

'In the enclosed letter, I only report ninety pieces of cannon taken; but when I dispatched it, I did not know the extent of our gains. In fact, I believe we took one hundred and two, but we destroyed some, and there is a mistake respecting the number; I know there are ninety-eight.

'Holkar has hitherto taken no part in the war, and I fancy that he will now remain neutral.

'I intend to move forward immediately. I have been detained hitherto by the difficulty of providing a secure place for my wounded soldiers; but I have got one at last; Colonel Stevenson, with the Nizam's army, is pushing the enemy forward.

'I am well supplied with every thing. I have already got some of the enemy's supplies, and I have great hopes that I shall get more.

'Ever your's affectionately,

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'*Treaty of Peace between the Honourable English India Company and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the part of the Honourable Company and their Allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, on the part of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.*

'Deogaum, 17th December, 1803.

'Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Com-

pany and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other.

'Art. 2.—Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the post and district of Balasore.

'Art. 3.—He likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories of which he has collected the revenues in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession, which are to the westward of the river Wurda.

'Art. 4.—It is agreed that the frontier of Senah Saheb Soubah, towards the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, shall be formed to the west by the river Wurda, from its issue from the Injardy hills to its junction with the Godavery. The hills on which are the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur are to be in the possession of Senah Saheb Soubah; and everything south of those hills, and to the west of the river Wurda, is to belong to the British Government and their Allies.

'Art. 5.—Districts amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum, contiguous to, and to the south of, the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur, are to be given over to Senah Saheb Soubah. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major

General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and delivered over to Senah Saheb Soubah at the same time with the forts.

'Art. 6.—Senah Saheb Soubah, for himself, his heirs and successors, entirely renounces all claims of every description on the territories of the British Government and their Allies, ceded by the second, third, and fourth articles, and on all the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

'Art. 7.—The Honourable Company engage that they will mediate and arbitrate, according to the principles of justice, any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the Honourable Company's Allies, Secunder Jah Behauder, his successors, and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, his heirs and successors respectively, and Senah Saheb Soubah.

'Art. 8.—Senah Saheb Soubah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the Government of which may be at war with the British Government; or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British Government. The Honourable Company engage, on their part, that they will not aid or countenance any discontented relations, Rajahs, Zemindars, or other subjects of Senah Saheb Soubah, who may fly from or rebel against his authority.

'Art. 9.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the Governments, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

'Art. 10.—Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with feudatories of Senah Saheb Soubah. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to Senah Saheb Soubah, when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

'Art. 11.—Senah Saheb Soubah hereby renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and other Marhatta Chiefs, to attack the Honourable Company and their Allies. He engages not to assist those Chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

'Art. 12.—This treaty of peace is to be ratified by Senah Saheb Soubah within eight days from this time, and the ratification of it is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are to be delivered, and the troops are to withdraw. Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and

that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.
'JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER,
on the part of
'SENAH SAHEB SOUBAH.

'*Done in Camp at Deogaum, this 17th December, 1803, answering to the 2d Ramzaum, 1213, Fuzale.*

(A true copy.) 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th December, 1803.

'MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose the English, Marhatta, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace, which I have this day concluded with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.

'I have made the treaty in the name of the British Government and its Allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the Allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it, will become sufficiently obvious, when the character and conduct of the Government of these Allies are recollected.

'It will remain with your Excellency to give such orders as you may think proper to the Residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the Allies to this treaty. But I should

imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your Excellency's ratification.

'The cessions under the treaty are made to the British Government and its Allies; and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rajah shall ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter; but I shall request the Resident at Hyderabad to apprise his Highness's ministers that it must be considered only a temporary arrangement; and that all the acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace will be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

'I wished to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttack, but I had no information upon the subject. Lieut. Colonel Harcourt stated his opinion, that it would be convenient if the districts of Sohnpore and Boad were ceded, besides Cuttack; and Mr. Melville his, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttack countries which would have joined the northern circars with the province of Bundelcund. But upon reference to the map, which is all the information that I could procure, I found that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand, on that side, to such a degree as to make it necessary to give up a

part of what I demanded on this side, or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether.

'I learn also, by a late letter from Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rajahs of Sohnpore and Boad; and if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company's territories, under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. If he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttack the boundary which Lieut. Colonel Harcourt wished; but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

'By the 3d article, the Company and their Allies gain, on this side, the whole province of Berar, and the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan will be carried forward to the Wurda river. The countries thus ceded are old possessions of the Soubah of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by them and the Rajah of Berar, in different proportions at different times. When the latter were admitted to a participation of them, they received one-fifth, afterwards a fourth, then half, by treaty; and latterly, four-fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rajah of Berar entirely from this fine country, than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttack.

'The revenues of Berar, on this side of the Wurda, are computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rajah had appropriated entirely to himself countries, the revenues of

which are computed to have been ten lacs of rupees; and the remainder, under different treaties, was to be divided equally between him and the Soubah of the Deccan. However, I have reason to believe, from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rajah of Berar never received more than thirty lacs as his share of the countries on this side of the Wurda.

'Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Scindiah; but whatever may be the real value of the acquisition, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rajah towards the Soubah of the Deccan; and by his renunciation of all claims, of every description, not only on the countries ceded, but on the other territories of the Soubah.

'In the course of the conferences in the negotiation, the minutes of which I shall have the honour of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rajah's minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territory.

'By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rajah shall have possession of the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur. In fact, these forts are of greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains, than to that which possesses the plains. Without them the Rajah could not have exercised the

powers of his government over the Goondwanah Rajahs in those mountains, a race of people who, above all others, require restraint; and to have given them to the Soubah of the Deccan would have added nothing to his Highness's power.

'I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains, immediately under the hills, will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills. The loss to the Soubah's government will be but trifling, in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rajah were not interested, as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

'The 7th article provides that the Honourable Company are to arbitrate between the Rajah and the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah. The Rajah's minister was desirous that I should consent to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by those powers; but I refused this, on the ground that I could not consent to any thing of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British government and its justice, as the best security the Rajah could have for his claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah; which proposal was accepted.

'The territory which the Rajah wished to secure by this demand was the province of Gurah-Mundela, of which he ought to collect the revenues in participation with the Peshwah;

but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use.

'At all events, it appears to me to be an important point gained, and highly honourable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice, against the demands of its allies. There was no objection on the part of the Rajah's minister to the 8th or 9th article of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

'The 10th article is one of considerable importance. The Rajah's minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rajah, and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said, that after ceding Berar and Cuttack, the Rajah had no territories excepting what he had conquered from the zemindars, rajahs, &c.; and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his territories. I told him, that whatever might be the consequence, the article was indispensable, and must be agreed to; that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British government had wished for the destruction of the Rajah's state; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government; and I promised him that the British government would apply it to as few cases as was possible, consistently with an adherence to good faith.

'The vakeel was satisfied with this assurance, which I requested him to convey to the Rajah; as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his durbar will have the strongest objections.

'I had demanded an hostage for the performance of the 11th article of the treaty; but upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me, that the best security the British government could have, would be its strength and continued success, and I had therefore determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the vakeel said that the Rajah would send to me whomever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son, or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might possibly be a security against his hostility.

'It appeared to me that he would not consent to send either of those persons, and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply, and which might have risked the whole treaty.

'I hope that your Excellency will approve of, and ratify this treaty. It appears to me to provide for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rajah's government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar is as poor as the other Marhatta chieftains.

'I have written to Mr. Webbe, to inform him that I have signed this treaty; and to request him to prepare to set out for Nagpoor as soon as possible. In the mean time, I propose to send the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone to the Rajah to act as Resident, till the arrival of Mr. Webbe.

'In case your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or me, according to circumstances; as I might be at a great distance, and the ratification might not reach the Rajah in the time specified.

'Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Marhatta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Rajah Mohiput Ram.

'23rd December, 1803.

'I have to inform you that I have concluded a treaty of peace with the vakeel of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, which has been ratified by that chief, and the ratifications have been delivered to me this day.

'By the 3d article of that treaty of peace, Senah Saheb Soubah has consented to cede to the British government and their allies all his rights and interests, and all the territories which he may possess which are to the westward of the river Wurda, and to the southward of the hills on which are situated the forts of Nernullah and Gawilghur.

'His boundary, therefore, in future towards the Soubah of the Deccan, will be the Wurda river and the hills above-mentioned. I have to request that you will make the following arrangements to take possession of, and settle those countries in the name of the allied governments. You will bear in mind that, from their situation, it is probable that they will be hereafter the possession of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan solely; but it is impossible to settle that point definitively, till peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

'First, You will appoint a sirdar to take possession of the countries, in whose ability and integrity you can confide. Let me know the name of the person on whom you will fix,

in order that I may insert it in the proclamation, of which No. 1 is a copy.

'Secondly, You will place under the command of this sirdar a sufficient body of horse and foot to enable him to perform the service intrusted to him, and to drive out the enemy's pindarries, who may be expected to remain here for some time. I will appoint some British troops to remain in the country and assist those of his Highness.

'Thirdly, You are to give orders to this sirdar to circulate proclamation No. 2, and he must conduct himself in every respect in the manner pointed out in the proclamation. If I should learn that he has been guilty of any oppression, or that he has persecuted any person because such person has formerly been the subject, or has rendered services to Ragojee Bhoonslah during the war, I shall desire you to deprive this sirdar of his office; and shall make to the Court of Hyderabad a complaint of you and of him; and I shall particularly desire that he may never be employed again.

'In the arrangements which I have thus requested you to make, you will observe a fresh mark of my confidence in you, and of my desire to act in a manner that will be agreeable to the Soubah of the Deccan; and I hope that, in carrying them into execution, you will take care to act in such manner as will justify the confidence I place in you, and will be honour-

able to the British Government and its allies, and particularly to the Soubah of the Deccan.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'Camp, 30th December, 1803.

'My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have this day concluded, with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signed, a treaty of peace; copies of which, in the English, Persian, and Marhatta languages, I have the honour to enclose.

'This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British Government and its Allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

'By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah's government; or, supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company's government, such an influence will be established in his as will render it very improbable

that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

'By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to the Honourable Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

'Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are three pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have never been carried into the dufters under the head of lands in Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah's house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

'Besides these pergunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 7th article, are to remain in the hands of their present possessors, under the protection of the British government; and the British government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its option, to sirdars to be

named by Scindiah, to the amount of seventeen lacs of rupees, including the value of those jaghires to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

'It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindiah's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival, Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his armies, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries; and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah's service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your Excellency's policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah's durbar which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance.

'Upon the whole, therefore, I hope that your

Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about fourteen lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

'The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency's attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the treaty; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a subsidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty.

'In the course of this war, Scindiah's power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished; while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war; and I have little doubt but that the contest between those Chiefs will be revived.

'This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavour to avoid the contest, which I do not

think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival.

'Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party to the general defensive alliance; and as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue.

'I was induced to make this last engagement, by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive; and that if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is insured so far as it can be by human means.

'I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue, such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him.

'Upon this point I have likewise to observe, that supposing Scindiah should agree to the

treaty of defensive alliance, the diminution of receipt to the Company will be of eight lacs of rupees annually, if his Highness the Peshwah be admitted to participate equally with the Company and the Nizam, in the benefits of the war; and twelve and a half lacs of rupees if his Highness the Nizam only should be admitted to that participation.

'I have sanguine hopes, therefore, that your Excellency will approve of this article of the peace.

'By the cession of Baroach the Company will gain a clear revenue of ten lacs of rupees annually, and a valuable territory in a commercial point of view.

'I ordered that the hill fort of Powanghur might be destroyed, when I determined to return that conquest to Scindiah. My motives for returning the conquests in that part of India, and Asseerghur and Burhampoor in the Deccan, are explained to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 11th of November; and although I intend to endeavour to retain possession of Powanghur and Dohud in the negotiation of the treaty of general defensive alliance, in exchange for land elsewhere, I am still of opinion that, without making some sacrifices, I could not have peace; and these places appeared to me to be of less consequence than any of the other conquests which the British troops had made.

'The territories restored in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur are the ancient family

lands of Scindiah; and your Excellency will perceive, in the minutes of the conferences which will be sent as soon as they can be copied, the great anxiety to retain their lands. They have been returned, therefore, under a particular stipulation, that no armed men are ever to be kept in them.

'I did every thing in my power to retain the lands of which I took possession upon the capture of Ahmednuggur, as I wished to exclude Scindiah entirely from the Deccan; but as the lands are really his family property, to have kept them would have occasioned a personal inconvenience, which your Excellency would have been desirous to remove; and the restoration of them is accompanied by a stipulation which I hope will prevent the bad consequences attending his having any lands in those countries.

'There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah's government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the British government. From the different accounts,

however, which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British government, would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Marhattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the British government would derive no additional security.

'I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by which your Excellency's object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others, they are left to their fate.

'There was not much difficulty in arranging the other articles of the peace. There were some objections to the 12th article, founded upon the necessity of Scindiah's performing the duties of his office of vakeel ul Mutuluk, which, however, were easily overcome.

'In negotiating this treaty, I have received the greatest assistance from Mr. Elphinstone, and, since he arrived in camp, from Major Malcolm; indeed, the acquaintance of the latter with your Excellency's sentiments upon all political questions, and his own political knowledge and abilities, have enabled me to conclude this difficult treaty in a manner which I hope will be satisfactory to your Excellency.

'I have requested Major Malcolm to pre-

pare to go to Scindiah's camp, as soon as I shall have received the ratification of the treaty. By a residence there for some time, he will be enabled to settle with that Chief the treaty of general defensive alliance, if it should be possible to arrange it; or, at all events, to acquire a knowledge of the characters at his durbar, and of the state of his remaining military resources.

'In case your Excellency should think it proper to ratify this treaty, it will be best to send one copy of the ratification to Major Kirkpatrick, to be forwarded to Major Malcolm; and one to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to be forwarded through Hindustan; as one of the objects of Major Malcolm's attention will be to communicate with his Excellency by a dawk.

'I propose to desire the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan to take possession of Scindiah's territories, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace. In respect to the other territories, they will remain to be disposed of, according to the orders which I may receive from your Excellency.

'I have the honour to be, &c.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Treaty of Peace between the Honourable English India Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the other; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the part of the Honourable Company and their Allies, and

by Eitel Mahadeo, Moonshee Kaval Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Ameer-ool-Omrah, and Naroo Hurry, on the part of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

'Surjee Anjengaum, 30th Dec., 1803.

'Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the other.

'Art. 2.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Dooab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; of which territories, &c., a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

'Art. 3.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon, and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon; excepting those lands which it is agreed by article 8th of this treaty that the Maharajah is to retain.

'Art. 4.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to

the Honourable Company and their Allies, all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnahpoor, the town and district of Gundapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

'Art. 5.—The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights, and interests, ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles; and all claims of every description upon the British Government and their Allies, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Peshwah, and Anund Rao Guickwar.

'Art. 6.—The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Burhampoor, the forts of Powanghur and Dohud, and the territories in Candeish and Guzerat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'Art. 7.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum, as a gift from the kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; and that lands in Hindustan, ceded by the 2nd article of this treaty to the Honourable Company and their Allies, are held in jaghire

by persons of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and others by principal sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: It is agreed that the Maharajah shall continue to hold, and enjoy in enaum, the lands of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah; and that Bala Baye Sahib, and Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire, under the protection of the Honourable Company; and further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall either pay pensions, or grant lands in jaghire, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other sirdars, and others to be named by the Maharajah; provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jaghires granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lacs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands which it is agreed by this article that Bala Baye Sahib, Munsoor Sahib, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, or the other lands held in jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

'Art. 8.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut

Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum certain lands or villages, &c. [51 *villages, &c. specified*] in the territories of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, which have lately been taken possession of by the British Government and their Allies: it is agreed that those lands and villages shall be restored to him; provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages, under pretence of collecting the revenues, or any other pretence whatever.

'Art. 9.—Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These treaties are to be confirmed; and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made; and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildars, or have been applicable as surinjamy to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

'Art. 10.—No person whatever is to be mo-

lested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

'Art. 11.—It is agreed that the rights of his Highness the Peshwah to certain lands in Malwa and elsewhere shall be established as heretofore; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the Honourable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide according to the principles of justice, between his Highness and the Maharajah; and whatever may be thus decided shall be agreed to by both parties, and will be carried into execution.

'Art. 12.—The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah hereby renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Alum, and engages on his part to interfere no further in the affairs of his Majesty.

'Art. 13.—The Maharajah Ali Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government, or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British government.

'Art. 14.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed, that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

'Art. 15.—The Honourable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance

with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun; to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof; and the Honourable Company, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah's territories, engage, in the event of his agreeing to the treaty above-mentioned in two months, to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, &c.; and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the lands ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah's government to decline to enter into the treaty above-mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this treaty of peace; which are in every respect to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs, and successors.

'Art. 16.—This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and the ratifications shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months, or sooner if possible.

'The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace; but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud are not to be delivered up till accounts shall have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharajah's officers and troops.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.
'EITEL MAHADEO.
'KAVEL NYN.
'JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH.
'NAROO HURRY.'

THE END.

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